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''BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS"?: 
CHALLENGES AND LIMITS OF 
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP 
PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES 
Joel B. Eisen* 
As one of the most important current topics in environmental law, 
the redevelopment of abandoned or underutilized urban properties, bet-
ter known as brownfields, continues to generate much discussion and 
debate. Because most agree that abandoned sites located in aging areas 
and the accompanying exodus of industry to the suburbs are undesir-
able, the federal government and many state governments have created 
programs to encourage the redevelopment of these industrial properties. 
But often overlooked by the advocates of such programs are the diffi-
cult political, scientific, and moral questions associated with 
redevelopment. 
In this insightful article, Professor Eisen provides the most com-
prehensive discussion to date of brownfield programs that often ex-
change increased health risks to the surrounding community for 
additional jobs and higher tax revenue. He then draws an analogy be-
tween brownfield redevelopment programs and negotiated compensa-
tion statutes, which were created to facilitate the siting of hazardous and 
solid waste disposal facilities but have experienced only limited success. 
Finally, after exposing the shortcomings of the current brownfield pro-
grams through this analogy, Professor Eisen concludes that adequate 
community input and a revision of CERCLA are but two of the many 
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changes that must be made in order to increase the public legitimacy of 
brownfield redevelopment programs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The optimism and good intentions of proponents of redeveloping 
"brownfields"-the abandoned, contaminated sites in aging industrial 
cities-mask political, scientific, and moral questions that state volun-
tary cleanup programs and federal incentives fail to address. The goal 
of brownfield redevelopment programs is laudable, for few would 
contend that it is desirable to let a brownfield site remain abandoned.1 
State and federal programs offer a variety of incentives for developers 
to make productive use of brownfield sites. The most prominent ap-
proaches are those of state voluntary cleanup statutes that attempt to 
alleviate developers' fears of liability under environmental laws if they 
undertake cleanup and redevelopment activities. States offer relaxed 
cleanup standards, streamlined administrative procedures, and re-
1. Johnine J. Brown, Brownfield Reform: Steering the Boat Without Any Oars, ILL. 
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1995, at 14, puts it rather pungently: "(L]etting a brownfield sit around 
looking ugly and dangerous is about as desirable as finding yet another day-time talk show listed 
in TV Guide." 
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leases from future liability to spur developers to clean up and reuse 
brownfield sites. 
The rise of state voluntary cleanup statutes is consistent with the 
trend of devolving responsibility for environmental protection to the 
states2 and has the EPA's tentative endorsement.3 Thus, the statutes 
are here to stay, and proponents already claim a track record of suc-
cess.4 But the statutes are too new for their overall effectiveness to be 
measured accurately, and they face many obstacles in fulfilling their 
proponents' expectations over the long run. There has been little crit-
ical analysis of these first steps irt promoting remediation and reuse of 
brownfield sites. This article attempts to fill that gap by focusing at-
tention on the complex issues raised by the voluntary cleanup statutes 
and federal programs. 
The statutes . envision voluntary cleanups that trade increased 
health risks to the affected community for the prospect of new jobs 
and higher tax revenues. This raises issues about the democratic na-
ture of the process, particularly with respect to participation by the 
affected community.5 Relaxing the rigorous cleanup standards of cur-
rent laws also shifts risks to the affected community.6 Some states link 
cleanup standards to anticipated future uses of brownfield sites, which 
may add to cumulative risks borne by urban communities.7 This ren-
ders a brownfield redevelopment project morally troublesome unless 
the affected community voluntarily approves of it. However, the stat-
utes give communities little ability to do this,8 putting brownfield de-
velopers on a collision course with the environmental justice 
movement.9 
The states' involvement raises troubling political issues. There is 
genuine room for concern about the states' ability to oversee volun-
tary cleanups. When they implement voluntary cleanup programs, 
2. See infra notes 640-59 and accompanying text . 
. 3. See, e.g., Superfund Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 219"20 (June 15, 1995) (testimony of Timothy Fields, Jr., Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (here-
inafter Fields Testimony]; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORffiES, GErnNG 
RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 86 (1995) (hereinaf-
ter NAPA REPORT) (stating that the trend toward state management of brownfield sites is "en-
couraged in part by EPA"). 
4. See infra notes 477-78 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 513-639 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 529-34 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra note 533 and accompanying text. 
8. The statutes are largely bereft of provisions for effective public participation in deter-
mining the fate of an individual brownfield site. See infra notes 382-94 and accompanying text. 
9. The communities where brownfields are located are typically lower-income and minor-
ity communities. As a result, the brownfield programs raise fundamental questions about the 
distributional consequences of a development project that might place an industrial facility in a 
lower-income or minority neighborhood. These issues are largely unaddressed in current pro-
grams. See infra notes 513-639 and accompanying text. 
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states often substitute standardized statewide solutions (developed 
with industry input) for local, site-specific decisions; this gives devel-
opers the potential to influence state regulators and reject community 
input in critical decisions.10 In many cases, when developers under-
take voluntary cleanups, they will act with little or no state .oversight; 
the state will often confine its role . to confirming the soungpes~ "-of 
what a developer has already done. 11 If this leads to inadequate or 
ineffective cleanups, the public will continue to be at risk. 
The image of cooperation in cleanups raises an added dimension 
of moral hazard. Voluntary cleanup statutes promise to reward devel-
opers that evince an intent to cooperate with regulators and communi-
ties. If a developer is not required to provide full disclosure about 
project risks and benefits, however, it may engage in, dishonest behav-
ior; for example, it may withhold important information that might 
damage a project's chances for success. Moreover, not all developers 
are "good actors"; some cannot-and should not-be trusted, due to 
their shoddy environmental records.12 
Assuming these obstacles can be overcome, the eventual impact 
of'the statutes is unclear. The statutes are being oversold as a panacea 
for urban redevelopment. States are relaxing the requirements of the 
environmental laws, with little empirical analysis of the statutes' po-
tential for spurring job creation and revitalization.13 Other factors, 
such as high crime rates, may hamper redevelopment activities. The 
statutes alter the market dynamics at an individual site, which assumes 
that piecemeal, site-specific urban development is appropriate. This 
may turn out to be inaccurate.14 Moreover; the states cannot fully 
reduce or eliminate the fear of environmental liability associated with 
brownfield cleanups. Because federal liability is a main concern of 
developers, only the Congress or the EPA can address this issue, by 
amending CERCLA or expanding administrative programs to rele~se 
developers from CERCLA liability.15 Legislation pending· in Con-
gress would exempt a developer from federal liability if it cleans up a 
brownfield site in an "approved" voluntary cleanup program.16 
Therefore, the EPA's ability to approve or reject a state's program, if 
10. For example, some states plan to establish statewide health standards for site cleanups. 
Developers can sway cleanup decisions for years to eome by influencing .the development of 
these standards. See infra note 581 and accompanying text. 
11. Given the lack of state resources to devote to oversight, the states will often-and 
intend to-find themselves rubber-stamping developers' decisions. See infra notes 654-59 and 
accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 668-76 and accompanying text. 
13. Even with voluntary cleanup programs in place, redevelopment may not happen for a 
variety of reasons. See infra notes 677-94 and accompanying text. 
14. Without regionwide economic development planning, developers may continue to flee 
to greenfield locations, regardless of the incentives in a voluntary cleanup program. See infra 
notes 679-81 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 683-94 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text. 
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that program would allow cleanups that fail to protect the public's 
health and the environment, is crucial to the acceptability of voluntary 
cleanups.17 
These questions are all critical to the design of a successful 
·brownfield program, but have received little attention. None is sus-
ceptible to an easy answer, and each requires a more rigorous, 
thoughtful, and comprehensive analysis. To begin this analysis, this 
article invokes a comparison between the incentives for voluntary 
cleanups and the implementation of state "negotiated compensation" 
statutes to facilitate the siting of solid and hazardous waste disposal 
facilities. These statutes, perceived at the time of their enactment as a 
major innovation in environmental policy, have had a rather poor rec-
~rd of success in addressing difficult issues of the siting process, de-
spite strong theoretical arguments that they might have succeeded.18 
Part I of this article reviews the challenges inherent in brownfield 
redevelopment. Part II provides an analysis of state voluntary 
cleanup statutes and federal programs. Part III compares voluntary 
cleanup programs with the "negotiated compensation" statutes. 
Based on recent assessments of the negotiated compensation statutes' 
shortcomings, part III concludes that the voluntary cleanup statutes 
must be amended in a number of significant respects. This part con-
cludes that states must allow for effective public participation by mak-
ing affected communities partners throughout the decision-making 
process and bolstering each community's ability to evaluate project 
risks and compare them to project benefits.19 States must ensure that 
project risks are communicated properly to communities and provide 
communities with the nec;essary technical and financial resources to 
evaluate projects. Tll.ey must. provide for additional public representa-
tion ill the state decision-making process and expand their oversight 
responsibilities. To ward off participation in their programs by devel-
opers who are not "good actors," they must bar developers with poor 
environmental records. · 
. , · Part III concludes that changes are necessary on the federal level 
as well, particularly to Title III of the "Reform of Superfund Act," 
which would exempt from CERCLA liability sites that have been cle-
aned up in an ·approved state program. At present, this provision 
amounts to a license to evade CERCLA's protective cleanup stan-
17. In particular, Congress should apply a presumption that the relaxed cleanup standards 
that states are applying to brownfield sites are not protective enough, and direct the EPA to 
reject state programs unless states and developers can· demonstrate the adequacy of cleanup 
standards. See infra notes 714-15 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 487-514 and accompanying text. 
19. The states should, for example, provide the affected community with the necessary 
technical and financial resources to facilitate decision making. See infra notes 609-13 and accom-
panying text. 
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dards and should be amended to provide the EPA with the latitude to 
evaluate and approve or reject state programs on substantive grounds. 
This article then concludes that with these and other changes, the 
voluntary cleanup programs will have increased public legitimacy. 
II. THE BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM 
A. The Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment 
A "brownfield" is best defined as "abandoned or underutilized 
urban land and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is 
complicated, in part, because of known or potential environmental 
contamination."20 Brownfield sites include abandoned industrial fa-
20. The exact definition of a brownfield is a matter of some disagreement. See NATIONAL 
ENVTL. POLICY INST., How CLEAN IS CLEAN?: WHITE PAPER ON BROWNFIELDS 38 (1995) 
[hereinafter NEPI WHITE PAPER] (stating that "[t]here is no commonly accepted definition of 
brownfields"); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: 
PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 3 (1995) (hereinafter OTA 
STATE OF THE STATES] (noting that "(b]rownfields have nearly as many definitions as there are 
interested parties"). The definition used here, and in the remainder of this article, is that in-
voked by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in its recent report on brownfield 
cleanup programs, and in OTA's congressional testimony. This definition is based on an EPA 
official's presentation at an Environmental Law Institute workshop. OTA STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra, at 1 (citing Timothy Fields, Jr., Federal Agency Brownfields Initiatives, presented 
at the Environmental Law Institute, Mar. 28, 1995); Superfund Reauthorization (Part 2): Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. 
on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (June 15, 1995) (testimony of Jan Linsenmeyer and 
Robert Atkinson, Energy, Transportation and Infrastructure Program, Office of Technology As-
sessment) (hereinafter OTA Testimony]. Because this definition includes properties that are 
both actually and potentially contaminated, it reflects the widespread fear of lenders, owners, 
and developers that redevelopment is hampered at sites even if contamination has not been 
documented there. Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelop-
ment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 EcoLOGY L.Q. 705, 707 n.3 (1994); 
see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. It is also consistent with the definition adopted in a 
recent article on state and federal brownfield programs and a recent "White Paper." See NEPI 
WHITE PAPER, supra, at 38; R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfie/ds Restoration and Voluntary 
Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENvrL.. LAW. 105, 106 (1995); see also NATIONAL ENvrL.. POLICY INST., 
BEYOND BROWNFIELDS: IDLE LAND, SUBURBAN SPRAWL, AND THE LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
REINVENTING URBAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM (1995) (manuscript 
at 6, on file with author) [hereinafter NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS]. 
Another definition of brownfield is a "previously productive industrial property now unused 
due to uncertainty over who bears responsibility for undertaking an environmental clean-up, the 
extent of contamination, and the cost of clean-up." Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to 
Save Greenfie/ds: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated 
Land, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 789, 790 n.2 (1995) (citing Remarks at the Third Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. 
Conference on Real Property Law 123 (Oct. 14, 1994)). Still another commentator defines a 
brownfield site as an "abandoned urban property, intentionally ignored for reuse, due to poten-
tial contamination and resulting liability." Daniel Michel, The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's 
Response to the Brownfield Problem, 26 U. ToL. L. REV. 435, 435 (1995); cf McWilliams, supra, 
at 707 n.3 (a brownfield is "urban property that has been contaminated by prior industrial or 
commercial activities, as compared with 'greenfields,' which are untainted by such 
contamination"). 
Each of these definitions assumes too much. The first two definitions imply that environ-
mental contamination is the only factor hampering brownfield redevelopment, which is not accu-
rate. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. McWilliams's definition reflects the 
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cilities, warehouses, and other commercial properties such as former 
gas stations and dry cleaning establishments.21 Although brownfields 
exist in many areas,22 they are concentrated in aging, predominantly 
minority and lower-income23 neighborhoods of "Rust Belt" cities such 
as Newark and Chicago.24 For decades, manufacturers have been 
fleeing these cities and moving to "greenfields"25 locations in the sub-
widespread (and mistaken, see infra note 25 and accompanying text) perception that brownfields 
are contaminated, while greenfields are not. 
Brownfield sites have also been dubbed "TOADS," short for "Temporarily Obsolete Aban-
doned Derelict Sites." See McWilliams, supra, at 715 n.25 (citing Michael R. Greenberg et al., 
The TOADS: A New American Urban Epidemic, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 435 (1990)); Tondro, supra, at 
790 n.2 (citing Michael R. Greenberg, Finding Treasure in TOADS, PLANNING, Apr. 1994, at 24). 
21. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6. 
22. Urban Land Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, 
and Aviation, of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 
(June 9, 1994) (testimony of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Insti-
tute) [hereinafter Bartsch Testimony] (noting that "[t]he issue of brownfields has surfaced in 
nearly every state across the country, and in numerous small towns as well as most large cities"). 
23. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13; Robert s. 
Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Challenge of Brownfield 
Redevelopment. 3 BUFF. ENvrL. L.J. 69. 72-73 (1995); Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and 
the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers ro Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BuFF. L. 
REV. 285, 302 (1995). 
24. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1995) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN] (stating that "[v)irtually every city in the 
nation's older industrial regions ... grapples with the challenge of unused manufacturing facili-
ties"); GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL OPTIMISM 617 (1995) (stating that "[i]n cities such as Newark, New Jersey, 
[environmental liability has] had the effect of insuring that old industrial properties could not be 
converted into new uses"); NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 
15-16 (quoting statements by Freeman Bosley, the mayor of St. Louis, Missouri, about the 
brownfield situation in his city); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4; Berger et al., 
supra note 23, at 73 (noting that the brownfield problem is "a significant environmental and 
economic problem" in the Buffalo, New York area); Clement Dinsmore, Recycling Brownfields: 
The Legislative Climate, J. URB. TECH., Spring 1995, at 9 (stating that "[b]rownfield sites are 
most highly concentrated in older industrial areas of large cites in the northeast and midwest 
United States"); Michel, supra note 20, at 436 (stating that brownfield sites are "prevalent in the 
Great Lakes region" due to the concentration of manufacturing activities); James T. O'Reilly, 
Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 
YALE J. ON REG. 43, 55-56 (1994) [hereinafter O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives] (noting that "[t)he 
old plants, visible from the elevated subways of Boston, Chicago, New York, and from the ele-
vated highways of dozens of other inner cities, are· wraiths of inner-city industry that no longer 
resemble the nostalgic photographs"). 
25. A greenfield site is usually described as one located in the suburbs, on land that is 
untainted by contamination because it has never been used for manufacturing or commercial 
activities. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; THE GREEN-
FIELDS GROUP, PROTECTING GREENFIELDS: THE STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM AL-
TERNATIVE 1 (1995) (copy on file with author); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9 (observing that 
'"[g)reenfields' refers to suburban or exurban land that has not yet been developed for non-
agricultural uses"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 707 n.3; Tondre, supra note 20, at 791 (stating 
that a greenfield site is "land that has never been used for manufacturing or commercial activi-
ties and which carries with it none of the potential for environmental liability of a Brownfield"); 
Solo, supra note 23, at 287. 
It is not always true, however, that greenfield sites are pristine. The risk of contamination is 
generally less at a greenfield site than at a brownfield site. See, e.g., Solo, supra note 23, at 287 
("Greenfields[ J are less likely to have been previously used for industrial purposes and, there-
fore, have a lower probability of containing hazardous waste."). But a number of sites in the 
suburbs and rural areas have been the locations of past commercial activities that created con-
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urbs.26 The abandonment of inner-city sites27 has left a "witch's brew 
of contamination" at abandoned brownfield sites.28 
tamination. Professor Tondro cites Diamond v. Marcinek, 629 A.2d 350 (Conn. 1993), where, 
"unbeknownst to its purchaser," underground gasoline storage tanks remained from a prior use 
of a farm as a filling station. Tondro, supra note 21, at 791-92. For the purposes of this article, 
then, a greenfield site is defined as a site located in the suburbs or exurbs, regardless of its level 
of contamination. 
26. See Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 223 (testifying that "migration from 'brownfields' 
to 'greenfields' is particularly problematic to certain urban and industrial areas, where the loss of 
investment capital and jobs further exacerbates existing economic and social conditions"); COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 
60-61 (1994) (noting that the movement of jobs out from central cities is "aggravating central city 
problems"); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 617 (stating that "companies planning expansions 
were buying up pristine land in rural areas where there was no chance of liability for existing 
contamination"); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY ON INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS 4-5 (1994); RICHMOND, VA. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEV., BROWNFIELDS PILOT PRO-
JECT, PROGRAM NARRATIVE STATEMENT 1 (1994) [hereinafter RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT 
PROJECT STATEMENT] (stating that "[t]he City's experience has been that private businesses tend 
to avoid [brownfield locations] ... [and] tend to prefer 'Greenfield' sites in the surrounding 
suburbs for their plant expansion sites or new facility developments"); Fran Ansley, Standing 
Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 
1757, 1839 (1993) (stating that "[o]bservers note that many domestic factory relocations involve 
moves from urban to suburban and from 'brownfield' to 'greenfield' sites"); Berger et al., supra 
note 23, at 73; William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup 
Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 39-40 {1995); 
Jane F. Clokey, Wisconsin's Land Recycling Act: From Brownfield to Greenfield, 2 Wis. ENVTL. 
L.J. 35, 37 (1995); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717 (observing 
that "[w]hen companies leave their urban sites, whether to flee the contamination they have 
produced or simply to expand or upgrade, they often build new facilities on greenfield sites"); 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 55; John Pendergrass, Abandoned Cleanups or 
Abandoned Sites?, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 6 (claiming that developers "prefer greenfields 
... regardless of whether available industrial sites are actually contaminated or could be cleaned 
up"); John B. Casserly, Comment, Minnesota's Land Recycling Act: Solving Problems by Evolv-
ing Superfu.nd, 2 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 261, 266 (1995) (noting the increase in development on green-
fields in Minnesota, and corresponding increase in the number of brownfields); Solo, supra note 
23, at 287. 
In Professor Ansley's view, there are many reasons for the out-migration of factory jobs, 
including "more favorable taxation, cheaper rent, or lower rates of unionization." Ansley, 
supra, at 1839-40. To this list. one should add lower perceived environmental costs and other 
advantages. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
27. McWtlliams, supra note 20, at 714 and n.21 (citing CHARLES BARTSCH ET AL., NEW 
LIFE FOR OLD BUILDINGS: CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES TO INDUS-
TRIAL REUSE 1 (1991)) (stating that "[d]ecades of heavy industry in an era with limited environ-
mental awareness have left a legacy of contaminated, often abandoned, industrial structures 
located on millions of acres of polluted land throughout the United States"); O'Reilly, Indiana's 
Incentives, supra note 24, at 43 (stating that "manufacturers have moved away from the inner 
city, taking valuable job opportunities and leaving behind environmentally hazardous sites"). 
28. William J. Angelo, EPA and Cities See Green in Cleanup of "Brownfield" Sites, ENGI-
NEERING NEws-REc., Nov. 6, 1995, at 31, 34 (stating that "[m]any of the sites contain obsolete, 
empty buildings with asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls or oil"). 
No. 4] BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS 893 
The number of brownfield sites,29 and the magnitude of contami-
nation at them, is not known.30 Despite this uncertainty, brownfield 
sites have significant potential for redevelopment.31 Developers32 
29. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment recently estimated that there may 
be "tens of thousands to 450,000" brownfield sites nationwide. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 2; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that "(s]ome experts 
have suggested that more than 500,000 sites nationwide show evidence of at least some contami-
nation which could trigger Superfund rules"); NEPI BROWNFIELDs POLICY FORUM PROCEED· 
JNGS, supra note 20, at 6 (stating that "[n]o reliable data exists on the number of brownfield 
sites"); Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of Superfund 
Liability, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1996, at 27 (stating that the General Accounting 
Office estimates the number of brownfield sites at between 150,000 and 500,000); Buzbee, supra 
note 26, at 39 n.11; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that the EPA "does not know if 
10% or 90% of the potentially hazardous waste sites have been identified"). 
States and localities do not have accurate information about the number of brownfield sites. 
Professor Tondro describes the problem in Connecticut: 
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not know the total 
number of affected acres of land. In 1993, the DEP estimated that more than 100 Brown-
field sites existed in Connecticut's urban areas. These were identified as part of the then 
newly enacted Urban Sites program .... At the conference, Parker estimated that there 
were probably a ''couple of thousand" sites in Connecticut. 
Tondro, supra note 20, at 789 n.l. Some cities and counties have identified the number of 
brownfield sites in their jurisdictions, but the accounting is "far from exact." OT A STA TE OF 
THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that Chicago, Cuyahoga County (which includes Cleve-
land), and Portland have estimated numbers of brownfield sites); see also NEPI BROWNFIELDS 
POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra nore 20, at 11 (stating that "[f]or brownfields reform to be 
successful, it will be necessary to accurately grasp the number of these sites and their breakdown 
by locat10n"); Paul MacClennan, Caution in Order on City "Brownfields" Opportunity, BUFFALO 
NEws, Oct. 15, 1995, at G8 (stating that the first task of Buffalo's brownfields group is to develop 
a "'city mdex on sites and problems"). The Rhode Island legislature has determined that "Rhode 
Island's urban corridor contains nearly two hundred (200) sites that have been found by federal 
or state programs to be contaminated [and] many potential sites ... which may have been con-
taminated by historical industrial activities." R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-l(e)-(f) (Supp. 1995). 
A recent survey released by the U.S. Conference of Mayors identified more than 20,000 
brownfield sites in 39 cities. Brownfields: Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors in Cleanup Efforts, Green-
wire, Jan. 29, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1/29/96 APN-GR 4 [hereinafter Clinton Backs U.S. 
Mayors]. 
30. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, 
at 2 (stating that conditions at brownfield sites "may vary from zero, low, or moderate contami-
nation to extremely hazardous conditions, while many sites have still not been evaluated"); Ber-
ger et al., supra note 23, at 72 (observing that "the degree of contamination [at brownfield sites] 
varies greatly"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that "(t]he actual scope of this prob-
lem is not known"). 
There are several reasons for the uncertainty about the extent of contamination at brown-
field sites. Brownfield sites were often the locations of industrial and commercial facilities that 
handled hazardous wastes. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4. Storage and dispo-
sal of these wastes generally took place before the advent of modem environmental laws and 
was largely unregulated. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that brownfield sites 
are "normally assumed to have varying degrees of contamination attributable to waste genera-
tion, handling, and disposal practices that prevailed before these practices were regulated in 
recent decades"). Governments at all levels have little information on the extent of past 
problems. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; see also OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 300 
(stating that "information about the extent of the problem and the level of contamination at 
many of these sites is limited"). States' records are of "limited usefulness" because they docu-
ment assessments made at the time of property transfers; properties may not have been trans-
ferred, and therefore not evaluated. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715. 
31. Charles Bartsch and Elizabeth Collaton, for example, describe a number of successful 
redevelopment activities at brownfield sites. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 117-37 (describ-
894 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW (Vol. 1996 
propose projects that range from industrial uses33 to retail uses,34 tech-
nology and office centers,35 airports,36 and even sports stadiums.37 
Although the costs of continued inactivity at brownfield sites are 
potentially immense, they are not well quantified. The types of costs, 
however, are well understood. Inner-city neighborhoods fail to bene-
fit from jobs that redevelopment might provide.38 Cities receive lower 
ing brownfield reuses in Akron, OH; Chicago, IL; Minneapolis, MN; Fort Collins, CO; Mesa, 
AZ; and Meadville, PA). 
32. This article uses the term "developer" to refer to any entity that proposes to take ad-
vantage of the incentives contained in a state voluntary cleanup program, whether or not that 
entity currently owns the brownfield site in question. Many states' statutes do not restrict the 
type of entity that can qualify as a brownfield redeveloper and take advantage of statutory pro-
tections. As one commentator has noted, "individuals, companies, associations, partnerships 
and municipal governmental entities are all potential beneficiaries." Clokey, supra note 26, at 
41-42; see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995). Moreover, a majority of states 
empower any person or entity to undertake a voluntary cleanup. The statutes often do not 
distinguish between present owners and prospective purchasers; both may participate in volun-
tary cleanup programs if they did not cause the contamination at the site. See infra note 188-90 
and accompanying text. 
33. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 127-29 (discussing automobile scrapyard in Min-
neapolis cleaned up and used for an electronics company's production facility); PENNSYLVANIA 
DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PENNSYLVANIA'S LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, SIX-MONTH 
PROGRESS REPORT 2 (1996) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT] 
(describing the redevelopment of the "Industrial Center of McKeesport" on the site of the for-
mer U.S. Steel National Tube Works in McKeesport, PA); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 71 
(describing the thwarted efforts of three proposals to reuse brownfield sites in Cleveland, Chi-
cago, and Detroit for industrial purposes). 
34. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 18 
(describing the failed proposal to redevelop a site in East St. Louis, IL, for use as a shopping 
center); MacClennan, supra note 29 (describing Buffalo's plans to build the Delaware Consumer 
Square retail plaza on a site, part of which is "an old Hartwell street toxic dump used by Atlas 
Steel and recently delisted by the state but not necessarily lacking in hazardous substances"). 
35. Pittsburgh, for example, has developed the "Pittsburgh Technology Center" on the site 
of the abandoned Jones & Laughlin steel mill, with plans to host the University of Pittsburgh's 
Center for Biotechnology and Bioengineering, the Carnegie Mellon Research Institute, and the 
engineering and research facility of the Union Switch and Signal Corporation. See Urban Land 
Reclamation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the 
House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (June 9, 1994) (testi-
mony of Margaret McCormick Barron, Assistant to Tom Murphy, Mayor, City of Pittsburgh); 
Gaines Gwathmey III & William J. O'Brien, States Stimulate "Brownfield" Development, N.Y. 
L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Sl (describing the Pittsburgh experience); see also COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 24, at 119-20 (describing the conversion of a brownfield site in Akron, OH, to the "AES 
Business Campus"); Angelo, supra note 28, at 32, 34 (describing the construction of the "125-
acre Twin Lakes Corporate Center" on a former brownfield site in Roseville, MN). 
36. Angelo. supra note 28. at 32 (describing Cleveland's attempt to build a new airport on a 
brownfield site). 
37. Sue Ellen Christian & John Kass, Gary Plan a Far Cry from Soldier Field; Glitzy Propo-
sal ls Detailed, But Financing Isn't, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1995, at 1 (describing efforts to attract 
the Chicago Bears football team to a brownfield site in Gary, IN). 
38. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 301; NEPI 
BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 21 (quoting Mary Gade, Direc-
tor, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that 
"[b]ecause of the difficulty in redeveloping urban industrial sites, rejuvenation of economies in 
these areas through job creation is also significantly hampered"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 
717; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87. 
No. 4] BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS 895 
property tax revenues from brownfield sites,39 which weakens their 
ability to provide basic services such as education.40 Brownfields are 
unsightly and threaten to contaminate drinking water and cause 
neighborhood health problems.41 Vacant properties contribute to 
high crime rates42 and deterioration of urban neighborhoods.43 They 
encourage further environmental abuse, such as "midnight dump-
ing. "44 Finally, brownfields are conspicuous symbols of the decline of 
lower-income and minority neighborhoods in which they are over-
whelmingly located. They discourage urban investment and contrib-
ute to a pervasive sense of poverty and hopelessness.45 
Moreover, there are substantial environmental costs to locating 
new commercial or industrial activities at a greenfield site instead of a 
brownfield site.46 Greenfield development often devours previously 
39. Owners of brownfield sites typically pay reduced amounts of taxes, due to the sites' 
marginal market value, or abandon the sites and pay no taxes at all. OTA Testimony, supra note 
20, at 301; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Dinsmore, 
supra note 24, at 9-10; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra 
note 24, at 48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 789-90; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87. The recent study 
released by the U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that brownfield sites account for between 
$121 million and $386 million of lost tax revenue annually. Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors, supra 
note 29. The shrinking tax base also has a pronounced impact on remaining businesses in inner 
cities, which face increased tax burdens to make up for the lost revenue. O'Reilly. Indiana's 
incentives, supra note 24, at 48. 
40. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717 (stating that "abandoned and otherwise inactive 
properties generate less, if any, tax revenue for schools and city services"); O'Reilly. Indiana's 
Incentives, supra note 24, at 48 (stating that "[m]unicipal and urban school budgets lost revenues 
from manufacturing facility taxes as plants moved"). 
41. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 20, at 6 (stating that "empty structures openly invite illegal dumping of house-
hold and hazardous waste, attract both criminal activity and curious children, and pose health 
and fire hazards to the surrounding community"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715 (stating that 
"[w]ithholding brownfield property from the market contributes to urban decay by ... allowing 
contaminated sites to go undetected, thereby threatening the environment, unsuspecting users, 
and local residents"); Solo, supra note 23, at 302. 
At the National Environmental Policy Institute's Brownfields Policy Forum, one participant 
stated that "[t]he kind of things you can get from these abandoned sites is not just the insecurity 
and danger of the building itself, but also the continued illegal dumping of hazardous waste 
drums." NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting 
Henry Henderson, Commission~r, Department of the Environment, Chicago, IL). Commis-
sioner Henderson added that health hazards other than toxic dumping exist, describing a site in 
Chicago: "A former bus barn, across from a meat packing company, had been taken over by a 
squatter who decided to build an indoor garbage dump. You don't want a rat farm next door to 
your meat packing company." Id. 
42. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 5; J. Thomas Black, Recycling 
Inactive Urban Industrial Sites, URB. LAND, June 1995, 47, 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 790; 
Solo, supra note 23, at 287. 
43. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 74; Black, supra 
note 42, at 47; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 
47 (describing the "social isolation" caused in inner-city neighborhoods by the declining job 
base) . 
. 44. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Buzbee, 
supra note 26, at 39. 
45. NEPI BROWNFIELDS PouCY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; McWilliams, 
supra note 20, at 715; Solo, supra note 23, at 286-87. 
46. Tondro, supra note 20, at 792. 
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unspoiled land.47 Development in suburbs and exurbs exacerbates 
their growing pollution problems.48 These developments will have ad-
verse impacts for many years to come, even long after their useful 
lives have ended.49 Stormwater,50 groundwater,51 and air pollution 
from additional traffic52 will increase.53 Suburban and exurban juris-
dictions will have to build54 or expand55 existing infrastructures such 
as highways and public water and sewer systems to serve new develop-
ment. Officials in these jurisdictions are concerned about the financial 
47. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that "[m]ore rural land is being used for 
industrial purposes than would be necessary if industries were encouraged to 'recycle' urban 
industrial properties. The direct effect is that more total land is 'industrialized', even though 
numerous former industrial sites sit idle and waste away"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 37; 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792 n.12; Solo, 
supra note 23, at 304. 
48. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 2; 
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717-18 (stating that "if industrial owners are allowed to use and 
abandon property at will, current greenfield development will spread the legacy of contamina-
tion to outlying areas"). For a description of existing environmental problems of suburban 
"Edge Cities," see Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism· Lessons from Federal Regula-
tion of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 1, 33-35 (1995). 
49. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 717-18; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792. 
50. The stormwater problem, caused in large part by runoff from parking lots and other 
impervious surfaces, is already a substantial environmental problem in the suburbs and exurbs. 
See generally Eisen, supra note 48. It will only be worsened by further industrial and commercial 
development. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 718. 
51. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 718. 
52. Suburbs depend on the automobile. See generally ROBERT CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUB-
URBAN CENTERS (1989) [hereinafter CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS] (analyzing 
patterns of traffic and congestion in suburbs and exurbs); ROBERT CERVERO, SUBURBAN 
GRIDLOCK (1986) [hereinafter CERVERO, SUBURBAN GRIDLOCK] (describing the inadequate 
road and highway infrastructure in the suburbs). As a. result, workers must increasingly use 
automobiles instead of mass transit to reach suburban workplaces. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 47-48. This worsens traffic and congestion, and adds to air pollution. 
Berger et al., supra note 23, a°t 73 (claiming that "industrialization of outlying rural and suburban 
lands creates a greater need for people to drive to outlying areas to work [with] the negative 
environmental effect of promoting greater air pollution"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 37; McWil-
liams, supra note 20, at 721 (stating that "by siting new facilities in dispersed outlying areas 
instead of in concentrated inner cities, greenfield development encourages a car-dependent work 
force because mass transit cannot economically serve these low density areas of development"); 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 792; Solo, supra 
note 23, at 304. 
53. McWilliams makes the intriguing suggestion that developers should be required to post 
bonds to cover the future costs of environmental liability at greenfield sites: 
Any facility where hazardous substances are used and that poses a threat to the environ-
ment, should be required to post an environmental bond, or otherwise prove financial re-
sponsibility sufficient to cover the potential costs of cleaning up the site, before it can bring 
hazardous materials onto the property. If the law required the owner of a facility to return 
the property to the market in as good or better condition than when she acquired the prop-
erty, the costs of the business would reflect the true costs of contaminating activities. 
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 719-20. 
54. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720; Tondro, supra 
note 20, at 792. 
55. The road system in the suburbs and exurbs, for example, was not built to meet the 
demands of intensified industrial and commercial activity, and must be expanded to serve it. 
Tondro, supra note 20, at 792. See generally CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS, supra 
note 52; CERVERO, SUBURBAN GRIDLOCK, supra note 52. 
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burden this imposes on them,56 a burden that is often alleviated to 
some extent by wasteful subsidies (in the form of grants and other 
funding) from the federal and state governments.57 
By contrast, brownfield redevelopment can take advantage of ex-
isting urban infrastructures.58 A brownfield site often features excel-
lent water and sewer systems, and rail and highway access to the 
metropolitan area, the region, and outlying areas.59 Densely concen-
trated urban areas offer better accessibility to workers60 and other ad-
vantages. 61 Other potential benefits include aesthetic qualities such as 
waterfront access and views,62 proximity· to downtown business dis-
tricts,63 public tax and financing initiatives to support development,64 
56. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 6; Berger et al., 
supra note 23, at 73 (stating that "[t]he cost of providing the necessary infrastructure to support 
these new developments is strapping the municipalities and counties in which they are located"); 
Tondro, supra note 20, at 792 (stating that "[f]rom the viewpoint of the public purse, the expen-
diture necessary to make [a greenfield] site properly accessible, including public utilities, is enor-
mous"); Solo, supra note 23, at 304. 
57. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720: 
Local governments, using federal grants and state funds to pay for new utility infrastructure 
(e.g., sewers, water, and electric) and secondary roads in outlying areas, are in effect dupli-
cating infrastructures that already exist in urban centers. Thus, federal, state, and local tax-
payers subsidize the environmentally suspect spread of industrial development to greenfield 
sites. · 
58. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; C6MING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; McWil-
Iiams, supra note 20, at 720; Solo, supra note 23, at 301 (observing that brownfield sites would 
"normally have been considered prime real estate and [are] connected to t!Xisting infrastruc-
ture"); Black, supra note 42, at 48. 
59. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 20, at 6; Black, suprd note 42, at 47; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 
24, at 47 (stating that "[h]ighway access;well developed infrastructure, power and water lines, 
easy access to rail tracks and to other modes of transport are all desirable features of existing city 
sites"); Tondro, supra note 20. at 790; This is not always the case. See infra notes 147-49 and 
accompanying text. 
· 60. COMING CLEAN, supra· note 24, at 2; Black, supra note 42, at 48; McWilliams, supra 
note 20, at 723; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-48; Tondro, supra note 20, at 
792. A brownfield redeveloper that creates jobs may hire workers from the area surrounding the 
site and provide a tremendous economic boost for affected communities. See, e.g., Bartsch Testi-
mony, supra note 22, at 25; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, 
supra note 24, at 47-48. Douglas McWilliams.cautions that brownfield redevelopment may not 
create jobs for residents of the affected communities unless training programs are implemented 
for unskilled workers. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 723-24. 
61. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 722 (stating that "concentrated urban job loca-
tions may facilitate efficient job training programs because resources are concentrated in a single 
facility that is accessible to the targeted urban workforce and to the job placement locations"). 
62. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Black, supra note 42, at 48. 
63. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2;.Black, supra note 42, at 48. 
64. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 61-64; Black, supra note 42, at 48. Existing incen-
tives include "tax increment financing" (TIF), which involves borrowing against future expected 
tax revenues to finance investments: COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 61-62; CHARLES M. 
HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, 
AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND 968, 997 (1989); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 753-54. TIF reve-
nues, as Haar and Wolf note, can be used to fund improvements required to spur an increase in 
economic activity. HAAR & WoLF, supra, at 968. Charles Bartsch and Elizabeth Collaton de-
scribe a number of other financing options for brownfield redevelopment, including tax abate-
ments, community development block grants, special service areas, use of general obligation 
bonds, and other forms of targeted assistance. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 62-64. 
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access to major universities and medical centers,65 and ancillary bene-
fits of spending by rejuvenated industries and their workers on local 
goods and services. 66 
B. The Fear of Environmental Liability 
Despite these potential advantages, brownfields remain aban-
doned or underutilized. In the eyes of many, this is due to widespread 
fears of brownfield developers that they will face liability under the 
environmental laws67 and that the cost of cleaning brownfield sites to 
meet government standards is both so uncertain and so high that it 
might outweigh the sites' market value.68 The literature is replete 
with anecdotes about developers who shunned brownfield sites "due 
to" the fear of environmental liability.69 Developers, it is said, de-
65. Black, supra note 42, at 48. 
66. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Water Resources and 
Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
601 (June 21, 1995) (testimony of Patricia Randolph Williams, Legislative Representative, Na-
tional Wildlife Federation) [hereinafter NWF Testimony] (claiming that brownfields redevelop-
ment will "stimulate economic growth of the surrounding areas"); COMING CLEAN, supra note 
24, at 2; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 724. Douglas McWilliams cautions that secondary eco-
nomic benefits may be "diluted" if, for example, "companies provide in-house food service and 
shops." Id. 
67. Most notable among these are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA, popularly known as the Superfund law) and its state coun-
terparts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. These 
"fears" have been invoked as the primary, and perhaps exclusive reason why brownfield sites 
continue to remain abandoned. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (noting that 
"environmental contamination-or the perceived threat of it-[is often] the principal deterrent 
to industrial site reuse"); NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 601 (testifying that "[Superfund] has 
inadvertently produced a chilling affect [sic] which has stymied prospective purchasers and lend-
ers from investing in the renewal of abandoned contaminated waste sites"); COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 6; NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 7; 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25 n.46 (quoting a press release by four Penn-
sylvania state senators that stated "[c]ompanies in Pittsburgh, Johnstown, and other communities 
have deliberately let industrial property stand idle indefinitely rather than even look to see what 
contamination might exist because they were afraid to deal with state environmental agencies"); 
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715-16; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 54 (stating that "[d]evelopment of the sites and their potential to create 
jobs for local residents were hampered by doubt that past environmental effects could be over-
come, [as] a direct result of ineffective federal remediation procedures"). 
68. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text. 
69. For example, one article describes three projects purportedly stymied by fear of envi-
ronmental liability: 
The owner of a newspaper in Cleveland looked at several downtown properties for a new 
production plant. The company chose an abandoned rail yard on the shores of Lake Erie. 
Calling the site "perfect" for its needs, the company spent $60,000 on an environmental 
assessment. only to learn that the cost of cleanup would be prohibitive. The "perfect" site 
was abandoned and the new plant, along with its 400 jobs, will open soon, in the suburbs. 
A Chicago metal-stamping firm wanted to expand in the city, but could not find a large 
enough urban site without possible environmental problems. It, too, moved to the suburbs 
and forty urban jobs were lost. 
An electrical contractor in Detroit wanted to expand his existing building onto a neighbor-
ing parking lot. He was not, nor had he ever been, the owner of the parking lot, but his 
bank refused to make the necessary expansion loan. Traces of oil, antifreeze and fuel had 
dripped onto the lot over the years and the bank was afraid that it could be held liable for 
the cleanup of hazardous waste if it held a security interest in the property. Instead of 
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mand the lower and more predictable cost of building new facilities in 
greenfield locations.7° From a developer's perspective, the list of ob-
stacles to brownfield redevelopment starts with the threat of liability 
under CERCLA.71 This is widely perceived as the most serious bar-
rier to redevelopment,72 outweighing all benefits.73 A developer must 
also be concerned about the uncertainties caused by state hazardous 
expanding in the city, the contractor moved his entire business to an undeveloped rural 
area, taking ten jobs away from urban workers. . 
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 71; see also Solo, supra note 23, at 297 (citing these three stories 
and stating that these "anecdotes merely skim the surface of instances in which urban workers 
have lost jobs due to legitimate fears by business owners of becoming liable for contamination 
on urban land"). 
At the National Environmental Policy lnstitute's Brownfields Policy Forum, Mayor Gordon 
Bush of East St. Louis, IL, described the failure of a proposed shopping center project in his city: 
"The people were ready, the bankers were there. The Department of Commerce and Com-
munity Affairs from the State of Illinois was there with their share. All incentives were in 
place, but guess what, it had to be cleaned up first." The city worked with the investors to 
remediate the property, but the process "was so bad and so protracted that when they went 
in, they estimated that they needed $200,000 to clean it up. They ended up spending over $1 
million, and it still wasn't clean." As the process dragged on and the costs continued to 
mount, the bankers and financial supporters backed out, and the project failed. 
NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 18 (quoting Gordon Bush, 
Mayor, East St. Louis, IL). 
70. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27 (comparing a developer's perspective on 
building on greenfield and brownfield sites); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2 (quoting a 
developer's statement that "[t]he numbers just make sense [in favor of greenfield sites)"). 
71. A recent White Paper on brownfields suggests that the requirements of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act's "'corrective action" process could pose more potential 
problems at older industrial sites than CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1994) (authority for 
corrective action orders); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 41-42 (stating that "if an older 
industrial facility wishes to develop its brownfields, it may have a multi-year [RCRA) liability 
issue"); Brownfields: RCRA Liability Could Pose Obstacle to Cleanup Greater than Superfund, 
Haz. Waste News, July 24, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407345. Professor Buzbee, 
noting the overlap between RCRA and CERCLA, claims that the EPA could use its authority to 
identify brownfield sites as RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal (TSO) facilities, in which 
case the RCRA corrective action provisions would govern. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 66-68; see 
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 11-14. Developers' fears of CERCLA liability appear, 
however, to be more widespread, because CERCLA is the principal federal statute governing 
hazardous waste cleanups, whereas RCRA 's corrective action scheme generally is limited to 
remediation of traditional TSO facilities. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 57. 
72. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 6-11; OTA STATE OF THE STATES; supra note 20, 
at 7 (stating that "[t)he law most often associated with liability at brownfield sites is CERCLA"); 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 30 ("There is a widespread belief that environ-
mental liabilities arising under CERCLA and related law distort the real estate market."); Mc-
Williams, supra note 20, at 725 (claiming that "[t)he magnitude and uncertainty of environmental 
liability costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) pose significant obstacles to urban industrial redevelopment"); Michel, supra 
note 20, at 435 (stating that "[t)he measures employed by Congress, primarily through CERCLA 
... , have been called 'draconian' and have had a chilling effect on lenders, 'would be' develop-
ers and purchasers"); Tondro, supra note 20, at 790-91; Casserly, supra note 26, at 266 (stating 
that Minnesota's cities "found that the Superfund laws were intimidating prospective purchasers, 
while rarely effecting a cleanup in Minnesota's urban centers"); Solo, supra note 23, at 285 (ob-
serving that "[f)ear of liability under federal Superfund law may be discouraging use of former 
hazardous waste sites even after they have been cleaned up and thus encouraging industrial 
development to sprawl onto unpolluted land"). 
73. The Urban Land Institute's brownfields analyst, Tom Black, has stated that "Superfund 
requirements overshadow the many advantages that sites in older industrial areas offer." Black, 
supra note 42, at 48. 
900 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1996 
waste cleanup programs,74 because it cannot predict at the outset 
whether it will be subjected to state or federal regulation.75 The states 
have primary responsibility for sites that do not rise to the threshold 
for federal action 76 and for sites that states have decided to regulate in 
the absence of federal requirements.77 
74. Approximately 45 states have hazardous waste cleanup statutes with requirements 
comparable to those of the federal program under CERCLA. OTA STATE oF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 11; BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRAcnCE § 1.01, at 2 
(1991). These statutes include, for example, Minnesota's Environmental Response and Liability 
Act. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.Ol-.37 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996), and Wisconsin's Hazardous Sub-
stance Discharge Law, popularly known as the "Spill Statute," Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.76 (West 
1989 & Supp. 1995). See also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7-8 (noting that 
states have independent authority to force brownfield developers to clean up sites). These stat-
utes (which, for the purposes of this article, are referred to as "state CERCLA Jaws") are per-
ceived as having a detrimental impact on brownfield development comparable to that of 
CERCLA. See Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources 
and Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 260 (June 20, 1995) (testimony of Dale Kaplan, President and Owner, Kaplan Cleaners, on 
behalf of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Cham-
ber Testimony] (stating that "[t]he state, just like EPA, can require a business to pay for the 
entire costs of a cleanup, regardless of whether or not the business acted legally"); Tondro, supra 
note 20, at 790-91 (stating that state "little CERCLA" statutes have a "chilling effect" on lenders 
at brownfield sites). Commenting on the New York law, one report states that although it "dif-
fers in significant respects from CERCLA," it is similar enough that it has had a dampening 
effect on brownfield development. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 91 (adding that "(t]he New 
York State Superfund program, like the federal program, includes exacting liability provisions 
and rigorous cleanup standards [and] has had the unanticipated effect of leaving many brown-
field sites abandoned and has caused companies to develop greenfields instead"). 
Professor Buzbee notes that while common-law schemes may create an additional source of 
legal uncertainty and potential liability, statutory liability is more significant because "statute-
based cleanup costs dwarf provable common law damages from contamination in most in-
stances." Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 n.10. 
75. See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucv FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 12 (noting 
that "[m]any panelists observed that a high level of uncertainty exacerbates the brownfields 
problem"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2-3 (stating that "[t]he complicated 
and often overlapping nature of [state and federal) laws creates an unclear picture of the real 
risk of liability, which serves as a disincentive for involvement at a site"); Mcwilliams, supra 
note 20, at 733 (observing that "the determination of whether a site will be subject to federal or 
state oversight is made well into the site assessment process, making it difficult to anticipate the 
regulatory requirements before substantial funds are spent on a redevelopment project"). 
As Douglas McWilliams notes, there is another area of uncertainty: a site can contain both 
"contaminants that are regulated exclusively under state law and contaminants subject to regula-
tion under both state and federal law." Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 732; see infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
76. States may set more stringent cleanup requirements than those found in CERCLA. 
CERCLA provides that a state may impose "any additional liability or (cleanup] requirements 
with respect to the release of hazardous substances" in the state. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9614(a); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 732. For example, states are free to regulate materials 
such as petroleum that are specifically excluded from CERCLA's definition of a "hazardous 
substance." See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 8.6, at 757 (2d ed. 1994). 
77. Developers may face liability under state Jaws even if they are not liable under federal 
law. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 732. Pursuant to 
this authority to regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes, states have identified many more 
contaminated sites than are on the National Priorities List (NPL), some of which may be brown-
field sites. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and 
Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 876 
(June 27, 1995) (testimony of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection 
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1. Uncertainty for Developers 
The uncertain nature of developers' responsibilities under CER-
CLA and its state analogues has a wide-ranging impact on brownfield 
developers.78 First, developers may be held liable for past contamina-
tion at sites, even if they did not cause it. Second, the uncertainty 
about liability gives rise to concerns about predicting the amount of 
cleanup costs, particularly the required standard of cleanup and its 
cost. Finally, there is the cost of delays necessitated by a lengthy 
cleanup process and the additional cost associated with potential fu-
ture responsibility after undertaking a cleanup. 
a. Liability for Past Contamination 
Although dangerous contaminants such as lead and PCBs are 
present at some brownfield sites,79 most sites are not seriously con-
taminated.80 The majority are not listed on the federal National Pri-
orities List (NPL, the list of properties to be cleaned up under the 
EPA's supervision to meet CERCLA's standards),81 the "CERCLIS" 
database of sites that the EPA is considering for further Superfund 
action,82 or comparable state lists of hazardous waste sites.83 Never-
Agency) [hereinafter Browner Testimony] (testifying that "[s]tates have already identified over 
100,000 non-NPL sites in their state cleanup inventories"): THE GREENFIELDS GROUP, supra 
note 25, at 1; see also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 8 n.19 (stating that "[a]s of 
1990, Massachusetts had 15 (federal) NPL sites but 383 on its state priority list. with an addi-
tional 1486 on a hazardous site registry"); EPA Sets Goals for Brownfields Clean Up, Redevelop-
ment as Part of CERCLA Reform, Daily Envtl. Rep. News, Oct. 17, 1995, available in 
WESTLAW, 1995 DEN 200 d9 [hereinafter EPA Goals] (quoting the statement of Mary Gade, 
director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, that Illinois has 37 NPL sites and 148 
state superfund sites). The sites identified by the states require cleanup under the state ana-
logues to CERCLA. 
78. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 725-26; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, 
at 52-53. 
79. See PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 7 (noting that the 
former Johnson Bronze site, one of the 13 sites where the state has granted final approval to 
date, was contaminated by lead and PCBs). 
80. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26 (observing that "it is essential to distinguish 
between Superfund high priority sites-the worst of the bad with little prospect for economically 
viable reuse-and those sites characterized by low and medium levels of environmental contami-
nation-typically, most industrial facilities that were in operation before CERCLA's 1980 enact-
ment"); OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2 
(stating that "most sites considered brownfields are not associated with extreme levels of con-
tamination"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 45 n.27; O'Reilly, 
Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 297-98. 
81. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2. The NPL is the list of sites that 
receive the highest priority from the EPA in CERCLA cleanup efforts. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1995); 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 720. Sites on the NPL are the only sites eligible for long-term 
remedial actions financed by the Superfund. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(l) (1995); RESOURCES 
FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 722 n.89. The National 
Contingency Plan governs studies of the contamination and selection and implementation of 
remedies at these sites. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430-.435 (1995). There are 1,231 sites on the NPL. 
40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1995) (listing of NPL sites). Most brownfield sites are not included on 
this list. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; Solo, supra note 23, at 298 n.65. 
82. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302. CERCLIS is the "Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Information System," a computer database of sites 
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theless, cautious developers and lenders assume involvement at any 
site will subject them to potential liability,84 because the site may later 
be discovered to be seriously contaminated,85 and regulators may de-
cide to target it for a cleanup. 
Prospective purchasers and developers fear that if they take own-
ership of a brownfield site, they will assume liability for past contami-
nation.86 Under CERCLA, the threshold event for liability is the 
"release" or threat of a release87 of a "hazardous substance"88 at a 
"facility."89 This is a broad definition that encompasses contamina-
that the EPA is investigating to determine whether they must be cleaned up under CERCLA. 
See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 711-13; 
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 n.11. Although a listing in the CERCLIS is no guarantee that a site 
is contaminated enough to warrant a cleanup under CERCLA, lenders regularly check the 
CERCLIS database as part of their environmental assessments. See RODGERS, supra note 76, 
§ 8.4, at 712 ("the real estate and lending enterprises are especially attentive to what listings [in 
CERCLIS] foretell about real estate values and cleanup costs"). Even though the EPA added 
the notation "No Further Response Action Planned" to the listing, lenders continued to shun 
these sites. Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10. 
There are about 13,000 sites on the CERCLIS, compared to almost 38,000 sites listed in 
early 1995. As part of its "Brownfields Action Agenda," the EPA deleted approximately 25,000 
sites from the CERCLIS to remove the stigma associated with a listing in the database and 
announced its intent to delete sites when it decided that no further response action should be 
undertaken. Amendment to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances National Contingency 
Plan (NCP); CERCLIS Definition Change, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,053, 16,054-55 (1995) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. § 300.5); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 79 n.144; see infra notes 411-16 and accompany-
ing text. 
83. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that Chicago "has identi-
fied over 2,000 brownfield sites in its metropolitan region"); EPA Goals, supra note 77 (quoting 
the statement of Mary Gade that although Illinois has 148 state superfund sites, it has "an esti-
mated 5,000 brownfield sites-2,000 in Chicago alone"). 
84. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302 (noting that "any association with a hazardous 
waste site implies some level of uncertain liability"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Solo, 
supra note 23, at 286, 298. 
85. Not all sites that are seriously contaminated have been the subject of regulatory scru-
tiny. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25; see also RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, 
at 712 (noting that "CERCLIS remains an incomplete inventory [that] is missing some sites that 
are sufficiently serious to be nominated for inclusion on the National Priorities List"). 
86. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 8; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; 
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 725; Solo, supra note 23, at 287. 
87. "Release" is defined in CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994), to include a 
broad range of activities, including "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment." Cases 
have read this definition broadly to include not only these, but also such activities as drifting of 
fibers in the wind, drippings from tanks, and transport of waste by a third party. See RODGERS, 
supra note 76, § 8.6, at 751-52 and cases cited therein. 
88. A "hazardous substance," as defined in CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), in-
cludes substances designated as hazardous in four other environmental laws, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act), the Clean Air Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, and those that the 
EPA has designated as hazardous under the authority of CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602. See 
also RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 756; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79 n.10; Solo, supra 
note 23, at 291-92. 
89. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at 
291-92. A hazardous waste "facility" is defined as "any building, structure, installation, equip-
ment ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment ditch, landfill, storage container ... [or] any site 
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or other-
wise come to be located." CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). Courts have interpreted this 
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tion at a wide variety of sites,90 including those where contamination 
occurred solely in the past.91 If a developer spends the money to test 
a site and finds some contamination there, it may be required to re-
port the contamination to the EPA,92 which might add the site to the 
NPL.93 CERCLA liability would then attach to the present owner, 
even if it did not cause the contamination at the site.94 
Once a site is designated for cleanup under CERCLA, its owner 
faces the power of the sweeping authority given to the EPA under 
CERCLA and judicial interpretations.95 The EPA may proceed with 
definition of facility broadly to include "virtually any place at which hazardous wastes have been 
dumped, or otherwise disposed of," including manufacturing buildings, stables, roadsides, drag 
strips, gas stations, private homes, real estate subdivisions, and even dry cleaning establishments. 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 758-61 and cases cited therein; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 
79-80; Solo, supra note 23, at 292. 
90. For example, CERCLA's definition of hazardous substance subjects a party to liability 
for disposal of any of over 700 substances. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 754 ("The term 
'hazardous substance' under CERCLA, like that of 'release,' is known best for its breadth and 
inclusiveness."); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 79 (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 
1192 (2d Cir. 1992)); Solo, supra note 23, at 291-92. 
91. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 769. 
92. Under CERCLA, an owner or operator is required to· notify EPA "as soon as he has 
knowledge of any release ... of a hazardous substance." CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9603(a); see also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 25; RODGERS, supra note 76, 
§ 8.5, at 71; WHI1MAN, supra note 74, § 2.02(a)-(c); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715. If the site 
is an industrial site with a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994), the permit holder has a continuing obligation to notify federal 
officials when it discovers hazardous substances at the site.· 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(6); O'Reilly, 
Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 52. 
93. There are three ways in which a site may be added to the NPL. See RODGERS, supra 
note 76. § 8.4, at 722. The principal way is that the EPA evaluates the danger at a site, using a 
system known as the "'Hazard Ranking ,System" (HRS), to decide whether a site should be 
placed on the NPL. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 n.12; RODGERS, supra 
note 76, § 8.4. at 714-17 (describing the operation of the HRS); WHI1MAN, supra note 74, 
§ 2.02(a)-(c); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 45 n.27; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 
52; see also CERCLA § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (subsection added in 1986 requiring amend-
ments to the HRS to "assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that the hazard ranking system 
accurately assesses the relative degree of risk to human health and the environment posed by 
sites and facilities subject to review"). The site is first proposed to be added to the NPL. After 
evaluating the public comments, the agency determines whether the site should be scored at 
greater than 28.5 on the HRS, and if so, the site is listed. Kit R. Krickenberger & Pamela Rekar, 
Superfund Settlements: Breaking the Logjam, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2,384 (1989); see also RE-
SOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 n.12; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 716. The 
NPL is "dynamic," with sites added and (less frequently) deleted quite often.' See id. § 8.6, at 
754. Thus, there is no guarantee that a brownfield site will not become an NPL site. 
94. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 769 n.12 and 
cases cited therein; WHI1MAN, supra note 74, § 5.01, at 134; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; 
Solo, supra note 23, at 293. For a typical small business owner's perspective on this aspect of the 
CERCLA liability scheme, see Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74, at 258 (testify-
ing that "liability, regardless of responsibility for contamination, ... results in unjust and se-
verely detrimental financial hardship to innocent parties"). 
95. For discussions of the EPA's comprehensive enforcement powers under CERCLA, see 
Beth l.Z. Boland, Consent Decrees Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 
1987 U. Ctt1. LEGAL F. 451; John C. Butler III et al., Allocating Superfund Costs: Cleaning Up 
the Controversy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,133 (1993); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 61-
66; Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from 1981- · 
1991, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (1991); Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National 
Contingency Plan-More Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 
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the cleanup itself,96 or, acting pursuant to Section 106 of CERCLA,97 
order responsible parties to clean up the site.98 In either case, the 
responsible parties are strictly99 and jointly and severally liable for re-
imbursement of all costs of removal or remedial actions that are con-
sistent with the National Contingency Plan,100 unless one or more can 
sustain the very heavy burden of establishing the divisibility of its con-
tribution at the liability stage.101 The defenses to CERCLA are nar-
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(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222 (1990); Kurt A. Strasser & Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the 
Trees in CERCLA Liability, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 493 (1993); William W. Bakke, Note, 
Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123 (1988). 
96. The EPA is authorized to pursue a short-term removal or long-term remedial action 
consistent with the NCP. CERCLA § 104(a}(l}, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a}(l); see RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.1, at 687. This authority is usually 
invoked only when no responsible party will undertake the cleanup. Id. 
97. 42 u.s.c. § 9606. 
98. The EPA 's orders, known as "unilateral administrative orders" (UAO}, may be issued 
whenever necessary "to protect public health and welfare and the environment." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9606(a); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 4.9, at 379 n.31; see also HAROLD c. BARNETT, TOXIC 
DEBTS AND THE SUPERFUND DILEMMA 261 (1994) (describing the increase in the number of 
unilateral orders issued). CERCLA attempts to give the responsible parties an incentive to com-
ply with these orders, by allowing parties who have complied with a UAO to file petitions with 
the EPA requesting that the Superfund reimburse the "reasonable costs" of compliance with 
such an order. 42 U .S.C. § 9606(b ). But the EPA need only grant such petitions if the petitioner 
can show "it is not liable for response cost under section 9607(a)" or that "the response action 
ordered was arbitrary or capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." This is an 
extremely heavy burden to meet. 
On its face, § 106 is a broadly worded provision that would not limit the EPA 's ability to use 
its unilateral order authority against a brownfield developer. See Pollution Control Indus. v. 
Reilly, 715 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that § 106 is a broadly written provision that 
"enables the EPA Administrator to issue orders as may be necessary to protect public health and 
welfare and the environment"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 
1113 (D. Minn. 1982) ("section 106(a) ... contains no limitations on the classes of persons within 
its reach"). 
99. NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 2; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, 
at 7; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at 293. 
Courts have consistently held that the standard of liability imposed by § 107 of CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C. § 9607, is strict. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 783 (stating that "[a]lthough 
Congress explicitly deleted references to strict liability before the enactment of CERCLA in 
1980, the cost recovery cases never have entertained seriously the possibility that liability under 
Section 107 requires a showing of negligence or fault"); see also United States v. Monsanto Co., 
858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood East Home-
owners v. Charles Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (declaring that Congress intended responsible parties to be 
strictly liable under CERCLA); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 
546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). For an excellent discussion of "strict liability" cases litigated under CER-
CLA, see McSlarrow et al., supra note 95, at 10,367. 
The applicability of strict liability under CERCLA has been the subject of intense debate in 
Congress's consideration of Superfund reform measures. See, e.g., Lois J. Schiffer, Keep 
Superfund Liability Intact, ENVTL F., SeptJOct. 1995, at 25 (Assistant Attorney General for 
Environment and Natural Resources arguing against legislative repeal of strict liability); Bob 
Smith, Repeal Retroactive Liability, Amend Joint and Several, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 30 
(chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control, and 
Risk Assessment arguing in favor of a "proportionate" liability system). 
100. CERCLA § 107(a)(4}(A}, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4}(A}. 
101. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.6, at 
764; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 43; Solo, supra note 23, at 293; 
see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating 
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rowly tailored and rarely available, particularly for lenders and 
"innocent" investors.102 The EPA's broad information-gathering 
power under Section 104 of CERCLA may force developers to turn 
that CERCLA defendants may escape joint and several liability only by demonstrating that 
harm .is subject to reasonable apportionment under the divisibility rule recognized in REST A TE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 433A (1965)); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (asserting that imposition of joint and several liability promotes CERCLA's 
legislative intent); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stat-
ing that CERCLA defendants bear the burden of proving divisibility). Like CERCLA 's imposi-
tion of strict liability, the joint and several liability interpretation has been debated in the 
Congress. See, e.g., Schiffer, supra note 99, at 25 (arguing against repeal of joint and several 
liability); Smith, supra note 99, at 30 (arguing in favor of amending CERCLA to implement a 
proportionate liability system). 
102. The only statutory defenses to liability under CERCLA are that the release was 
"caused solely" by an act of God, an act of war, or "an act or omission of a third party other than 
an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection 
with a contractual relationship." CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). These defenses are 
rarely available in CERCLA cases. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8. at 795-99 and cases 
cited therein. 
CERCLA's "innocent landowner defense," a subset of the third defense outlined above, has 
been construed very narrowly and "has not been effectively utilized." Solo, supra note 23, at 294 
n.38; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, 
at 12 (noting that CERCLA's innocent landowner defense does not "remove uncertainties asso-
ciated with ownership"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 84-85. Defining the innocent landowner 
defense and analyzing its ineffectiveness requires an excursion through several provisions of 
CERCLA. First is the basic liability section, § 107(a)(l) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l), 
which imposes CERCLA liability on. among others, the "owner or operator" of a "facility." An 
owner of contaminated property may therefore be liable for response costs under CERCLA. It 
may, however, establish a defense to CERCLA liability by proving that it meets the test of 
§ 3107(b)(3) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). 
The landowner must prove other elements of the defense enumerated in § 107(b)(3) and 
cannot use the defense if the release occurred "in connection with a contractual relationship." 
Section 101(35)(A) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) specifically defines "contractual rela-
tionship" to include ''land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession," 
such as leases unless the property was acquired after the disposal or placement of the hazardous 
substance which is the subject of the release or threat of release and the landowner establishes 
by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time he acquired the property, he had no knowl-
edge or reason to know of the disposal of the hazardous substances at the facility. The innocent 
landowner defense will then exempt a current owner from liability under CERCLA if the owner 
did not contribute to the contamination and undertook "all appropriate inquiry into the previous 
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial and customary practice." 
42 u.s.c. § 9601(35)(B); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 798-99; see COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 24, at 7; McWilliarns, supra note 20, at 727; Michel, supra note 20, at 455 n.179. 
To avail itself of the innocent landowner defense, then, a lender or prospective purchaser 
must not have been aware of the contamination at the site. This is becoming more unlikely, 
because an audit of existing conditions at the site is a feature of many commercial real estate 
transactions: 
As a practical matter, such information is almost always known at the time of sale. Many 
states (but not including New York) require that any finding of contamination on a site must 
be listed on the deed so that a sale cannot occur without the purchaser knowing about such 
contamination. Most lenders also require that an environmental audit be conducted on the 
property prior to agreeing to a purchase, partially because of their own fear of future liabil-
ity. It is, therefore, almost impossible to purchase urban industrial land without first having 
been notified of any chemical contaminants on the property. Once the buyer has been 
notified of contamination, the innocent landowner defense is no longer available. 
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 84-85; see also Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 26 (claiming 
that better detection methods show more sites to be contaminated and leave fewer buyers able 
to use the innocent landowner defense); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7; RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 26 (assessments typically required in property transactions); 
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over detailed information about their financial situations.103 
Although CERCLA contains incentives for the EPA to settle its 
claims against responsible parties,104 the EPA's settlement policies of-
fer little hope to developers of escaping the crushing burden of joint 
and several liability .105 
b. Uncertain Cleanup Standards and Costs 
Developers fear that potential exposure to liability under CER-
CLA prevents them from making reliable estimates of site cleanup 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.8, at 798-99 n.111 and cases cited therein; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 
48; Solo, supra note 23, at 295-96. 
103. Section 104(e)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2), allows EPA to seek three broad 
categories of information: 
Any officer, employee, or representative described in paragraph (1) may require any person 
who has or may have information relevant to any of the following to furnish, upon reason-
able notice, information or documents relating to such matter: (A) The identification, na-
ture, and quantity of materials which have been or are generated, treated, stored, or 
disposed of at a vessel or facility or transported to a vessel or facility. (B) The nature or 
extent of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contami-
nant at or from a vessel or facility. (C) Information relating to the ability of a person to pay 
for or to perform a cleanup. 
If the party refuses to tum over information, it may be ordered to do so. Id. § 9604(e)(5). A 
letter from the EPA requesting information under § 104 would probably be a brownfield devel-
oper's first exposure to the remedial process at a Superfund site. At this point, the party typi-
cally knows little more than that it is involved in an environmental law problem. See Lynnette 
Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 83, 84 (1992). 
104. Section 122, added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (SARA) in 1986, expressly authorizes EPA to enter into agreements which "are in the pub-
lic interest . . . in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation." 42 
U.S.C. § 9622. Section 122 authorizes the EPA to provide certain substantive elements in a 
settlement agreement. For example, the EPA is authorized to enter into "mixed funding" or 
partial agreements with Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) under which certain costs of the 
prospective cleanup will be financed by the government from the Superfund. The EPA also has 
authority to grant releases from liability by issuing covenants not to sue. See Buzbee, supra note 
26, at 64. 
105. Despite the policy of CERCLA § 122 favoring voluntary settlement of Superfund dis-
putes, there are many barriers to settlements, and commentators have been heavily critical of 
§ 122 and its limited effectiveness. See Frederick W. Addison, III, Reopener Liability Under 
Section 122 of CERCLA: "From Here to Eternity," 45 Sw. L.J. 1081 (1991); Buzbee, supra note 
26, at 61-66; Frank B. Cross, Settlement Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 66 OR. L. REv. 
517 (1987); James M. Strock, Settlement Policy Under the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 58 U. Cow. L. REV. 599 (1988); Balcke, supra note 95; Peter F. 
Sexton, Comment, Superfund Settlements: The EPA's Role, 20 CONN. L. REv. 923 (1988). For 
example, within 60 days of receiving a "Special Notice Letter" from the EPA that they are in-
volved with a Superfund site, see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(l), PRPs must organize and decide 
whether to submit a good faith proposal to undertake or finance the cleanup operation. Id. 
§ 9622(e)(2)(B). At this point there are typically a large number of PRPs with little information 
with which to assess how to allocate liabilities and responsibilities among themselves. Professor 
Buzbee also cites the statutory requirement to require "reopeners" in Superfund settlements as a 
disincentive to finality. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 63-64; see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A). 
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costs.106 They perceive, in particular, that cleanup costs threaten to 
exceed the market values of these properties.107 
This uncertainty is attributable in part to the considerable vague-
ness and uncertainty associated with applicable cleanup standards.108 
For example, it is nearly impossible to determine in advance the re-
quired level or cost of a cleanup under CERCLA.109 The cleanup 
106. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74, 
at 260 (stating that "[t]he unlimited and undefined costs of a cleanup are a constant impediment 
to a small firm's survival"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 75; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 50 (using 
a hypothetical case to conclude that buyers and sellers of brownfield sites "can only estimate 
prospective value and prospective cost; even the best lawyers and consultants cannot tell them 
what cleanup plans would legally suffice"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 726 (observing that 
"the threat of spiraling environmental assessment and remediation costs creates financial uncer-
tainty and makes predicting future development costs difficult"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, 
supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 287-88. 
107. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 3; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 47 n.33 (noting that 
"[w]ith cleanup costs regularly running in the multi-million dollar range, many contaminated 
parcels standing alone have a negative value"); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36-37 (stating that 
"[b]ecause the risks are both difficult to quantify and potentially enormous, contaminated indus-
trial property frequently becomes unmarketable"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 715; Tondro, 
supra note 20, at 789; Solo, supra note 23, at 298 & n.71 ("In many cases, the cost of liability is 
found to 'far exceed the value of the property in an environmentally clean condition."') (quoting 
Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 885, 885 (1992)). The Urban Land Institute's Tom Black calculates that 
industrial sites typically range in price from $1 to $6 per square foot: at that rate, assuming a 
postdevelopment increase of $2 per square foot in the value of the property, a five-acre site 
supports about $370,000 in cleanup costs. Black, supra note 42, at 51. For most contaminated 
sites of this size, says Black, this amount must cover the costs of site assessment, cleanup, and 
future liability costs. Id. 
Cleanups can cost far more than that. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (stating that 
"the developer of an inner-city Cleveland parcel ... spent nearly $225,000 per acre for site 
testing, remediation, and preparation," over five times the cost of a comparable project in the 
suburbs): COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 5 (putting remediation costs for a hypothetical 
brownfield site at between $100,000 and $5,000,000); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 94 (observ-
ing that "[t]he price of even a small cleanup can run into the millions"); see infra note 115 and 
accompanying text. Even the costs to assess existing conditions at the site can be significant. It 
has been estimated to take as much as $100,000 to assess the condition of a 20-acre site. See 
Michel, supra note 20, at 439 n.30 (quoting Urban Land Reclamation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and 
Technology, l03d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Dr. A.E. Moffitt, Jr., Vice 
President, Safety, Health and Environment, Bethlehem Steel Corporation)). 
Fear of environmental liability also increases the cost of borrowing from lenders, due to 
higher transaction costs. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 28 (lending costs have in-
creased "more than three-fold since 1980, according to some practitioners"); COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 14. 
108. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27-28; OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302; COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 10; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 10; Buzbee, 
supra note 26, at 47 (noting that "CERCLA cleanup standards in application are highly variable 
and subject to discretionary judgments, and thus yield unpredictable results"); O'Reilly, Indi-
ana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 52; Solo, supra note 23, at 288. 
109. NEPI WmTE PAPER, supra note 20, at 6; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, 
at 7 n.13; Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REv. 581, 584 (1995); Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alter-
native, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1996, at 22, 23 (stating that the cleanup standards of 
CERCLA § 121 "remain difficult to determine"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 59; see also Roo-
GERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-26 (describing the vagueness of the remedy selection phase). 
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standard embodied in Section 121 of CERCLA 110 forces a detailed 
inquiry to be undertaken at each site.111 Establishing the appropriate 
level of cleanup requires a wealth of information about the remedies 
that might work at each site.112 This information is generated in a 
lengthy,113 multistep process114 that is expensive115 and has been 
called a "slow-motion Kabuki."116 Cleanups also must comply with 
the standards of other federal and state laws th~t are "applicable or 
relevant and appropriate"117 which introduces a maddening complex-
110. 42 u.s.c. § 9621 (1994). 
111. Excellent descriptions of the Superfund remedial process can be found in RODGERS, 
supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-48; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-88; and Starfield, supra note 95. 
The screening of potential remedies illustrates the complexity of the process. Proposed remedies 
are screened using nine remedy selection criteria: "(l) health protectiveness, (2) compliance 
with relevant laws and standards, (3) long-term effectiveness and permanence, (4) reduction of 
toxicity, mobility, or volume through treatment, (5) short-term effectiveness, (6) imple-
mentability, (7) cost, (8) state acceptance, and (9) community acceptance." Abrams, supra note 
109, at 587; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9621; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 727. As Professor 
Abrams notes, this analysis is further constrained 
by treating the first two factors as "threshold" criteria that must be met, the next five as 
"balancing" criteria that weigh trade-offs among remedies, and the final two as "modifying" 
criteria that allow for adjustments in the selection process to accommodate the political 
realities in selecting among otherwise viable alternatives. 
Abrams, supra note 109, at 587. 
112. BARNETI, supra note 98, at 98 (observing that Superfund cleanups require "extensive 
technical information on the cost, efficacy, availability, and applicability of alternative remedies 
to site specific contamination problems"); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 725; Abrams, supra 
note 109, at 586-87; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that "[e]ven an amended CERCLA 
would require some degree of site-specific analysis, taking into account a site's geology, popula-
tion patterns, future use, type and extent of contamination, and the costs of alternative cleanup 
techniques and levels"). 
113. Despite increasing experience with Superfund cleanups, the process can still take a 
number of years to complete. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7 n.13 (stating 
that "[t]he total cleanup process can take up to ten years"); RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 
725-26; Abrams, supra note 109, at 581 (stating that it typically takes about eight years after a 
Superfund site is discovered to select a remedy at the site). 
114. There are a number of principal stages in the Superfund remedial process, including the 
remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), which identifies possible cleanup remedies. 
The chosen remedy is embodied in a "Record of Decision" (ROD). Thereafter, the remedy is 
implemented through the remedial design-remedial action (RD/RA) phase, in which the specif-
ics of how the chosen remedy will be implemented are designed in detail (RD) and performed 
(RA). RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 724-48; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-88. 
115. The cost of cleaning up an average Superfund site is enormous. Each step in the reme-
dial process at an NPL site can cost millions of dollars, and cleanup costs at an average site have 
been estimated at over $25 million. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7 n.13; 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, at 725 (stating that an RI/FS can cost up to $10 million); WHIT-
MAN, supra note 74, at 5-6 (estimated response costs at a typical NPL site include an average of 
$1.3 million for a complete RI/FS, $1.5 million for remedial design, $25 million for remedial 
action, and nearly $4 million for 30-year operation and maintenance of the site). Moreover, as 
Whitman indicates, "[t]hese costs have risen quickly as EPA has applied 'stricter' cleanup stan-
dards pursuant to SARA .... " Id. at 6; see also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 
51 n.42 (citing O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing a $5,800,000 reimburse-
ment settlement to clean up a pig farm formerly used as waste disposal site). Although most 
brownfield sites probably would not cost this much to remediate, a developer would not know 
this in advance. 
116. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 608. 
117. This requirement, known as the "ARAR" requirement, is set forth in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 962l(d). ARARs include the following: 
No. 4] BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS 909 
ity to the process.118 Furthermore, there is no ability to learn from 
past experiences and develop predictability: under the statute, each 
site must be analyzed individually.119 
Proponents advance several justifications for promoting certainty 
in cleanup standards. First, they argue that predetermining (i.e., stan~ 
dardizing) the level of cleanup required can help make project deci-
sions more efficient~ Standardizing cleanup standards allows project 
developers to internalize project costs and, therefore, helps to ensure 
that only those projects that are efficient will be built.120 Owners and 
prospective investors presumably will be more motivated to invest in 
brownfield redevelopment if they can determine in advance whether 
they will recoup their expenditures on cleanups.121 Lenders, once 
wary of any involvement at brownfield sites, will open the money tap 
and provide the indispensable funding for brownfields. Insurers can 
even underwrite the cost of remediation, so that there will be a "cap" 
on financial responsibility. 122 Finally, the pace of cleanups can be 
more rapid with pre-set standards. 
Brownfield redevelopment advocates also say Superfund's 
cleanup standards are too strict.123 They believe that cleanup stan-
1) Cleanup standards and standards of control of other federal environmental laws (for 
example, those of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988)) or state 
environmental or facility siting laws that specifically address a hazardous substance, pollu-
tant, contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance found at a CERCLA 
site; and 
2) Promulgated standards that, while not directly applicable to the substance, location, or 
action, addresses problems or situations sufficiently similar to those encountered at a CER-
CLA site. 
See RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5. at 742-43. The use of ARARs "is unique to CERCLA and 
has generated controversy and confusion." Starfield, supra note 95, at 10,230; see also Buzbee, 
supra note 26, at 59 n.65; Michel. supra note 20, at 439 (terming the ARAR requirement a 
"prescription for litigation"). 
l18. RODGERS, supra nore 76, § 8.5, at 744 and cases cited therein (stating that "[c]ase law 
shows some of the difficulties that arise in identifying ARARs and in adjudging compliance"). 
To take one example, the cleanup might be required to meet the stringent requirements of the 
RCRA "corrective action" standard. Id. § 8.5, at 742; Michel, supra note 20, at 452 (stating that 
"(b]y imposing RCRA standards in CERCLA cleanup actions, huge costs are imposed, whereas 
human health and the environment can be adequately protected for significantly Jess by taking 
into account the intended future use of the site"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Initiatives, supra note 24, at 
54. 
119. RESOURCES FOR 1HE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 10; Abrams, supra note 109, at 584-87. 
A number of proposals have been advanced to streamline the Superfund remedy selection pro-
cess. Professor Abrams discusses the potential for reducing cleanup costs by standardizing cer-
tain features of the remedy selection process, and, in particular, by developing an archive of 
solutions that have proven to work at NPL sites. Id. at 588-93. 
120. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 737. 
121. Black, supra note 42, at 48. 
122. Id. at 50. 
123. Many commentators have asserted that Superfund cleanup standards have failed to 
resolve fundamental issues of "how clean is clean," and, in particular, force cleanups to risk 
levels far more stringent than necessary to protect health and the environment. See Superfund 
Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous 
Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (June 15, 1995) (testi-
mony of Becky Norton Dunlop) [hereinafter Dunlop Testimony] (stating that "(t]he Superfund 
Jaw has a misplaced emphasis because it employs a standard of hypothetical future risks for sites, 
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<lards are based on inaccurate and unrealistic assumptions about the 
risks posed by hazardous waste124 that overestimate the true risks 
posed by Superfund sites and produce overly stringent cleanups, par-
ticularly because cleanups are required to meet residential standards 
at all sites.125 If this view is correct, standards could be relaxed with-
out increasing the actual threat to human health and the environment. 
This is particularly true in the brownfield context, many say, given the 
intended use of most property for industrial or commercial 
purposes.126 
c. Other Uncertainties 
Developers and lenders also fear the lack of finality, especially 
the inability to obtain releases from liability for contamination ex-
isting on the property.127 If contamination is discovered in the future, 
nothing prevents an enforcement action against the developer.128 De-
velopers who settle state claims may face subsequent enforcement 
proceedings from the EPA.129 Finally, developers fear delays that 
without regard for actual or likely risks"); BARNETI, supra note 98, at 274-75 (discussing this 
debate); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 611 (likening Superfund cleanups to searches for "hy-
pothetical perfection"); NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 11 
(quoting a panelist's view that "it is reasonable to expect mitigation for identified risks, [but] it is 
not reasonable to require remediation for all hypothetical risks"); Joan Glickman, A Superfund 
Retrospective: Past, Present and . .. , Pua. MGMT., Feb. 1994, at 4 (describing criticisms of the 
EPA's risk assessment process); Michel, supra note 20, at 452 (citing Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Cycle (1993), for the proposition that "remediators 
must spend millions of dollars more than what is pragmatic to achieve pristine standards"); Solo, 
supra note 23, at 308. But see Glickman, supra, at 5-6 (stating that "[o]n the other side of the 
debate, some residents near Superfund sites argue that risk assessments do not adequately ac-
count for the synergistic effects of commingling contaminants and actually underestimate the 
effects of these toxics on human health"); Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Per-
spective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 568 (1994). 
124. The National Academy of Public Administration's recent report on the EPA's opera-
tions contains a severe critique of the EPA's risk assessment methodologies. NAPA REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 34-49. 
125. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 738. 
126. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 10 (citing a rec-
ommendation to "[s]et reasonable cleanup standard for identified risks and connect them to the 
intended use of the property"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (stating that "[r]edevelopment 
advocates have taken the reform of risk assessment one step further by lobbying for pre-set 
tiered standards that reflect current and reasonable future land uses"). 
127. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 14 (stating the 
common recommendation that "[p]roperty owners who complete required cleanups should be 
released from further liability"); id. at 27 (citing the statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy 
Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute, that "other barriers facing redevelopment include[ ] a dis-
heartening lack of certainty and finality in the legal process"); id. at 31 (quoting the statement of 
Curtis "Hank" Barnette, Chairman and CEO, Bethlehem Steel Corp., that "in exchange for 
cleanup to [redefined] standards, a complete release from further environmental liability must 
be provided to the owner of the property and others in the chain of ownership"). 
128. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27 (stating that a brownfield developer 
will "spend the rest of his natural life worrying if some as-yet-undetected contamination will 
surface, undermining the value of the property and possibly bringing with it potentially costly 
liability claims"). 
129. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 39-40 
(quoting the statement of Tim Vanderver. Senior Partner, Patton Boggs, that "(t]he private law-
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jeopardize the viability of their'projects:130 A CERCLA cleanup can 
take many years to complete, and, in that time, a project that was 
initially viable can become inefficient.131 
2. Uncertainty for Lending Institution.s 
Perhaps even more important than the disincentives for develop-
ers is the perception of lenders that they face risks for lending on con-· 
taminated property.132 As "the traditional sources of capital for 
factory rehabilitation and renovation for start-up companies,"133 their 
participation at brownfield sites is crucial to the success of most 
projects .. However, lenders often practice "greenlining," routinely re-
fusing to extend loans to brownfield redevelopers. 134 
Lenders fear they will become a target for liability under CER-
CLA if they lend money on brownfield redevelopment projects.135 
This fear is widespread136 and justified. Recent cases interpreting 
CERCLA have held lenders liable for cleanup costs at Superfund sites 
yer's worst fear is, after he signs the administrative order on behalf of his client with the state, is 
[sic] to have the EPA come in and say 'do it again"'). 
130. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 2; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 76; O'Reilly, Indi-
ana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 51-52 (stating that "[d]elay is so widely recognized as a flaw of 
[CERCLA] that advocates of inner-city rehabilitation are likely to be skeptical when told that 
waiting for cleanup under government mandates will suffice"); Solo, supra note 23, at 294 n.41 
(describing the "great delays" in Superfund cleanups). · 
131. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 55 (stating that "[t]he pragmatic devel-
oper fears that by the time an environmental agency can become satisfied that no further RCRA 
and CERCLA remediation duties exist for an industrial location, the manufacturer will no 
longer sustain interest in that manufacturing site"). 
132. id. at 45, 52 (claiming that "[f]ear of liability encourages banks to withhold loans and 
opportunities for business development in inner cities"); Solo, supra note 23, at 299. 
133. O'Reilly, Indiana's incentives, supra note 24, at 52. 
134. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; Pennsylvaniti Chamber Testimony, 
supra note 74, at 260; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 39 (noting 
that lenders' caution may make property "unmarketable"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 730-31 
n.107 (citing Charles Bartsch et al., Restoring Contaminated Sites, lssuEs Sci. & TECH., Mar. 22, 
1994, at 74); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 54. The obvious analogy here is to 
the practice of "redlining," the systematic refusal of banks to extend loans to prospective home 
purchasers in certain neighborhoods. See, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15 (terming 
this practice "brownlining"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 731. 
135. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 27; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15; Solo, 
supra note 23, at 299; see also Eric S. Tresh, The Return of Lender Liability Under CERCLA: 
What Should Lenders Do?, 3 S.C. ENVTL L.J. 131, 133 (1994) (noting that lenders fear CERCLA 
liability by virtue of their involvement). 
136. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 15 (citing a poll by the American Bankers Asso-
ciation that indicated that "43 percent of small financial institutions ... had stopped making 
loans to companies associated with environmental contamination"); RESOURCES FOR THE Fu-
TURE, supra note 26, at 1-2 (citing a survey of its members by the Independent Bankers Associa-
tion of America found that "seven out of ten indicated that there are some classes of loans their 
institution will not write due to environmental liability concerns"); O'Reilly, Indiana's incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 53-54 (citing a study in New Jersey of lenders' fears); John Holusha, EPA 
Helping Cities to Revive Industrial Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 1 (citing the ABA survey). 
Lenders' fears of liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA were the subject of discussion at a 
recent conference on brownfield redevelopment. Uncertainty Greatest Concern of Lenders in 
Redeveloping Brownfields, Panel Says, 65 Banking Rep. (BNA) 654 (Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter 
Uncertainty Greatest Concern]. 
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as the "owner or operator" of the sites if they are sufficiently involved 
in activities at the sites.137 The scope of "lender liability" is· still a 
matter of intense debate.138 
137. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 7-9; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770; Michel, 
supra note 20, at 443-46; Solo, supra note 23, at 299. 
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994), excludes certain lenders from the 
definition of "owner or operator," exempting "a person who, without participating in the man-
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security inter-
est in the vessel or facility." See also RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 7: 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770. A number of recent cases, most notably United States v. 
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), and Kelley 
v. EPA. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub 
nom. American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995), have created considerable uncer-
tainty in the lending community over the scope of this exemption. In Fleet Factors, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that the lender was liable as the "operator" of the facility because "its involvement 
with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could 
affect hazardous waste disposal if it so chose." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558; see RESOURCES 
FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 26 n.48; RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.7, at 770; Alfred R. 
Light, Deja Vu All Over Again?: A Memoir of Superfund Past, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 
1995, at 29, 32; Michel, supra note 20, at 445-46; Tresh, supra note 135, at 138. Fleet Factors "sent 
shock waves through the financial community," subjecting virtually every lender to CERCLA 
liability, as lenders usually have the requisite level of control over borrowers. See, e.g., COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 8-9; Tresh, supra note 135, at 138. Recognizing this, lenders began 
shunning contaminated property and asking Congress for relief. Light, supra, at 32; Michel, 
supra note 20, at 446; Tresh, supra note 135, at 139-40. 
Not all courts of appeals followed the rationale of Fleet Factors. The Ninth Circuit held that 
a lender must actually participate in the management of the facility before it could be considered 
to be an "owner or operator." In re Bergsoe Metals Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 8 (discussing Bergsoe Metals). Bergsoe Metals was of small 
comfort to lenders, who believed they would still face liability under the relatively vague test of 
"actually participating" in management. Tresh, supra note 135, at 140-41. Moreover, the split in 
the circuits' rulings prompted widespread uncertainty. In response, the EPA adopted a rule in 
1992 that specifically defined the scope of activities which a lender could undertake without 
"participating in management" of a facility and clarified the protections available to a foreclos-
ing lender. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 446-47. For example, 
the rule subjected the lender to liability only if it had "undertaken responsibility for the bor-
rower's waste disposal or hazardous substance handling practices," or "exercised control at a 
management level ... comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that 
(it) ha(s] assumed or manifested responsibility for the management of the enterprise." 57 Fed. 
Reg. 18,344, 18,377 (1992); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 446-47: Tresh, supra note 135, at 
144. Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the lender liability 
rule in Kelley on the grounds that the EPA was attempting to change CERCLA by regulation 
and did not have the authority to promulgate the rule. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d at 1108; see also 
Light, supra, at 32; Michel, supra note 20, at 448-49; Tresh, supra note 135, at 145-50. Therefore, 
the uncertainty over lender liability persists, and Congress will have to act if lender liability 
under CERCLA is to be limited. See Berger et al., supra note 23, at 78; Light, supra, at 32; 
Michel, supra note 20, at 449; Tresh, supra note 135, at 149-51 (noting that the Kelley court 
stated that even though its decision would cause continued uncertainty, it was necessary, given 
the invalidity of the EPA's rule); Solo, supra note 23, at 299-300. 
138. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 53; Solo, supra note 23, at 299. Evan 
Henry, Bank of America's Vice President and Manager for Environmental Services, stated at a 
recent conference that "[t)he environmental liability precedent set by CERCLA is still alive and 
well," and "lenders can get tagged for environmental cleanup costs associated with the property 
that are above and beyond" the amount of their loans. Uncertainty Greatest Concern, supra note 
136, at 654. For recent discussions of lender liability's continued vitality after Kelley v. EPA, and 
the call from the financial community for reform, see Sara A. Goldberg, Lender Liability Under 
CERCLA: Shaping a New Legal Rule, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 61 (1995); Light, supra note 137, at 
32 (stating that Kelley invalidated the EPA's rule intended to "fix" the lender liability problem); 
Tresh, supra note 135, at 136. On the subject of lender liability generally, see William R. Mitch-
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There are other considerations besides liability. Lenders fear that 
the discovery of contamination at the site will decrease the market 
value of their collateral139 or compel borrowers to spend large sums 
on cleanups, forcing them to default on loans.140 
C. The Call for Reform 
We should be cautious about making generalizations about the 
impact of developers' fears of environmental laws and, for that mat-
ter, any other assertion.that environmental laws prevent activity that 
would otherwise take place.141 The flight of businesses to greenfield 
sites began long before CERCLA's enactment in 1980.142 Research-
ers have yet to establish a causal link between businesses' location 
decisions and perceived environmental costs.143 Moreover, fear of en-
vironmental liability is not the only problem with brownfield sites.144 
A recent study by the nonprofit group Resources for the Future con-
cluded that there are many other reasons besides fear of environmen-
tal liability why brownfield sites remain undeveloped.145 High urban 
ell, CERCLA: The Problem of Lender Liability, 7 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 101 (1991); Philip 
J. Schworer & Catherine M. White, Environmental Problems and Their Effect on Lending Insti-
tutions, 18 N. KY. L. REv. 175 (1991). 
139. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 78; Mc Williams, 
supra note 20, at 726; Tresh, supra note 135, at 133; Solo, supra note 23, at 299. 
140. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, 
at 26 n.48; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 77-78; Patrice Courtney, Urban Alchemy: Turning 
Brown to Green, VIRGINIA'S ENv'T, Feb. 1996, at 14 (quoting Stephen Driver, Manager of Con-
struction and Environmental Services, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bridgeport, CT) ("A bank wants 
to know that the borrower is not going to go bankrupt."); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 726; 
Tresh, supra note 135, at 133; Solo, supra note 23, at 299. 
141. The perception that environmental laws have a chilling effect on business location deci- · 
sions may simply be inaccurate. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 6 (conclud-
ing that "among the conclusions in the literature, the empirical evidence of the effect of 
environmental regulation on land use is ambiguous"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 40 n.12 (stating 
that "while uncertainty may play a contributing role in the continuing underutilization of old 
industrial properties, ascribing a causal relationship between the two is unwarranted"). 
In another context, my colleague, Michael Allan Wolf, has questioned the credibility of 
"horror stories" cited by advocates of "reforming" the Endangered Species Act. Michael Allan 
Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 637 (1995). 
142. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 4. 
143. Id. (stating that "[r]esearchers in general have yet to find a systematic relationship be-
tween environmental regulation and corporate location decisions"); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 
114 n.282. 
144. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303 (testifying that "[m]any brownfield stakeholders 
are quick to point out that concern about environmental contamination is only part of the prob-
lem"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 72; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9-10. Clement Dinsmore 
lists a number of obstacles to brownfield redevelopment besides fear of liability under state and 
federal environmental laws. Id. 
145. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY C?N 
INDUSTRIAL AND GREENFIELDS DEVELOPMENT (1994). In the view of at least one commentator, 
however, this study may be flawed in that it was prepared under contract to the EPA. Interview 
with Clement Dinsmore, Clean Sites, Inc., in Alexandria, Va. (July 27, 1995). 
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crime rates,146 obsolescence of existing infrastructures147 and manu-
facturing facilities at brownfield sites, 148 and access from greenfield 
sites to amenities and recreation149 are frequently cited as reasons for 
developers' flight to greenfield sites. 
Nevertheless, it is a widespread-and perhaps even universal-
assumption that fear of environmental liability is the dominant con-
cern of brownfield developers.150 As a result, prospective purchasers 
of contaminated brownfield properties often shun sites rather than 
buy them and face environmental liability.151 The costs of brownfield 
redevelopment are perceived to exceed the benefits, and therefore 
worthy development does not take place. Thus, industries and cities 
claim that without the incentives provided by voluntary cleanup stat-
utes, the projects will not be undertaken.152 
Ill. STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP STATUTES AND FEDERAL 
INCENTIVES 
The EPA and the Congress have been active in brownfield policy 
making, but the states have taken the lead in promoting voluntary 
146. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10; Tondro, supra 
note 20, at 790 n.3. 
147. Although some brownfield sites have excellent existing infrastructures, see supra note 
59 and accompanying text, others are located near infrastructures too deteriorated to support 
development activities. See OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 307-08 (testifying that "[t)here are 
a number of other factors that hinder brownfield redevelopment," including "poor location" and 
"old and obsolete infrastructure"). The fact that businesses are lured to greenfield sites with 
promises to construct new infrastructures indicates that this is an important factor in business 
location decisions. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 720 n.52 (citing a study of 2000 finns 
conducted by the Bureau of Census that found that "the availability of public works facilities" is 
characterized as a 'critical' or 'significant' factor in location decisions"). 
148. For example, Dinsmore states that: 
economic or technological obsolescence of the buildings still standing on many of these 
lands also affects the economics of recycling the properties. Typically, these are multi-sto-
ried buildings that will not permit the large-scale, high-volume assembly and materials han-
dling that industries now use. Demolishing the buildings and transporting and landfilling 
the debris adds significant costs to the preparation of sites for alternative uses. 
Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 10; see also Tondro, supra note 20, at 790 n.3 ("Frequently ... 
[brownfield sites] have obsolete buildings that would be costly to renovate or demolish in order 
to make way for modem manufacturing structures."). 
149. See, e.g., OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 303 (stating that "other factors such as ... 
low-quality amenities ultimately prevent redevelopment of brownfield sites"). JoEL GARREAU, 
EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991), contains a number of case studies of the role 
of suburban amenities in the growth of suburban and exurban concentrations of activity, popu-
larly known as "Edge Cities." 
150. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that "[u]ncertain 
liability associated with federal and state environmental laws is perhaps the most critical" chal-
lenge at brownfield sites). 
151. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 716 (noting that "[a)s a result, the owner is 
encouraged to remove the property from the market, thereby losing the resale value of the 
property but escaping the risk of paying for the entire cleanup"). 
152. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 (noting the substantial support for voluntary cleanup 
programs). 
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cleanups at brownfield sites. 153 The most common approaches are re-
forms of property transfer laws154 and enactment of voluntary cleanup 
statutes that cre~te new programs and reform state CERCLA laws. 
The voluntary cleanup statutes are the most widespread and receive 
the most attention. 155 
A. State Voluntary Cleanup Statutes 
1. The Statutes and Their Common Features 
Twenty-nine states have statutes and regulations that establish 
programs to provide incentives for voluntary cleanups of contami-
nated sites,156 and this number is growing rapidly.157 Several states, 
153. See, e.g., NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 43; Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 
(stating that "[t]he most dramatic changes are taking place in the states, not in Washington"); 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 103; Bernard A. Weintraub, New Jersey's Approach to the Voluntary 
Remediation of Brownfield Sites, N.J. L.J., June 5, 1995, at 16 (noting that "while the federal 
government is part of this movement ... , most of the attempts to facilitate the remediation and 
redevelopment of brownfield sites are occurring on the state level"). For a description of federal 
brownfield activities, see infra notes 407-76 and accompanying text. 
154. Property transfer laws condition the transfer of real property (or its ownership or con-
trol) on the discovery, identification, investigation, cleanup, or filing of disclosure forms about 
contamination at the site. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 12-13; Tondro, supra 
note 20, at 793. In 1994, 18 states. including New Jersey and Connecticut, had property transfer 
laws. OTA STATE OF nrn STATES, supra note 20, at 12; see, e.g., Tondro, supra note 20, at 792 
(~iting the Connecticut Transfer of Hazardous Waste Establishment Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN.'§ 22a-134 (West 1995)). These statutes were intended to facilitate the reuse of property by 
providing a statutory mechanism for cleanups. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 11. _However, 
they often had the opposite effect: chilling cleanups due to the complex process involved in 
property transfers. Thus, reforms to these laws may hold promise for brownfield site reuse. Id. 
at 807-10. 
New Jersey and Connecticut are the two states which have enacted the most comprehensive 
statutes to change the disincentives to property reuse in existing property transfer laws. In 1993, 
New Jersey enacted the "Industrial Site Recovery Act" (ISRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -
14 (West Supp. 1996), which was intended to streamline the cumbersome property transfer pro-
cess of the state's "Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act" and provide incentives for 
site reuse. See OTA STATE OF nrn STATES, supra note 20, at 12-13; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 
107 n.254; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (describing the amended cleanup standards of 
ISRA). New Jersey's voluntary cleanup program applies to low priority sites under the require-
ments of the ISRA. See N.J. ADMJN. CooE tit. 7, § 26C (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996) 
(outlining scope and procedures for remedial activities under Memoranda of Agreement); COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82. Connecticut's Urban Sites Remedial Action Program {US-
RAP), created by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West 1995), operates in conjunction with 
the state's Transfer Act. In 1995, Connecticut enacted two laws expanding its voluntary cleanup 
program. Id. § 22a-134a (a)-( e), (m) (modifying the requirements of the transfer act); id. §§ 22a-
452d, -452e, -432, -133k, -134e, -1330, -133p, -134d; 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190 §§ 1-6, 14 (provid-
ing for voluntary cleanups and defining the role of licensed professionals); see also Reed D. 
Rubinstein, Waiting for the Happy Ending, CONN. L. TRJB., Nov. 13, 1995, at S4. 
155. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
156. States' voluntary cleanup programs operate under a combination of authorities, includ-
ing statutes specifically intended to promote voluntary cleanups, existing statutory authorities 
(typically state CERCLA Jaws), regulations promulgated under the authority of new statutes, 
existing regulations, and informal policy and guidance documents. In Oregon, for example, the 
Volunteer Cleanup Program has operated since 1991 under the state CERCLA law, OR. REv. 
STAT. §§ 465.200-.455 {1992 & Supp. 1996), and the regulations promulgated under it, OR. Ao. 
MIN. R. 340-122-010 to -140 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). In addition, guidance docu-
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including New Hampshire and New York, have programs in place 
without direct statutory authority or have pilot projects.158 These 
ments have been issued that amplify specific issues such as numerical soil cleanup standards as 
found in OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-045 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). In 1995, the Oregon 
Legislature acted to amend the state CERCLA law to promote voluntary cleanups. See 1995 Or. 
Laws 662. However, certain features of the program described in this article such as the public 
participation requirements as found in OR. REV. STAT.§ 465.320 (1992) and OR. ADMIN. R. 340-
122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995), were unaffected by the 1995 act and continue to be 
based on existing authority. The list in the appendix contains the authorities upon which each 
state bases its program. See infra app. 
For general descriptions of state programs, see NEPI WHITE PAPER. supra note 20, at 43-47 
(comparing the approaches in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and California); OTA 
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9-24; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 9, 10-12; Stephen C. 
Jones, Unless Congress Authorizes the EPA to Grant Developers Releases from Liabiliry, New 
Inner-City Cleanup Programs May Be of Limited Value, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at B6. Spe-
cific descriptions of individual statutes are found in COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 71-115 
(describing existing programs according to the EPA Region in which the states are located}; 
Brian L. Buniva & James R. Kibler, Jr., Virginia Joins National Trend in Protecting Environmen-
tal Audits and Encouraging Voluntary Remediation of Contaminated Sites, VA. BAR Ass'N J., 
Summer 1995, at 8 (describing the Virginia statute); Buzbee, supra note 26, at 118-22 app. 1 
(listing 19 statutory and several informal voluntary cleanup programs in place by 1995); Casserly, 
supra note 26, at 265-74 (describing the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes); Clokey, supra note 
26 (describing the Wisci>nsin statute); Thomas J. Helfrich, Missouri Hazardous Substance Envi-
ronmental Remediation Program: One Year Later, 5 Mo. Envtl. Compliance Update (M. Lee 
Smith}, No. 3, at 1 (Sept. 1995) (describing the Missouri program); Michel, supra note 20, at 454-
64 (describing the Ohio statute); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56-67 (describ-
ing the Indiana statute); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121-56 {describing the California, Colorado, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia statutes, and the Illinois 
program); Rubinstein, supra note 154 {describing the Connecticut statutes); Thomas A. Wacker-
man, Take Advantage of "New" Relief for Polluted Propeny, MICH. LAW. WKL v., June 26, 1995, 
at 6 (describing the Michigan statute); Weintraub, supra note 153 {describing the New Jersey 
statute). 
Ohio and Pennsylvania maintain comprehensive sites on the Internet's World Wide Web to 
assist persons interested in voluntary cleanups. See About the Ohio Voluntary Action Program 
(last modified Aug. 22, 1996) <http://www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html> [hereinafter Ohio Vol-
untary Action Program]; Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program, (last modified July 23, 1996) 
<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/landrecy/default.htm>. Other states with 
program information available on the Internet include Maine and Massachusetts. Bureau of 
Hazardous Materials & Solid Waste Control, Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, The Voluntary 
Cleanup Program {last modified July 1994) <http://www.state.me.us/dep/ip-vraphtm>; Massa-
chusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup Home Page {last modified July 
10, 1996) <http://www.state.ma.us/dep/bwsc/bwschome.htm>. 
157. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that voluntary cleanup pro-
grams "are being developed at a rapid pace" with 17 programs adopted since 1991); see also 
Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (stating that "[a]lready 25 states have some sort of voluntary 
cleanup program, and the trend is expected to accelerate"). In 1995, for example, states enacting 
or substantially modifying their voluntary cleanup statutes included Arkansas, Connecticut 
(which expanded its voluntary cleanup statute and enacted substantial amendments to its prop-
erty transfer act), Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra app. 
158. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77-78, 84-85 {describing the New Hampshire and 
New York programs); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 92-93 (describing efforts to enact a volun-
tary cleanup statute in New York). The New York Department of Environmental Conservation 
implemented a voluntary cleanup program in 1994, based on a policy memorandum. See CoM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84-85; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 119 app. 1; Steven G. Brooks, 
Cities Look to Brownfields for Greenbacks, NATION'S CmEs WKLY., Sept. 4, 1995, at 5. Propos-
als have been introduced in the New York General Assembly and State Senate in recent years to 
create a statutory voluntary cleanup program. See N.Y. S.B. 3848, 218th General Assembly, 1st 
Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y. S.B. 341, 218th General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). None of these 
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states and others are considering proposals to adopt voluntary cleanup 
statutes.159 Some states such as Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
and Ohio, have extensive programs tailored to redevelopment of 
brownfield sites, whereas others such as North Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Virginia, have more limited voluntary cleanup statutes.160 The 
most developed programs are those in the northeastern and midwest-
proposals has been enacted into law, although Senate Bill No. 3848 did pass one house of the 
legislature in 1995. The New York Voluntary Cleanup Program has many of the same features as 
statutory programs. For example, a participant in the program may receive a "no further action" 
letter from the state regarding the state's intent to avoid pursuing enforcement actions at the 
site. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84-85. However, because the New York program is 
based on the state's administrative discretion, a participant in it does not have the same guaran-
tees as participants in other states' programs. See Beth Fitting, Environmentalists, Developers, 
and the Regulators Finally Seem to Be Pulling in the Same Direction, CENTRAL N.Y. Bus. J., July 
10, 1995, at 10 (quoting the statement of Neil Gingold, an attorney with the Syracuse, NY law 
firm of Hancock & Estabrook, that "[t]here is no legislation in this state to guarantee freedom 
from future liability"). 
California has both a statutory cleanup program, a pilot project created in the California 
Expedited Remedial Action Reform Act of 1994, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE §§ 25396-
25399.2 (West Supp. 1996), and an informal Voluntary Cleanup Program. See COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 109; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 118 app. 1 (listing the California programs). The 
notation "California ERAP" in the charts in this part refers to the statutory pilot project; the 
notation "California VCP" refers to the Voluntary Cleanup Program. 
As the voluntary cleanup programs in Iowa and Kansas are pilot projects, they are not 
counted among the states' programs or considered in this part. See id.; Program Surveys Re-
ceived from State Voluntary Clean Program Administrators (1996) [hereinafter Survey Results] 
(surveys compiled by and on file with author; program information is believed to be current as of 
July 1, 1996) (regarding the Iowa program). The Utah statute is included; however, no developer 
to date has entered into an agreement to perform a voluntary cleanup in the Utah program. See 
ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, VCP/BROWNFIELD RESOURCE GUIDE 31 (1995) [here-
inafter ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE]. The state of Utah cautions that its statute is not, strictly speaking, 
"written to serve as a voluntary cleanup program," and, as such, "does not contain the usual 
elements" of other states' statutes. Survey Results, supra. 
159. The Maryland and Oklahoma legislatures are currently considering proposals to create 
voluntary cleanup statutes. See 1996 Md. H.B. 5 (bill introduced Jan. 10, 1996, to establish a 
voluntary cleanup program in the Maryland Department of the Environment); 1996 Okla. H.B. 
2972 (bill introduced Jan. 12, 1996, to create a voluntary remediation program in Oklahoma); see 
also Judith Evans, Cleaning Up the Nation's 'Brownfields'; Critics Want Some Assurances Indus-
trial Sites Aren't Re-Polluted, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1995, at El (describing the development of 
the Maryland proposal); Maryland: Businesses Push for Brownfields Cleanup Bill, Greenwire, 
Dec. 4, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 12/4/95 APN-GR 17 [hereinafter Maryland Proposal]. 
160. By March 1996, no site had progressed through the Arkansas or Tennessee program to 
a final cleanup, and Vermont had only one site in its program; by contrast, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, and Minnesota had each had hundreds of sites enter their programs, and Indiana had 77 
sites in the program, with another four to six entering each month. Telephone Interviews with 
State Voluntary Cleanup Program Administrators (1996) [hereinafter Telephone Interviews] 
(program information is believed to be current as of July 1, 1996); see also Buzbee, supra note 
26, at 118-19 app. 1 (noting that states have handled as few as one site (California ERAP) and as 
many as 3600 sites (New Jersey)); Jones, supra note 156; cf OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra 
note 20, at 19 (noting that as of May 1995, over 100 sites had been cleaned up in the Minnesota 
program and limits on liability had been issued for 300 sites); Douglas E. Congdon, Virginia's 
Voluntary Cleanup Act: Where's the Beef?, VIRGINIA'S ENV'T, Feb. 1996, at 6 (noting that the 
Virginia program is currently handling fewer than a dozen sites); Courtney, supra note 140, at 15 
(noting incorrectly that site owners at over 800 sites have received certificates of completion in 
Massachusetts since October 1993; this number refers to the number of sites in the program); 
Rubinstein, supra note 154 (noting that Illinois regulators were handling 300 sites in the state's 
voluntary cleanup program by 1993). 
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em states161 of Connecticut,162 Illinois,163 Indiana,164 Massachu-
setts,165 Michigan,166 Minnesota,167 New Jersey,168 Ohio,169 
Pennsylvania,170 and Wisconsin.171 
The statutes vary widely in their structure and provisions. Some 
consist of amendments to state CERCLA laws or revamped state 
CERCLA schemes that encourage voluntary cleanups.172 Others are 
free-standing acts applying to sites and developers meeting statutory 
criteria for participation.173 Some spell out in detail such critical is-
161. Jones, supra note 156. 
162. Cf NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45 (describing Connecticut's cleanup funding 
mechanisms); Rubinstein, supra note 154 (criticizing the new Connecticut statute). 
163. See OTA STATE oF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 24; Rubinstein, supra note 154. 
164. See O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 56-57. 
165. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 75-77 (noting that eight to ten covenants already 
have been granted). 
166. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 23 (stating that the Michigan statute, 
together with those of Pennsylvania and Illinois, "characterizes many of the issues at the heart of 
the debate on brownfields"); Rubinstein, supra note 154 (stating that "Michigan lawmakers ... 
acted decisively ... [and] a few months later, their efforts are already paying off"). 
167. In 1988, Minnesota started what is generally recognized as the first voluntary cleanup 
program, working by administrative discretion within the state's mini-CERCLA _program. The 
program's codification in 1992 spurred further growth and development, and Minnesota's pro-
gram is viewed widely as a "pioneer" and model program. See THE GREENFIELDS GROUP, supra 
note 25, at 3; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (terming the Minnesota 
program the first voluntary cleanup program, and describing its features); Casserly, supra note 
26, at 262; Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6; Solo, supra note 23, at 318 n.177 (terming Minne~ 
sota's program a "model" voluntary cleanup program). A number of state officials contacted for 
this article cited the Minnesota statute as an influential model; the Louisiana statute closely 
resembles it. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
168. New Jersey's Industrial Site Recovery Act was not the first brownfield statute. How-
ever, the state is generally recognized as one of the first to create incentives for brownfield 
cleanups through the use of administrative discretion. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (cred-
iting New Jersey as the first state to provide incentives for brownfield cleanups); Pendergrass, 
supra note 26, at 6 (stating that "New Jersey was the first state to deal with the key problem, that 
developers and financers shy away from contaminated sites"); Weintraub, supra note 153, at 16. 
169. See Michel, supra note 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 124 (stating that "[t]he Ohio 
Voluntary Action Program is perhaps the most comprehensive voluntary cleanup legislation en-
acted into law"). 
170. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 15 (stating that the impact of the new Pennsylvania 
law may be "far-reaching"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 152-53 (terming the Pennsylvania pro-
gram "progressive," and "[a]rguably as comprehensive as the Ohio [program]"); Cliff Tuttle, The 
New Hot Properties: Old Industrial Sites: New 'Brownfield' Laws Should Entice Developers, 
Lenders, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 30, 1995, at 13. 
171. See Clokey, supra note 26, at 35 (stating that "[t]he new [Wisconsin] Act alters existing 
law in several significant respects and has had an immediate impact upon many real estate and 
financial transactions involving contaminated property within the state"). 
172. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Washington, among others, are states that 
have adopted this approach. See 70 Del. Laws ch. 218, amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, 
§§ 9101-9116 (1995), and Delaware Regulations Governing Hazardous Substance Cleanup§§ 1-
15 (1996) [hereinafter Delaware Regulations]; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West 
Supp. 1996) and MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0001-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No. 
794); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 324.20101-.20142 (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 70.105D.010-.921 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); and WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890 
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996). 
173. Illinois's "Site Investigation and Remedial Activities Program," for example, applies 
separate requirements to sites meeting statutory criteria, with other sites remaining subject to 
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sues as applicable cleanup standards,174 while others leave these de-
tails to rule-making proceedings175 and administrative discretion.17~ 
Statutory provisions have evolved rapidly as states learn from one an-
the state's CERCLA law. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5158 to 58.12 (West Supp. 1996); cf IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-1 to -23 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.). 
174. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.301 to -.304 (West Supp. 1996) (establishing 
procedures for determining cleanup standards). 
175. A number of states have supplemented their voluntary cleanup statutes with official 
regulations promulgated specifically under the new statutes' authority. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 
10, § 25-15.010 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
§§ 3745-300-01, 3745-300-03 to -05, 3745-300-12 to -14, 3745-300-99 (WESTLAW through Aug. 
31, 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203-(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting new rules, 30 TEx. ADMIN. 
CODE§§ 333.1-.11). Others rely upon rules developed to implement a state CERCLA law. See, 
e.g., MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0001-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); TENN. 
COMP. R. & REGS.§§ 1200-1-13-.01 to -.13 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); Wis. ADMIN. 
CoDE chs. NR 716, 724, 726 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); Clokey, supra 
note 26, at 39-44 (referring to provisions of Wisconsin's administrative rules); Casserly, supra 
note 26, at 273 (describing the Wisconsin approach); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
Some states provide authority and/or mandates to develop program rules. See, e.g.' DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, § 9104(b)(2) (WESTLAW through 1st Special Sess. of 138th General Assembly, 
1995); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.ll(c) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring rules to be promul-
gated within nine months after the effective date of the act); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-23 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing rule-making authority); LA.. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 30:2290(B) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 260.571 (West Supp. 1996); OR. 
REv. STAT. § 465.315(2) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.104(a) (West Supp. 1996); 
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-18 (Supp. 1996); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.612 
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that public participation may be provided for by rule; notice re-
quirement added to rules effective in 1996). · · 
Pennsylvania's Bureau of Land Recycling and Waste Management, together with the Bu-
reau of Regulatory Counsel, is developing rules to implement the Pennsylvania statute. PENN-
SYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. The Virginia program will rely 
on administrative rules to be promulgated by July 1, 1997, to clarify statutory provisions. VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.l(A), -1429.l(B) (Michie Supp. 1996). Until then, the program will be 
administered on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 10.1-1429.l(B); see also Buniva & Kibler, supra note 
156, at 10. Rules are also under development in Illinois, North Carolina (which currently relies 
on a guidance document for most aspects of its program), Oregon, and Rhode Island. D1v1s10N 
OF SITE REMEDIATION, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY REMEDIATION AND REUSE PROGRAM: A USER'S GUIDE 2 (1996) (hereinafter RHODE 
ISLAND USER'S GuIDE] (stating that Rhode Island is developing soil cleanup standards); Tele-
phone Interviews, supra note 160. 
Ohio's Voluntary Action Program is operating on an interim basis under the 1994.statute 
and a first set of program rules; until final rules are developed, the program is limited to 200 
cleanups at sites not involving groundwater contamination. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3746.04, 3746.07 (Anderson 1995) (calling for adoption of rules to implement program re-
quirements, and applying interim standards prior to adoption of generic cleanup standards); 
OHIO ADMIN. CoDE §§ 3745-300-01, -300-03 to -05, -300-12 to -14, -300-99 (WESTLAW through 
Aug. 31, 1996); Department of Emergency & Remedial Response, Ohio Envtl. Protection 
Agency, Real Estate Cleanup and Reuse Program (last modified Dec. 19, 1996) <http:// 
www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html>. 
176. Many states rely on detailed "guidance documents" that supplement the statutes. See 
generally Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134-36 (describing the Minnesota approach); Casserly, 
supra note 26 (referring to guidance documents used in Minnesota). Although these do not 
have the force of law, they can often be important elements in voluntary cleanup programs. This 
article cites to guidance documents where possible; the reader should be aware, however, that 
specific details of a state's implementation of its statute may be amplified upon in a guidance 
doc11ment not described in this section. 
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other.177 The recent Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes arguably repre-
sent the most comprehensive and enthusiastic state efforts to promote 
voluntary cleanups.178 
Despite widespread variations, there are some common features 
in each of the states' programs. All of the programs are voluntary; no 
developer is forced to enter into them.179 The principal mechanism of 
each program is a streamlined cleanup process, in which developers 
conduct cleanups in a fast-tracked process180 to meet redefined 
cleanup standards. The cleanup process begins with an investigation 
to characterize existing conditions at the site. 181 The developer then 
prepares a cleanup plan and carries it out, cleaning up the site to meet 
specific statewide standards, site-specific standards based on higher 
levels of risk than those allowed in the Superfund program, or stan-
dards based on background levels of contamination in the area.182 
177. Courtney, supra note 140, at 14. Many state officials contacted for this article indicated 
that they had examined one or more existing programs in developing their own programs. Some 
relied on programs of adjoining or nearby states, but others (Illinois, for example) had surveyed 
a larger number of existing programs. ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE, supra note 158; Telephone Inter-
views, supra note 160. 
178. See PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 9-11 (reprinting 
an article entitled New State Approach Aids Developers in Recycling Old Industrial Sites, first 
published in the Harrisburg Patriot on Nov. 24, 1995); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (terming 
Ohio a "leader in this field"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 124, 152. The responses to the Ohio 
and Pennsylvania programs are by no means universally positive. The programs have been criti-
cized as "going too far" to promote voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 
6: 
Sometimes, unfortunately, in their zeal to do something about brownfields, lawmakers go 
too far. In May (1995), for example, Pennsylvania enacted a law that essentially treats any 
site as if it is a brownfield worthy of special incentives and cleanup standards, regardless of 
where it is located or its history. 
But see Michel, supra note 20, at 464 (claiming that the Ohio statute "falls short in providing 
incentives to volunteer remediators"). 
179. See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REv. 
CoDE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995) (providing that except at sites where voluntary clean-
ups are prohibited, "any person may undertake a voluntary action ... to identify and address 
potential sources of contamination by hazardous substances or petroleum of soil, sediments, 
surface water, or ground water on or underlying property and to establish that the property 
meets applicable standards"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN._§ 361.602 (West Supp. 1996) 
(providing that the program is "restricted to voluntary actions"); INDIANA DEP'T OF ENVTL. 
MANAGEMENT, VOLUNTARY REMEDIATION PROGRAM 1 (1996) (hereinafter INDIANA VRP 
FACT SHEET]; see also OTA STATE oF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that the major 
difference between voluntary cleanup programs and other state programs is that "owners or 
developers of a site approach the state voluntarily to cooperatively work out a process by which 
the site can be readied for development"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58 
(stating that participation in Indiana's program is voluntary). 
180. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (observing that "[v]oluntary pro-
grams are particularly popular because they allow private parties to ... avoid some of the cost 
and delays associated with state Superfund or other enforcement driven programs"). The 
remediation process is streamlined in a number of ways. Many statutes impose time limits on 
critical steps in the decision-making process about cleanup of an individual site. See infra notes 
374-78 and accompanying text. A developer's ability to choose a predetermined cleanup stan-
dard, see infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text, also shortens the process. 
181. See infra notes 204-23 and accompanying text. 
182. See infra notes 231-88 and accompanying text. 
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Cl~anups are conducted with varying degrees of state oversight, 
with a trend toward less state involvement.183 A developer whose 
cleanup is approved by the state receives some form of protection 
against future state enforcement actions, 184 and this limit on liability is 
often transferrable. to the developer's successors and assigns.185 . Sev-
eral states aim t!J spur redevelopment of brownfield sites further by 
providing financial incentives designed to reduce the costs of clean-
ups.186 Some states also provide for public participation in the deci-
sion-making process.187 
· The definition of perspns eligible for participation in some states 
is anyone willing to clean up a site.188 Other states restrict participa-
183. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; see infra notes 352-73 and accompanying text. 
184. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18-19; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121-22; 
see infra notes 289-351 and aecompanying text. 
185. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text . 
.. 186. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18-20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122. 
Firiancial assistance can consist of Io.w-interest loans, grants, or tax incentives for developers. See 
infra notes 395-406 and accompanying text. 
187. See infra notes 382-94 and accompanying text. 
188. The states allowing anyone to participate include: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996)); California (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 109 (California 
VCP has no formal restriction on parties eligible to participate; program includes prospective 
purchasers, owners, and responsible parties)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(a) 
(WESTLAW through end of lstSpecial'Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (allowing 
p~rticipation by "any person who has knowledge of a release of a hazardous substance at. a 
facility and agrees to perform a remedy"; state retains discretion to disqualify applicants)); Illi' 
nois (415 Ii.L. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.2 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by "remedia-
tion applicant," defined as "any person seeking to perform or performing investigative or 
remedial activities under this Title, including the owrier or operator of the site")); Indiana (INDI-
ANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 1); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(1)(a) 
(West Supp. 1995)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CoDE 
REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(1) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Montana 
(MoNT. · CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(1) (1995)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,184 
(WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, 
at 77 (regarding New Hampshire)); New Jersey (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82 (New 
Jersey has no restriction 6n eligibility)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9(b) 
(1995)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995)); Oregon (OR. REv. 
STAT. § 465.325(1) (Supp. 1996); 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(1)(a) (allowing participation by any 
person, and establishing separate criteria for prospective purchasers who may receive releases 
from liability)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301(a) (West Supp. 1996) (allowing 
participation by any "person who proposes or is required to respond to the ·release of a regulated 
substance at a site and who wants to be eligible for the [available] cleanup liability protection")); 
Rhode Island (R.l. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-7, -3(b), -10 (Supp. 1995) (provides for a liability ex-
emption for a "bona fide prospective purchaser," defined as "a purchaser of a site who intends to 
purchase a contaminated property, who had documented their intent to purchase the property in 
writing, and who has offered to pay fair market value for the property in the contaminated 
state," who also settles with the state);· RHODE ISLAND UsER's GumE, supra note 175, at 3 
(participants may include responsible parties, volunteers, and bona fide prospective purchasers; 
actions of participants are governed by the DEM's Site Remediation Regulations)); Tennessee 
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(a) (Supp. 1995) (allowing participation by any party who is 
"willing and able to conduct an investigation and cleanup of an inactive hazardous substance 
site"; state has instituted an application procedure to determine if the party is in good standing)); 
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.§ 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by own-
ers and persons who "own, operate, have a security interest in or enter into a contract for the 
purchase of contaminated property to voluntarily remediate releases of hazardous substances, 
hazardous wastes, solid wastes or petroleum")); Washington (Telephone Inte~iews, supra note 
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tion to a site's prospective purchaser189 or current owner.190 A devel-
oper responsible for existing contamination at the site-usually as a 
"responsible person" under a state CERCLA law or as an owner or 
operator of a site requiring remediation under the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act-is sometimes disqualified from taking part 
in the program.191 The states also focus on sites believed to be of 
160 (Washington imposes no eligibility restriction on participants conducting "independent re-
medial actions" under WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 
1996); potentially liable parties also may negotiate voluntary agreements, including consent de-
crees and "agreed orders," under the procedure set forth in id. § 173-340-510(2)). See also 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 151 n.296 (describing the Virginia provision); Survey Results, supra 
note 158 (regarding the New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee provisions); Telephone Inter-
views, supra note 160 (regarding the California, Delaware, Indiana, and Washington programs). 
As indicated in notes 192 and 193 and the accompanying text, infra, states may disqualify 
persons otherwise eligible because the sites in question are ineligible to participate in the pro-
gram. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Maine program, which disqualifies 
certain sites subject to RCRA, and the Texas program, which disqualifies certain sites subject to 
state enforcement actions). 
189. ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 8-7-503(16), -523(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (defining a "prospec-
tive purchaser" as ·'a person who expresses a willingness to acquire an abandoned industrial site 
and is not responsible for any preexisting pollution at or contamination on the site" and requir-
ing that the prospective purchaser "reuse or redevelop the property for industrial activities to 
create employment expansion"); MASSACHUSETrS DEP'T OF ENvrL PROTECTION, CLEAN SITES 
INITIATIVE 2 (1995) (hereinafter MASSACHUSETrS CLEAN SITES INmATIVE FACT SHEET] (re-
stricting eligibility to prospective purchasers or prospective tenants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§§ 6602, 6615a(b), 6615a(f)(l)(B) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (allowing participation by an "eligible 
person"; restricts participation to prospective purchasers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(1)(c), 
(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (exempts a "purchaser" from liability, and defines purchaser as "a 
person who acquires property in an arm's-length, good-faith transaction ... (who] did not par-
ticipate in the management of, and was not the owner of, a business or entity that caused the 
release of a hazardous substance on the property[;] ... did not own the property at the time of a 
hazardous substance was released(; and] ... did not otherwise cause the release of a hazardous 
substance on the property"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Vermont 
provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Vermont provision). 
190. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); Survey Results, supra 
note 158. 
191. ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-523(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2285.l(A) (West Supp. 1996) (barring a "responsible person" as defined in id. §§ 30:2271 -
:2279); MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2; COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York excludes responsible parties at state Superfund sites); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.610(a) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding a developer that 
is a "responsible party" at the time of application); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c) (Supp. 
1996) (excluding a person otherwise liable under the state's hazardous waste cleanup statute); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123 
(citing to the Colorado and Minnesota provisions). In Wisconsin, a responsible person may not 
remediate the property, or receive a release from liability, but may perform site investigation 
activities. 
But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.l 75(6a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that responsible 
persons who undertake voluntary response actions may obtain a limitation on liability); Swee-
ney, supra note 20, at 133. Other states allowing participation by responsible persons include 
California ERAP (applying the pilot project to responsible persons who agree to be bound by 
program requirements, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396.6(c)(3) (West Supp. 1996)), 
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See SuPERFUND SECTION, 
N.C. DEP'T OF ENv'T, HEALTH & NATURAL RESOURCES, INACTIVE HAZARDOUS SITES PRO-
GRAM: GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE PARTY VOLUNTARY SITE REMEDIAL ACTION 1-1 (1996) 
[hereinafter N.C. GUIDELINES]; RHODE ISLAND USER'S GUIDE, supra note 175, at 3; Telephone 
Interviews, supra note 160; supra note 189 and accompanying text. Although Oregon allows 
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lesser regulatory concern. Many prohibit voluntary cleanups of sites 
listed on the NPL192 or a comparable state list, or exclude sites subject 
to certain types of state or federal enforcement action (e.g., state 
CERCLA cleanups, RCRA corrective action cleanups, and under-
ground storage tank (UST) cleanups).193 However, some states such 
responsible persons to participate in its Volunteer Cleanup Program in order to obtain a "no 
further action" letter, it does not allow them to obtain a release from liability under its new 
"Prospective Purchaser Agreement." 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(1)(a); Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. Similarly, responsible parties in Rhode Island may receive a "letter of compliance," 
but not a covenant not to sue. RHODE ISLAND USER'S GUIDE, supra note 175, at 3-4; Telephone 
Interviews, supra note 160. 
192. States specifically excluding NPL sites include: California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE§ 25396.6(c)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (California ERAP); Telephone Interviews, supra note 
160 (California VCP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(I) (West Supp. 
1996)); Illinois (415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.l(a)(2)(i) (West Supp. 1996)); Missouri (Mo. 
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(3)(D) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (ex-
cludes sites that warrant enforcement action under CERCLA or are being considered for the 
NPL based on a completed site investigation that indicates that NPL listing is appropriate)); 
Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-732(1)(a) (1995) (excludes sites listed or proposed for 
listing on NPL)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77); New Jersey (N.J. AD-
MIN. CoDE tit. 7, § 26C-5.3 (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996) (the state, in its discretion, may 
"allow a regulatory or enforcement mechanism already in effect at the site to control the 
remediation at the site")); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84); North Carolina 
(Survey Results, supra note 158); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 3746.02(A)(l)(d) (Anderson 
1995)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 111); Pennsylvania (COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 24, at 88); Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 79); Tennessee (Survey Results, 
supra note 158 (allowing only prospective NPL sites which have not undergone formal HRS 
scoring to join the program)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996)); 
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996) (providing that an NPL site is 
ineligible unless negotiations are ongoing for a Prospective Purchaser Agreement prior to April 
20, 1995)); Wisconsin (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160). See also COMING CLEAN, supra 
· note 24, at 82, 109 (regarding the California VCP and New Jersey programs); Michel, supra note 
20, at 454 n.173 (describing the Ohio provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 137 (describing the 
Colorado provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Missouri, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and Vermont programs); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Mon-
tana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee programs). 
A number of states have entered into agreements with the EPA that allow voluntary clean-
ups at NPL sites in certain instances. For example, Delaware maintains an agreement with EPA 
Region III that allows potential NPL sites to enter the program if the cleanup party is competent 
to handle the cleanup. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24; at 86. Washington has a similar agree-
ment with the EPA's Region X. Id. at 113; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
193. States excluding sites with pending state or federal enforcement actions include: Ar-
kansas (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (Arkansas does not at present include UST sites 
from participation, but RCRA corrective action sites are handled by the state's RCRA pro-
gram)); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396.6(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding 
a site from the California ERAP with a "known condition of interim endangerment existing at 
the site"); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (UST sites not handled under the California 
VCP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(II)-(IV) (West Supp. 1996) (ex-
cluding RCRA corrective action sites, UST sites, and state enforcement sites, in addition to NPL 
sites)); Delaware (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 86 (Delaware excludes UST sites, RCRA 
corrective action sites, and others; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2010 defines sites eligible for tax 
relief to include brownfield sites and exclude enforcement sites)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/58.l(a)(2)(ii)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996) (excluding permitted facilities, RCRA closures, and 
UST sites)); Maine (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Maine disqualifies any RCRA corrective 
action, TSDFs or RCRA generator sites subject to closure)); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 24, at 98 (Minnesota disqualifies sites under the jurisdiction of other state remediation 
programs, UST sites, RCRA corrective action sites, and sites involving the removal of asbestos, 
radon, radioactive wastes, or agricultural chemicals)); Missouri (Mo. CODE REGS. tit.10, § 25-
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15.010(3)(D) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (disqualifies sites that are fa-
cilities with RCRA permits or interim status, sites subject to state or federal enforcement ac-
tions; also disqualifies sites where conditions constitute an imminent and substantial threat to 
public health or the environment)); Montana (MoNT. CoDE ANN. §§ 75-10-732(1)(b)-(e), (2) 
(1995) (disqualifies facilities subject to certain state enforcement actions; providing, however, 
that notwithstanding the provisions of§ 75-10-732(l)(b)-(e), "the department may agree to ac-
cept and may approve an application" for an otherwise ineligible site)); New Hampshire (COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77 (New Hampshire excludes UST sites)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. 
CoDE tit. 7, §§ 26C-3.l(b), -5.3 (WESTLAW through July 15, 1996) (excludes enforcement sites, 
such as UST sites and landfills)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York 
excludes RCRA sites)); Nonh Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310(2)-(3) (1995) (excludes 
RCRA permitted facilities, UST sites, and sites where the Division of Environmental Manage-
ment or the Department of Agriculture has assumed jurisdiction; state regulates only hazardous 
substances as defined in CERCLA)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.02(A)(l)-(5) (An-
derson 1995) (disqualifies sites where closure or remediation is mandated by Ohio or federal 
law)); Oregon (OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-030(3) (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (excludes 
RCRA corrective action sites and UST sites from state CERCLA program; however, cleanup of 
the latter may be authorized under OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-215(2)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.904(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1996) (applying cleanup standards developed under 
the Land Recycling Act to state Hazardous Sites Cleanup Priority List sites and UST sites, but 
providing for cleanups to take place under the administrative requirements of those programs)); 
Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 79 (Rhode Island excludes UST sites at pres-
ent, but expecting new regulations to include them; any participant, including responsible par-
ties, may volunteer up until the time that the Department orders cleanup)); Tennessee 
(TENNESSEE D1v. OF SUPERFUND, VOAP: A CLEANUP PROGRAM FOR THOSE WILLING AND 
ABLE 2 (1996) [hereinafter TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET] (UST sites excluded)); Texas (TEx. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN.§ 361.603(a) (West Supp. 1996); id. § 361.605(a)(l); 21 Tex. Reg. 
3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) {adopting a new rule, 30 TEX. ADMIN. CoDE § 333.2 (1996), 
that disqualifies the portion of site that is subject to a commission permit or order and providing 
that the state may reject application if an administrative, state, or federal enforcement action is 
pending that concerns the remediation of the hazardous substance or contaminant described in 
the application; state indicates, based on its definition of "pending enforcement action" in 
§ 333.2 that several sites which have had some level of enforcement action, up to the issuance of 
an order, have been redirected into its program)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6615a(f)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. 1996) (excluding RCRA corrective action sites and underground 
storage tanks subject to regulation; UST sites are regulated separately with cleanup funds and 
liability limits under Vermont's Petroleum Cleanup Fund; both sites subject to enforcement ac-
tions anJ voluntary cleanups under other programs are excluded)); Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN. 
§ 10.1-1429.l(A) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that rules will apply where remediation has not 
"clearly been mandated" under CERCLA, RCRA, state law, or common law; excludes sites with 
existing or pending permits, closure plans, administrative orders, court orders, or consent or-
ders)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82, 109, 111 (describing the California VCP, 
New Jersey, and Oregon programs); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 13 (stating 
that "[s]ites that typically enter a voluntary program ... are not currently listed or being consid-
ered for the federal NPL or similar state superfund lists"); Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 6 
(describing the Virginia provision); Michel, supra note 20, at 454 (describing the Ohio provi-
sions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123 & n.126 (citing the Ohio, Colorado, and Pennsylvania 
provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 265-66 (stating that "[t]he [Minnesota] program cannot 
typically be utilized for cleanup of a property that already falls under the authority of one of the 
other state or federal pollution programs"); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Colo-
rado, Delaware, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California VCP, 
Delaware, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington 
programs). Indiana has discretion to reject an application if a "state or federal enforcement 
action that concerns the remediation of the hazardous substance or petroleum described in the 
application is pending." IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-5 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.); INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 1. One commentator has criticized the 
Pennsylvania statute for its application of certain features to virtually any site, whether or not it 
is a legitimate brownfield site. Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6; see also Tuttle, supra note 170 
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as Michigan allow voluntary cleanups to take place at virtually any 
site,194 and others provide administrative discretion to allow participa-
tion at sites that would otherwise be disqualified.195 
The following tables summarize the sites and persons eligible for 
each of the state programs. 
(stating that "most provisions of the (Pennsylvania] statute are applicable to any property in 
need of environmental remediation"). 
194. In Michigan, virtually any contaminated site is eligible. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20101(1)(/) (West Supp. 1996) (provisions apply to a "facility," defined as "any area, place, 
or property where a hazardous substance in excess of the concentrations which satisfy the re-
quirements of section 20120a(l}(a) or (17) has been released, deposited, disposed of, or other-
wise comes to be located"}. However, sites containing underground storage tanks are usually 
addressed under the state's UST program. Id. §§ 324.21301a-.21330. Washington provides that 
the state may clean UST, RCRA, and NPL sites under its program whereas Wisconsin's program 
currently allows all sites to obtain a certificate of completion; however, RCRA corrective action 
sites and NPL sites may still be the subject of federal actions under CERCLA and RCA; UST 
sites are eligible. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 113 (regarding the Washington program); 
Survey Results. supra note 158 (regarding the Wisconsin program); Telephone Inter\.iews, supra 
note 160 (regarding the Washington and Wisconsin programs). 
In Connecticut, the state evaluates sites for participation in the Urban Sites Remedial Ac-
tion Program, based on factors that include the site's economic development potential, as de-
fined by the state. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(b) (West 1995). Eligible sites may be 
NPL, RCRA corrective action, or UST sites. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 72. The state 
subdivides sites according to whether the applicant will remediate the property (Type I sites), the 
state will draft the cleanup plan and implement it at a site in a "distressed municipality" (Type II 
sites), or whether the state will acquire the site and remediate it (Type III sites). CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West 1995); CONN. AGENCIES REGS.§§ 22a-133m-1 to -3 (WESTLAW 
through Sept. 24, 1996) (governing Type III site cleanup process); COMING CLEAN, supra note 
24, at 72-73. Similarly, the Massachusetts program applies to sites in an "Economic Target 
Area," as defined by the state, or sites that present economic development opportunities. MAS-
SACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2. 
195. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. Indiana does not expressly 
disqualify sites targeted for state or federal action, but allows the state to declare such sites 
ineligible. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-5 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.); see also 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 59-60 (describing the Indiana provision). Like-
wise, Maine's statute does not disqualify any sites; the state, however, requires that developers 
seeking to remediate certain types of sites (e.g., sites with USTs) receive a determination of 
eligibility from the state prior to submission of a voluntary response action plan. Maine Dep't of 
Env't Protection, The Voluntary Clean-up Program (visited Mar. 6, 1996) <http:// 
www.state.me.us/dep/ip-vrap.htm> [hereinafter Maine VCP Fact Sheet]. Some statutes bar par-
ticipation at certain sites but empower the state to allow participation under certain conditions. 
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-732(2) (1995) (providing that the state "may agree to accept 
and may approve an application for a voluntary cleanup plan" for disqualified sites); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995) (providing that the state may allow participation by a 
developer at an NPL site if negotiations are underway to culminate in a prospective purchaser 
agreement). 
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Persons Eligible 
Any person (except those 
involved with 
disqualified sites) 
Prospective purchaser 
Owner only 
Responsible parties 
excluded 
Other 
TABLE 1 
PARTICIPANT ELIGIBILITY 
State 
Arizona, California VCP, 
Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, 
Washington 
Arkansas. Massachusetts, 
Vermont, Wisconsin 
Colorado 
Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New 
York, Vermont, 
Wisconsin 
Connecticu~ 196 California 
ERAP, 19 ' Michigan 198 
Comments 
Oregon, Rhode Island: 
responsible parties are 
eligible, but only pro-
spective purchasers will 
receive release from lia-
bility 
Colorado: participant may 
also be the owner's des-
ignated representative 
Wisconsin: statutory defi-
nition of "purchaser" 
limits participation to 
innocent parties 
196. In Connecticut, no site is eligible for the USRAP unless "the state owns the site or 
otherwise has or obtains the power to approve the type of development which first occurs on the 
site after remediation," which necessarily limits the type of persons who may participate. CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(b) (West 1995). Prospective purchasers may participate at "Type 
III" sites, whereby the state purchases property and cleans it up. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-
133m(e) (West 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73. Responsible persons may 
participate at Type I sites if they are willing to clean up the sites. Id. at 72. The protection of the 
new voluntary cleanup program extends to owners and lessors. 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 3. 
197. The California ERAP applies to sites designated by the Site Designation Committee 
that have one or more responsible persons. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25396.6(c) 
(West Supp. 1996). As a result, the participants will all be responsible persons. 
198. Michigan provides a liability exemption for a prospective purchaser or transferee that 
conducts a "baseline environmental assessment" and submits the result to the state, together 
with a plan for any necessary remedial action. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20129a (West 
Supp. 1996). Because the statute also exempts owners and operators who have not caused 
contamination at the site, the new law offers them protection as well, unless they exacerbate the 
contamination. Id. §§ 324.20107, 324.20126. 
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Sites Eligible 
Any site is potentially 
eligible 
NPL sites excluded 
Sites subject to other 
state and federal 
enforcement actions 
(e.g., RCRA corrective 
action, UST sites) 
excluded 
Eligibility defined by 
economic development 
potential 
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TABLE 2 
SITE ELIGIBILITY 
State 
Indiana, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Washington, 
Wisconsin 
California ERAP, 
California VCP, 
Colorado, Illinois, 
Missouri, Montana, 
New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Virginia, 
Vermont 
Arkansas, California 
ERAP, California VCP, 
Colorado, Delaware, 
Illinois, Maine, 
Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia 
Connecticut, 
Massachusetts 
Comments 
Indiana: state has discre-
tion to reject participa-
tion at sites with 
pending enforcement 
actions 
Delaware: NPL sites may 
enter under certain 
circumstances 
California ERAP: sites 
that qualify for program 
are state CERCLA 
sites (with pending 
enforcement actions) 
Maine, Oregon: UST sites 
may be included 
Montana: state has discre-
tion to approve cleanup 
plan for otherwise ineli-
gible site 
Texas: basis for rejecting 
application; discretion-
ary with state 
2. Distinguishing Environmental Audit Statutes 
At the outset, a distinction must be made between the voluntary 
cleanup statutes and the growing number of state "environmental au-
dit" statutes199 designed to promote voluntary compliance with the 
199. The first state to enact an environmental audit privilege law was Oregon in 1993. OR. 
REv. STAT.§ 468.963 (Supp. 1996). See generally James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privi-
leges: The Need for Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGJS. J. 119 (1994) [hereinafter 
O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges] (terming the Oregon statute a model for subsequent 
state efforts). Other states have enacted or propose to enact similar statutes. See .1996 Alaska 
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environmental laws. The audit statutes offer incentives to the owner 
or operator of a facility, including an evidentiary privilege,200 if it eval-
uates its operations, discovers contamination, and reports violations, 
together with a plan for corrective action, to the state.201 Environ-
mental audit statutes are similar to voluntary cleanup statutes in their 
goals and features.202 For example, both often preclude a state from 
taking certain enforcement actions against the owner or operator with 
respect to contamination described in a site report and cleaned up in a 
timely fashion.203 The principal difference between the two is that en-
vironmental audit statutes are designed to enable a polluter to admit 
its mistakes and correct them. A brownfield developer participating 
in a voluntary cleanup program, by contrast, typically has not had any 
involvement with the site, let alone caused any contamination there. 
Therefore, the voluntary cleanup statutes are likely to be more helpful 
to brownfield developers. · 
S.B. 199 (bill introduced to establish an environmental audit program in Alaska); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 8-1-303 (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5 (West Supp. 1996); 
IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to -811, 9-340 (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2 (West 
Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-1 to -10 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.); 1994 N.J. S.B. 1797 and 1994 N.J. A.B. 2521 (unsuccessful proposals to establish an envi-
ronmental audit privilege in New Jersey); 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws 204 (establishing an environmen· 
tal audit program in Kansas); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-.040 (Baldwin 1995); 1995 Minn. 
Sess. Law Serv. 168, §§ 8-19 (West) (creating an "environmental improvement pilot program" in 
Minnesota); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to -109 
(1995 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.§§ 10.1-1198 to -1199 (Michie Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to -1106 (Michie Supp. 1996). For descriptions of these statutes and their 
features, see Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement 
Policy, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 365, 365-66 (1992); Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 8-10 
(describing the Virginia statute); O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges, supra. 
In December 1995, the EPA issued its policy on "self-policing" (Incentives for Self-Policing: 
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations Notice) offering incentives for 
companies to report violations of the environmental laws. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,705 (1995). The 
EPA's policy differs from the state statutes in that it offers no privilege or immunity to an envi-
ronmental audit; the Agency opposes granting a privilege on a number of grounds, including its 
contention that granting a privilege would "invite defendants to claim as 'audit' material almost 
any evidence the government needed to establish a violation or determine who was responsible." 
Id. at 66,710. Thus, the EPA's policy seems destined to produce a lukewarm response. See, e.g., 
Margaret A. Hill & Andreas H. Leskovsek, EPA's Self-Policing Final Policy, VIRGINIA'S ENv'T, 
Mar. 1996, at 6 (stating that the EPA's policy "does not ... retreat from EPA's position that 
information obtained from environmental audits or compliance programs is not privileged 
information"). 
200. See, e.g., 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168, § 13 (West) (environmental audit privilege in 
Minnesota); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996). 
201. Buniva & Kibler, supra note 156, at 8; O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges, supra 
note 199, at 119-20 (noting that the "environmental audit" is defined as "a systematic examina-
tion of a facility, product line, or corporation as a whole ... [that] functions by measuring com-
pliance with environmental norms and then reporting the results, complete with a set of 
corrective actions that are necessary for the facility, product line, or corporation to achieve 
compliance"). 
202. See Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (terming the environmental audit privi-
lege a "companion" to voluntary cleanup statutes); Congdon, supra note 160, at 7 (describing the 
relationship between the two types of statutes). 
203. See, e.g., 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168, § 13 (West) (deferred or waived enforcement 
in Minnesota). 
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B. Features of Voluntary Cleanup Statutes 
1. Site Investigation 
The first step in assessing whether and to what extent a brown-
field site must be remediated is usually a "site assessment" or similar 
investigation. This involves an evaluation of existing environmental 
conditions to evaluate the site's condition, determine the existing level 
of contamination, and generate information that may be used in 
cleanup plans.204 Although the states differ in their approaches,205 
most require all developers to conduct on-site investigations designed 
to identify contamination at the site and the risk it poses.206 To spur 
204. OTA STATE OF TIJE STATES, supra note 20, at 14-15. 
205. Id. at 14 (noting that states "tailor [site assessments] to address their own specific tech-
nical concerns"). Vermont, for example, requires that the site investigation meet these 
objectives: 
(A) to define the nature, source, degree and extent of the contamination; 
(B) to define all possible pathways for contaminant migration; 
(C) to present data that quantify the amounts of contaminants migrating along each 
pathway; 
(D) to define all relevant sensitive receptors, including but not limited to public or private 
water supplies, surface waters, wetlands, sensitive ecological areas, outdoor and indoor air, 
and enclosed spaces such as basements, sewers and utility corridors; 
(E) to determine the risk of contamination to human health and the environment; 
(F) to gather sufficient information to identify appropriate abatement, removal, remediation 
and monitoring activities; and 
(G) to gather sufficient information to provide a preliminary recommendation, with justifi-
cation, for abatement, removal, remediation and monitoring activities. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g)(l) (Supp. 1996); cf Clokey, supra note 26, at 39 (detailing the 
minimum requirements of the "site investigation" in Wisconsin, under Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. 
NR 716 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aµg. 1996 Release)). States often retain flexibility to 
determine the scope of the site investigation. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-050(2) 
(WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). 
206. _These include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-503(17) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requir-
ing a "site assessment," to "identify the location and extent of contamination, the quantity or 
level .of contamination, the type of contamination, the probable source of contamination and the 
risk or threat associated with the contamination"; state is considering redefining this to include a 
"site assessment" (similar to Phase I investigation) and "facility investigation" (similar to Phase 
II investigation))); California (CAL. HEALTIJ & SAFETY CODE§ 25319.5 (West 1992) (requiring 
a "preliminary endangerment assessment" (PEA) to determine whether response action is nec-
essary; applies to sites in California VCP); id. § 25396.6(b) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a PEA 
for sites in the California ERAP)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-16-304(2)(a), -
308(2) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring an "environmental assessment")); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(g) (West 1995) (requiring the state to assess Type II and Type III sites 
for cleanups); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(a) (specifying that licensed environmental profes-
sionals may conduct Phase II environmental site assessments and Phase III investigations for 
voluntary site remediations)); Delaware (DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(e)(l) (WESTLAW 
through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (providing for a remedial 
action plan to be "based on any investigation or study conducted by or for the Secretary, the 
potentially responsible party, or others"; state accepts forms of investigations that conform to 
department guidelines)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.6(b)(l) (West Supp. 1996) 
(requiring that remedial applicants conduct on-site investigations in order to identify contamina-
tion at the site and the risk it poses)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-2, -3, -7(b)(l) 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring an "environmental assessment," de-
fined as similar to a Phase I assessment, to be submitted with an application; developer must also 
perform a Phase II assessment)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286.l(B) (West Supp. 
1996) (requiring an "investigative report")); Massachusetts (MAss. REos. CoDE tit. 310, 
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§§ 40.0404(1), 40.0480-.0483, 40.0830 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring an ini-
tial investigation, Phase I and Phase II site assessments; requirements may be waived, under the 
"technical justification" standard of MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.0193, by a Licensed Site 
Professional (LSP))); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(4) (West Supp. 1995) (requir-
ing an "investigation report prepared by an appropriate professional that identifies and describes 
the nature and extent of the discharges, releases and threatened releases at the identified area of 
real property, methods of investigation, the analytical results and the professional's evaluation of 
this information")); Michigan (M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20126(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996) 
(providing that an owner or operator is liable under the state mini-CERCLA law unless it con-
ducts a timely "baseline environmental assessment"); id. § 324.20129a (requiring an environmen-
tal assessment before a developer may petition for an exemption from liability)); Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 115B.175(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the voluntary response 
action plan must include an "investigation report that describes the methods and results of an 
investigation of the releases and threatened releases at the identified area of real property")); 
Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(3) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-
15.010(4)(C) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring a Phase I assess-
ment at a minimum to be provided with the application; state's practice is to require at least a 
minimal Phase II assessment once the site is accepted into the program)); Montana (MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-733(2)(a) (1995) (requiring an "environmental assessment")); Nebraska 
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-15,184(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) (requiring appli-
cant to provide "appropriate engineering, scientific, and financial feasibility data")); New Hamp-
shire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 77 (New Hampshire requires a site investigation and, 
where necessary, an Rl/FS)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 7, § 26C-3.2(c) (WESTLAW 
through July 15, 1996) (state may require preliminary assessment and site investigation under a 
Memorandum of Agreement)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New York 
requires a site investigation)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.1, -310.3 (1995); 
N.C. Gu1DELINES, supra note 191, at 2-1 to 2-5 (describing the requirements for remedial investi-
gation phases as site-dependent)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.04(8)(3)-(4), 
3746.07(B)-(C), 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995) (mandating that forthcoming rules will determine 
minimum standards for Phase I and Phase II property assessments, setting forth interim stan-
dards, providing that voluntary actions may include Phase I and Phase II property assessments in 
order to ''identify and address potential sources of contamination," and stating that a certified 
professional may base the issuance of a no further action letter on property assessments)); Ore-
gon (OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-050 to -080 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing that the 
state will determine the amount of investigation necessary on a case-by-case basis; simple sites 
may require only a Preliminary Assessment or comparable information to be developed, and 
complex sites will require an RI and/or FS)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 6026.302(b)(2), .303(e)(2), .304(1) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a site investigation for per-
sons choosing to meet any of the three types of available cleanup standards)); Rhode Island (R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-B(b) (Supp. 1996) (requiring "voluntary investigations," consisting of a 
"site characterization" at all sites, as defined in § 7 of the Site Remediation Regulations, with an 
RI/FS if necessary; forthcoming rules expected to streamline the site assessment process at some 
sites)); Tennessee (TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.09 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX 
Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring an initial investigation and site characterization equivalent to 
ASTM Phase I Environmental Site Assessment)); Texas (TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 361.606(c) (West Supp. 1996) (describes investigation actions to be taken by developer); 21 
Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.7(a) (1996) 
that requires an investigation of the "full nature and extent of contamination in all media" unless 
the developer demonstrates that a focused investigation is warranted, using an "exposure assess-
ment model")); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(e)(l)(C) (Supp. 1996) (requiring a 
preliminary environmental assessment to be submitted with the program application); id. 
§ 6615a(g)(l) (requiring a site investigation)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-350 
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (RI/FS; complexity varies)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.765(2)(a)(l) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the property seller or developer in Wisconsin to 
conduct a thorough environmental investigation of the property, as defined in Wis. ADMIN. 
CODE§ NR 750.03(10) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release), and have that inves-
tigation approved by the state)). See also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83, 86 (regarding 
the Delaware and New Jersey programs); INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 2; OTA 
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14-15; Clokey, supra note 26, at 39 (describing the 
Wisconsin provision and administrative rules); Michel, supra note 20, at 454-56 (describing the 
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investigations, states often provide that developers do not face state 
"mini-CERCLA" liability by virtue of performing site assessments.207 
Some statutes and regulations specify the use of a two-part site inves-
tigation process based on standards implemented by the American So-
ciety for Testing and Materials (ASTM) for "Phase I" and "Phase II" 
environmental review in real estate transactions.208 If the limited 
Phase I review indicates that there is contamination at the site, the 
more detailed Phase II review is required.209 
Ohio's scheme of Phase I and Phase II assessments is typical of 
the level of effort required.210 Forthcoming rules for Phase I assess-
ments will require, at a minimum, a review of documents affecting the 
site's history such as documents in the chain of title,211 previous envi-
Ohio provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 135, 137 n.214, 142 n.238 (describing the Colorado, 
Indiana, and Minnesota provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 267 (describing the Phase I and 
Phase II investigation in Minnesota's program); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the 
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas provisions); Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160 (regarding the Arkansas, California, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, 
and Wisconsin provisions). 
207. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126(c)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that 
"accessing property to conduct a baseline environmental assessment" is not "occupancy" that 
potentially subjects an owner or operator to liability); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.501(b) 
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that the developer is not considered a responsible person for con-
ducting an environmental assessment, unless it.fails to exercise due diligence). 
208. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16. The designation "Phase I" derives 
from the ASTM standard for these assessments, AMERICAN Soc'y OF TESTING & MATERIALS, 
STANDARD PRAcnCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS: PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL 
SITE AssESSMENT PROCESS, STANDARD E 1527-94 (1994). See also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 
106. This standard has been adopted in whole or in part by many states. Ohio, for example, 
bases its interim standards for Phase I property assessments directly on the ASTM standard. 
OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 3746.07(B) (Anderson 1995); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 454 
n.178. The ASTM standard has been influential in other contexts. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 303 (1995) (making CERCLA's innocent landowner defense available to a buyer who 
conducts a site assessment according to the ASTM standard or similar procedure adopted by the 
EPA); RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 3 (directing site 
evaluations in the Richmond pilot project to follow the ASTM standard). 
209. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15. But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CooE § 25319.5 (West 1992) (requiring a "preliminary endangerment assessment," the 
equivalent of a "mini-Phase II assessment," for all sites); IND. CooE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-7 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring a Phase II assessment for all clean-
ups); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g)(l) (Supp. 1996) (requiring site investigation and correc-
tive action phases analogous to an RI/FS); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(l) (West Supp. 
1.995) (requiring a "thorough environmental investigation of the property," defined in Wis. Ao. 
MIN. CooE § NR 750.03(10) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) as comparable 
to a Phase II assessment, in all cleanups); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the 
Vermont provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California, Indiana, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin provisions). 
210. Michel, supra note 20, at 454-56, and Sweeney, supra note 20, at 126-27, describe 
Ohio's requirements for Phase I and Phase II site assessments. Compare COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 26, at 98 (describing the Phase I and Phase II investigation scheme in Minnesota) and 
Casserly, supra note 26, at 267 (describing the Phase I investigation in Minnesota's program) 
with Mo. CooE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(2)(A)(7)-(8) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 
1996 Release) (defining the Phase I and Phase II assessments in Missouri). 
211. OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(3)(a) (Anderson 1995). 
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ronmental studies of the surrounding area,212 and previous documents 
submitted to comply with environmental laws,213 as well as an investi-
gation to determine the nature and extent of contamination at the 
site.214 The average cost of the Phase I assessment has been estimated 
to range from $1,000 to $5,000.215 If this assessment demonstrates that 
the site is not contaminated, no cleanup is required and the developer 
can request a "no action" letter from the state, a limited form of liabil-
ity protection.216 
At most sites, the Phase I assessment will demonstrate that there 
is existing contamination.217 In that case, the developer will be re-
quired to engage in a Phase II assessment.218 Under forthcoming 
rules, the Phase II assessment will be required to include an examina-
tion of the information collected in the Phase I assessment, an analysis 
of soil and groundwater samples collected from the site, and a deter-
mination of whether the site requires remediation or is suitable in its 
current condition.219 Ohio attempts to control the quality of site as-
sessments, specifying that the developer must use a certified labora-
tory220 to perform the analyses required in Phase II assessments.221 
212. The developer will be required to review previous environmental assessments, environ-
mental studies and geological studies of the site and any land within two thousand feet of the 
site. Id. § 3746.04(B)(3)(b). 
213. Id. § 3746.04(B)(3)(c). 
214. This includes a review of aerial photographs that reveal prior uses of the property; 
interviews with managers of the site who have knowledge of the environmental conditions of the 
property; a walkover of the site; and interviews with people who have knowledge of the current 
and past uses of the site and adjacent properties. Id. § 3746.04(8)(3)(d)-(g); see also McWil-
liams, supra note 20, at 736. 
215. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 
24, at 16 (estimating the cost of a "basic environmental assessment" at between $500 and 
$2,500); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736 (estimating the cost at between $2,000 and $7,000). 
216. A developer can conclude cleanup activities in Ohio when the Phase I assessment dem-
onstrates that "there is no reason to believe that there has been a release of hazardous sub-
stances or petroleum at or upon the property." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 
1995); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 454 n.176; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 131; cf COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 98 (stating that developers in Minnesota may receive liability assur-
ances if a Phase I investigation shows limited contamination at the site that does not require 
remediation); RHODE ISLAND USER'S GumE, supra note 175, at 3-4; Casserly, supra note 26, at 
268 (developers can receive "no action" letters in Minnesota if they demonstrate that no con-
tamination exists); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (noting that a developer can receive a 
"letter of compliance" in Rhode Island if the site characterization demonstrates that no contami-
nation exists). For a description of the "no action letter" and other forms of liability protection, 
see infra notes 289-317 and accompanying text. 
217. One commentator states that "(i]n the case of an industrial site intended for reuse, a 
Phase I site assessment is virtually certain to generate sufficient evidence to warrant further 
assessment expense." Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 736. 
218. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 20, at 15. 
219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(4) (Anderson 1995). 
220. OHIO ADMJN. CODE § 3745-300-04 (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (specifying 
procedures for the certification of laboratories). 
221. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(B)(l)(a) (Anderson 1995). 
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Phase II assessments can be expensive,222 and their cost alone may 
deter some marginally cost-effective projects from consideration.223 
2. Streamlining Cleanup Procedures and Costs 
Assuming a cleanup is required, the next step in the development 
process is the preparation of a cleanup plan using the findings from 
the site assessments and applying relevant cleanup standards.224 
a. The Remedial Action Plan 
Most states require a developer to submit a work plan for cleanup 
actions225 that is typically accompanied by the site investigation report 
and other supporting documents.226 This plan may be part of, or sub-
mitted pursuant to, an agreement with the state to remediate the 
site.227 Indiana, for example, requires a developer to enter into a 
222. The cost of a Phase II assessment depends on a number of factors, including the size of 
the facility and the number of locations at the site where hazardous substances are found. The 
Office of Technology Assessment estimates the cost of a Phase II assessment at between $50,000 
and $70,000. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18. Others believe the costs may be 
even higher. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736 (stating that "[a] Phase II property assess-
ment on a parcel with prior industrial activity is likely to cost $25,000 to $250,000"). 
223. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 302 (noting that "(i]n some cases, site assessment 
costs alone will deter interest in a brownfield property"); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 16; 
OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18 (stating that "initial costs to some volunteers 
can be prohibitive from the start"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 736. 
224. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15. 
225. This document, which may be designated a "work plan," "remedial action plan," "cor-
rective action plan," or similar term, becomes the blueprint for cleanup activities at the site. Id. 
at 16. The states that do not require submissions of work plans are those that enable the devel-
oper to proceed with the cleanup on its own, with, in some states, the assistance of a licensed 
environmental professional. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
226. Indiana, for example, requires a comprehensive set of information to be submitted in 
the voluntary remediation work plan, including: 
(1) Detailed documentation of the investigation conducted by the applicant in preparing 
the proposed voluntary remediation work plan and a description of the work to be per-
formed by the applicant to determine the nature and extent of the actual or threatened 
release. 
(2) A proposed statement of work to accomplish the remediation in accordance with guide-
lines established by the department. 
(3) Plans concerning the following: 
(A) Quality assurance for the implementation of the proposed remediation project. 
(B) Descriptions of sampling and analysis. 
(C) Health and safety considerations. 
(D) Community relations. 
(E) Data management and record keeping. 
(F) A proposed schedule concerning the implementation of all tasks set forth in the 
proposed statement of work. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-7(b} (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.); Survey Results, 
supra note 158. But see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.lO(A)-(B) (Anderson 1995) (devel-
oper has discretion to decide whether sampling plans and remediation plans are necessary; plans 
are reviewed by certified professionals, not the state). 
227. States requiring the plan to be submitted pursuant to, or as part of an agreement are: 
California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25398.2(b}(l), (e) (West Supp. 1996) (enforceable 
agreement in California ERAP to perform cleanup and cleanup pursuant to a remedial action 
plan); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (a "voluntary cleanup agreement" in the California 
VCP defines the scope and schedule of proposed cleanup)}; Colorado (CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
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§ 25-16-304 (West Supp. 1996) (voluntary cleanup plan)); Connecticut (CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22a-133m(g) (1995) (requiring the state to develop remedial action plans for Type II and Type 
III sites); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2 (specifying that licensed environmental professional 
may prepare Phase III remedial action plans for voluntary site remediations)); Delaware (DEL. 
CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(a), (e)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th 
General Assembly, 1995) (settlement agreement provides for a plan of remedial action)); Illinois 
(415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.6(d) (West Supp. 1996) (remedial action plan required for a 
cleanup to levels below those existing at the site); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (voluntary remediation agreement setting forth 
terms and conditions of evaluating and implementing a "voluntary remediation work plan" as 
defined in id. § 13-25-5~7)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2286.1 (West Supp. 1996) (vol-
untary remedial action plan)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(5) (West Supp. 
1995); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.20118, 324.20120a (West Supp. 1996) (reme-
dial action plan, as defined in id. § 324.20101(1)(aa))); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1158.175(3) (West Supp. 1995) (voluntary response action plan)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 260.567(5) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(5) (WESTLAW through 
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (remedial action plan)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-733 
(1995) (voluntary cleanup plan)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.§ 81-15,184 (WESTLAW through 
end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) (remedial action plan)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 
24, at 77 (New Hampshire requires a remedial work plan)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, 
§§ 26C-2.2, -3.3, app. A (1996) (state may require a remedial action work plan under a Memo-
randum of Agreement that complies with the technical standards of N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, 
§ 26E-6.2; state indicates that this is typically done where groundwater contamination is present 
or a longer cleanup effort is involved)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84 (New 
York requires an agreement or consent order outlining cleanup requirements)); North Carolina 
(N.C. GurnELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1 to 1-2 (providing for two different types of cleanups, 
with one being a cleanup under an "Administrative Order on Consent," which incorporates a 
remedial work plan as outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 130A-310.9(b) (1995)); Oregon (OR. REV. 
STAT. § 465.325(1) (Supp. 1996); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(3) (providing for the state to enter into 
agreements for cleanups)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.302(e)(l), -.303(h)(l) 
(West Supp. 1996) (notice of intent to remediate under background or statewide health standard 
must contain description of proposed remediation measures); id. § 6026.304(/)(3), U) (requiring 
a remediation plan if developer chooses to remediate under the site-specific standard)); Rhode 
Island (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (Rhode Island requires a remedial action work 
plan, as defined in § 9 of the Site Remediation Regulations)); Tennessee (TENN. COMP. R. & 
REGS. § 1200-1-13-.09 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (RI/FS report)); 
Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.606 (West Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 
(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 333.7 regarding voluntary 
cleanup agreements and work plans)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(g), (h) (Supp. 
1996) (site investigation work plan and corrective action plan)); Virginia (VA. CooE ANN. 
§ 10.1-1429.l(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1996) (calling for rules to establish procedures "to be fol-
lowed by a person volunteering to remediate a release and by the Department in processing 
submissions and overseeing remediation")); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. NR 722 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (remedial options report)). See also COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 82, 86, 111 (describing the Delaware, New Jersey, and Oregon 
agreements); OT A STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 137 & 
n.212, 143, 149 & n.286 (describing the Colorado, Indiana, and Texas provisions); Survey Results, 
supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia provisions); 
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the California, North Carolina, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island programs). 
Massachusetts's scheme of work plans and oversight depends on the classification of the site 
according to the risk it poses. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0500-.0582 (WESTLAW 
through Register No. 794) establishes the tier classification scheme. Tier I sites are those posing 
the most risk (sites having scores above 350 on the HRS-like "Numerical Ranking System" of 
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.1500-.1516). Id. § 40.0520(3). Tier II sites are those posing 
lesser risks. Tier I sites are subdivided into Tier IA sites (the most complicated and serious 
sites), Tier IB, and Tier IC sites. Id. (scored according to id. § 40.1500-.1516). At all but Tier IA 
sites, response actions may take place under the supervision of an LSP without direct oversight 
by the state. See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, THE 1993 MASSACHUSETTS 
CONTINGENCY PLAN: A NEW APPROACH TO CLEANING UP DISPOSAL SITES 4 (1993) [hereinaf-
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"voluntary remediation agreement" that sets forth the terms and con-
ditions of a "work plan" for the site.228 In some states, the plan may 
be part of a consent decree entered in judgment to memorialize the 
agreement between the state and a developer who is a responsible 
party at the site.229 Under some approaches, the plan may provide for 
ter MASSACHUSETIS MCP FACT SHEET]. At Tier IA sites, comprehensive oversight includes the 
preparation of a remedial action plan. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0800-.0896 
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794). At other sites, the LSP submits any or all appropriate 
intermediate reports to the state, with the process culminating in the preparation of a final "Re-
sponse Action Outcome Statement." Id. § 40.1056 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); see 
also Tondro, supra note 20, at 804. As Professor Tondro notes, this allows the LSP's opinion to 
function as "a Department 'sign-off' for work completed." Id. 
Ohio's scheme also depends extensively on review and oversight of remedial activities by 
certified professionals, with the state's review limited to audits of no further action letters; thus, 
the state is not involved in reviewing remedial action plans except in cases where it reviews plans 
after cleanups have been completed. Omo ADMIN. CODE§§ 3745-300-05, -13, -14 (WESTLAW 
through Aug. 31, 1996) (setting forth standards for certification of environmental professionals, 
empowering them to issue no further action letters, and setting forth audit procedures); Omo 
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.lO(A)-(B), 3746.11, 3746.12 (Anderson 1995). At the developer's dis-
cretion, it need not even submit the no further action letter to the state EPA and trigger the 
possibility of an audit, although it must do so if it intends to receive a covenant not to sue. Omo 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-13(F)-(G). 
The Washington program is similar to the Massachusetts program in that it has alternative 
courses of action, depending on the administrative procedure selected by the developer. If the 
site is not under a state order or decree, the developer (whether or not it is a "potentially liable 
party") may proceed by negotiating an "agreed order" or consent decree with the state, or pro-
ceeding with independent remedial action at its own risk; if the site is under an order or decree, 
only the first two actions are available. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-510(2) (WESTLAW 
through July 24, 1996); cf. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that 
the developer may request that the state approve the remedial action "at any time before, during 
or after the remedial action"). Most voluntary cleanups have been independent remedial ac-
tions, though some have taken place after negotiations with the state. Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160. Like a cleanup in Ohio, an independent remedial action in Washington may 
take place with limited state involvement, and without a formally approved work plan; the devel-
oper need only submit a final independent remedial action report at the completion of the 
cleanup. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also 
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 113. Cleanups pursuant to agree.d orders or consent decrees 
will involve the preparation of draft and final cleanup action plans under WASH. ADMIN. Co DE 
§ 173-340-360. Survey Results, supra note 158. Similarly, North Carolina allows developers to 
proceed with independent cleanups, that is, without entering into "Administrative Orders on 
Consent." Id. 
228. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); see also 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143. The "work 
plan" is "the heart of the [Indiana] program." O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 
61. The work plan must include details of how the site will be cleaned up, including proposed 
remediation steps, schedules, quality assurance, and community relations information. IND. 
CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-7; see also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61; Sweeney, 
supra note 20, at 143; Survey Results, supra note 158. 
229. The states in which the plan may be part of a consent decree include: Arkansas (ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(d) (Michie Supp. 1995) (remedial action plan becomes an amendment to 
the consent administrative order)); Delaware (DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(b) (WESTLAW 
through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (settlement agreement 
may be a "consent decree, administrative order of consent, memorandum of agreement or any 
other form of agreement consistent with regulations"; however, state has indicated that sites are 
not handled in the program with consent decrees)); New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, 
at 84 (in New York, the agreement may take the form of a consent order)); North Carolina (N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 130A-310.9 (1995); N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1to1-2 (stating that the 
applicant seeking state involvement may enter into an Administrative Order on Consent with 
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a partial cleanup either of certain contaminants or of a portion of the 
site.230 
b. Risk-Based Cleanup Standards 
Although some state programs do not change existing cleanup 
standards,231 many attempt to implement modified, risk-based stan-
dards as an incentive to developers.232 The Office of Technology As-
the state)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(3) (providing that participants entering into a Pro-
spective Purchaser Agreement may embody that agreement in an administrative consent order, 
"other administrative agreement," or consent decree)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-
19.14-8, .14-10, .14-11 (Supp. 1995) (providing for bona fide prospective purchaser or otherwise 
performing party to enter into a settlement agreement to be entered as a commitment by the 
state and performing party; voluntary cleanup takes place under a remedial action plan)); Ten-
nessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-224(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing that a party may enter into 
a consent order with the department outlining the steps to be taken for "investigation, cleanup, 
monitoring, maintenance and oversight° cost reimbursement")). See also Survey Results, supra 
note 158 (regarding the Arkansas. Delaware, Rhode Island, and Tennessee provisions); Tele-
phone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Tennessee provisions). 
230. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 343-E(2) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(2) (West Supp. 1995); MoNT. 
CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(4) (1995); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.608(d} (West 
Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW. Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 
30, § 333.7(b)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(4) (Supp. 1996) (state may approve a partial 
plan if it finds "that the releases or threatened releases that are not abated, removed or 
remediated pursuant to the corrective action plan do not pose an unacceptable risk to human 
health and the environment"). 
231. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15 (stating that "[m]any voluntary pro-
grams apply the same cleanup standards to voluntary sites that are used under their state 
superfund program"). Cleanup standards in this category of states are determined on a site-by-
site basis and must follow the requirements of existing state and federal laws. For the purposes 
of this article, the term "existing" means that the state requires that all cleanups at brownfield 
sites follow the traditional site-specific risk assessment approach; this category does not include 
those states that have redefined standards applying to all cleanups under the state CERCLA 
law, including voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0900-.0996 
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (applying a tiered approach to all cleanups governed by 
the Massachusetts Contingency Plan). Several states apply existing cleanup standards: Califor-
nia (CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.4 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the cleanup 
must "when fully implemented, place the site for which the plan is prepared in a condition that 
allows it to be permanently used for its planned use without any significant risk to human health 
or any significant potential for future environmental damage"); id. § 25398.6(a)(4); Telephone 
Interviews, supra note 160 (indicating that under the California VCP, cleanup standards of ex-
isting state CERCLA law apply}); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.3(d} (1995) 
(requiring cleanup levels to be determined in the same manner as under CERCLA/SARA)); 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(e) (Supp. 1995) (providing for cleanups to follow 
existing site-specific criteria established pursuant to TENN. CoDE ANN. § 68-212-206(d); TENN. 
COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.08 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Ver-
mont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h) (Supp. 1996). See also TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET, 
supra note 193, at 1 (noting that the criteria for cleanup actions in Tennessee are the same as for 
state Superfund sites); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 148 & n.279, 146-47 (describing the California 
and Tennessee provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the North Carolina provi-
sion); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Tennessee plans to issue guidance 
modifying existing cleanup standards and the Vermont provision). 
232. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 
(noting that Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have implemented 
"state-approved standardized cleanup levels or methods by which such cleanup levels are 
derived"}. 
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sessment has termed modifications to cleanup standards "[p]erhaps 
the most significant feature in many voluntary programs."233 Most 
states aim to spur redevelopment by redefining cleanup standards in 
terms of actual risks posed to human health and the environment.234 
There is widespread variation in the states' approaches to developing 
cleanup standards due to differing assumptions about the risk associ-
ated with contamination (e.g., toxicity, exposure pathways, and other 
factors), the importance of considering the proposed use of the site, 
and other considerations such as the effectiveness of engineering con-
trols.235 The ASTM's risk-based corrective action (RBCA, or "Re-
becca") approach, a "tiered" process for evaluating the appropriate 
level of cleanup at contaminated sites, has been influential in spurring 
states' development of cleanup standards.236 
States are developing two general types of cleanup standards: (1) 
standardized state-approved generic statewide cleanup standards, 
based on assumptions about exposure to contamination;237 and (2) 
site-specific standards, requiring a risk assessment to be performed at 
every site, but often incorporating consideration of the future use of 
the site (i.e., industrial, commercial, or residential) and allowing some 
cleanups that result in a public health risk higher than that currently 
allowed under CERCLA.238 In addition, some states continue to re-
quire or allow the developer to choose cleanups to meet strict stan-
233. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16; see also NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 20, at 49 (stating that a model brownfield approach might include "[r]isk-based cleanup 
levels based upon land use"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 158 (calling for "flexible, recognized 
cleanup standards and procedures" in voluntary cleanup programs). 
234. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16; Anderson, supra note 109, at 24; 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 35 (noting that "[a] number of 
states have implemented remedial standards based upon the risk to human health and the envi-
ronment posed by contamination"). 
235. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 15-16. 
236. AMERICAN Soc'Y OF TESTING & MATERIALS, EMERGENCY STANDARD GUIDE FOR 
RISK-BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION AT PETROLEUM RELEASE SITES, STANDARD E 38-94 (1994) 
outlines the "Rebecca" approach. See Robert W. Wells, Jr., Without "Rebecca," Cost-Effective 
Environmental Cleanup ls an Oxymoron at Florida's Petroleum Contamination Sites, FLA. B.J., 
Feb. 1996, at 53. The RBCA approach was developed for use at petroleum contamination sites 
and has the EPA's approval for this purpose. U.S. ENvrL PROTECTION AGENCY, UsE OF RisK-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN UST CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS (1995). The fundamental 
assumption of RBCA is that not every site must be cleaned up to meet traditional conservative 
cleanup standards. RBCA involves a three-tier approach with different cleanup levels; the high-
est tier is a site-specific risk assessment, the second and third tiers depend on more generic 
evaluations of the sites. The decision to choose any given tier for a cleanup involves a policy 
judgment that the standards of that tier are cost-effective and protective of health and the envi-
ronment. See generally Superfund Reassessment and Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment of the Senate Comm. on Environment 
and Public Works, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 450 (Apr. 5, 1995) (testimony of Steven J. Milloy, 
Director, Science Policy Studies, National Envtl. Policy Inst.) (calling for increased use of "Re-
becca" at Superfund sites); Wells; supra, at 53-54. 
237. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121. 
238. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Anderson, supra note 109, at 23-24 
(describing the Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio approaches); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 121; Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania approach). 
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dards based on levels of natural contamination in the surrounding 
area, or background standards .239 Increasingly, the states combine 
these approaches and allow developers to choose from tiered systems 
of cleanup standards. Ohio allows a developer to obtain a variance 
from applicable standards in certain instances.240 
The following table illustrates the states' approaches. 
TABLE 3 
MODIFICATIONS TO CLEANUP STANDARDS 
Type of Cleanup Standard State Comments 
No change from existing California ERAP Tennessee: forthcoming 
standards California VCP, North guidance may imple-
Carolina, Tennessee, ment a modified risk-
Vermont based system 
North Carolina: applies 
cleanup levels deter-
mined in same manner 
as under CERCLA in 
most cases 
Modified risk-based site- Arkansas, Connecticut, Arkansas: statute calls for 
specific standards Delaware, Illinois, risk-based standards; 
Indiana, Louisiana, tiered system contem-
Maine, Massachusetts, plated 
Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, North Carolina: applies 
New Hampshire, New only under certain site 
Jersey, New York, conditions 
North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon (forthcoming), Oregon: developing rules 
Pennsylvania, Rhode implementing a modi-
Island (forthcoming), fied risk-based 
Texas, Virginia, approach 
Washington, Wisconsin 
Washington: "Method C" 
cleanups generally not 
allowed 
Option to select back- Indiana, Minnesota, Virginia : rules to take 
ground standard Pennsylvania, Texas, account of background 
Virginia levels of contamination 
239. OTA STATE OF TIIE STATES, supra note 20, at 15. 
240. The variance allows the developer to use less expensive (and, perhaps, less protective) 
cleanup techniques. See Michel, supra note 20, at 457. Omo REv. CooE ANN.§ 3746.04(8)(11) 
(Anderson 1995) requires the state EPA director to develop rules to govern the application for 
, and issuance of variances, and § 3746.09 provides guidelines under which variances may be 
granted. To qualify, the developer must (1) demonstrate that compliance is not technically feasi-
ble or (2) make a showing that the cost of compliance outweighs the benefits. Id. 
§ 3746.09(A)(l); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 457. 
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Option to select generic 
statewide cleanup stan-
dard 
Option or requirement to 
select from tiered sys-
tem 
Other 
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Connecticut, Delaware, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, 
New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island 
(forthcoming), Texas, 
Washington, Wisconsin 
Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, 
Ohio (forthcoming), 
Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island (forthcoming), 
Texas, Washington, 
Wisconsin 
Colorado241 
Maine: limited approach 
based on experience at 
other sites 
Oregon: developing rules 
to redefine an existing 
generic statewide stan-
dard approach 
Arkansas, North Carolina, 
Oregon: considering a 
tiered system 
i. Generic Statewide Standards 
As an alternative to employing traditional site-specific cleanup 
standards, some states allow certain cleanups to meet generic numeri-
cal statewide standards.242 Ohio243 and Pennsylvania,244 for example, 
241. Colorado has no specific cleanup standards for soils and will approve cleanup levels 
based either on a site-specific risk assessment or the soil standards of the EPA or another state 
(e.g., New Jersey or Pennsylvania). COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 108; Telephone Inter-
views, supra note 160. 
242. The states allowing certain cleanups to meet generic numerical statewide standards in-
clude: Connecticut (CoNN. AGENCIES REGS.§ 22a-133k-2 (WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996) 
(defining generic standards for soil cleanups)); Delaware (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87 
(cleanups in Delaware may be to "trigger levels" for specific contaminants derived from the 
EPA Region III risk-based concentration tables)); Illinois (415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 51 
58.5(d)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (remediation applicant may propose a "Tier I" remediation objec-
tive that involves meeting a numeric standard)); Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra 
note 179, at 3 (providing that cleanups in Indiana may meet levels of generic risk-based stan-
dards)); Massachusetts (MASS. REGS. CoDE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0975 (WESTLAW through Reg-
ister No. 794) (providing that "Method 1" cleanups may meet the levels of generic soil and 
groundwater standards)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120a{l)-(4) (West Supp. 
1996) (providing that the state may establish generic cleanup criteria for categories of sites, in-
cluding residential, commercial, recreational, industrial, other land use based categories, limited 
residential, limited commercial, limited recreational, limited industrial, and other limited catego-
ries, replacing the provisions of M1cH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5709-.5715 (WESTLAW through 
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) calling for "Type B" cleanups to levels of generic cleanup stan-
dards assuming residential land uses)); Missouri (DIVISION OF ENVTL QUALITY, MISSOURI 
DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, How CLEAN Is CLEAN? UNIFORM CLEANUP STANDARDS FOR 
CONTAMINATED SITES tN MISSOURI (1996) [hereinafter MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS] 
(describing Missouri's Tier 1 approach to allow certain cleanups to meet "Uniform Cleanup 
Standards")); New Jersey (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83 (New Jersey maintains and re-
vises guidance on generic soil cleanup standards that can be used at individual sites)); Ohio 
(Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1) (Anderson 1995) (directing that rules be prepared to 
develop appropriate generic numerical cleanup standards)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 465.315(1)(f) (Supp. 1996) {directing the state to "identify generic remedies for common cate-
gories of facilities ... [taking account of] demonstrated remedial actions and technologies and 
scientific and engineering evaluation of performance data")); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
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are developing generic standards equivalent in scope, content, and 
coverage to applicable standards established by federal environmental 
laws and regulations. These standards will address issues such as the 
health risks posed by contamination at the site and protection of 
workers and nearby residents.245 However, generic standards offer 
two advantages to developers: certainty about the cleanup stan-
35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996) (directing the Environmental Quality Board to promulgate 
standards)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-4 (Supp. 1995) (providing for numerical 
criteria to be developed by forthcoming rules)); Texas (30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 335.555 
(WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996) (providing for cleanups to meet "Risk Reduction Standard 
Number 2" by meeting generic cleanup levels)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CoDE § 173-340-
700(3) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing for cleanups to meet "Method A" by 
reference to tables and to meet "Method B" by reference to risk equations specified in WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-340-720 to -750)); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN. CODE chs. NR 140, 720 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (providing numeric tables and site-specific 
modeling for soils cleanups)). See also Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.261 (describing the Indi-
ana Volunteer Remediation Program's provisions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 128, 153 & n.312 
(describing the Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes' provisions); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing 
the Pennsylvania statute's provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the New Jersey 
provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware and Wisconsin provi-
sion). A number of states, including Oregon and Rhode Island, are developing rules to provide 
for or expand the coverage of existing generic statewide standards. Oregon has generic stan-
dards in place for simple soil cleanups. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-045 (WESTLAW through Oct. 
31, 1995); Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Maine has a 
limited number of numerical cleanup levels, based on experience at similar sites. COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
243. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 1995); see also Department of 
Emergency & Remedial Response, Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, What's New with the Volun-
tary Action Program (last updated Dec. 19, 1996) <http://www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volunt.html> 
[hereinafter Ohio VAP Update] (stating that a second set of rules, including rules establishing 
generic cleanup standards, will be developed in 1996); Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.261; Swee-
ney, supra note 20, at 128 (describing the Ohio statute's provision). 
244. Pennsylvania's statute empowers two state boards to set generic statewide health stan-
dards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996) directs Pennsylvania's Environ-
mental Quality Board (EQB) to promulgate statewide health standards for cleanups for 
residential and nonresidential land uses, for medium-specific concentrations other than for dis-
charges into surface water, outside air, or groundwater. See also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 152-
53 & n.312; Tuttle, supra note 170. The newly created Cleanup Standards Scientific Advisory 
Board (CSSAB) is a 13-member board established to provide scientific and technical advice to 
the EQB in developing the statewide standards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.104 -.105 (West 
Supp. 1996). The CSSAB's members are appointed by the DEP and the leadership of the Penn-
sylvania legislature, and are required to have relevant experience or education "that relates to 
problems and issues likely to be encountered in developing health-based cleanup standards." 
The statute requires board members to be drawn from local governments, the public, academics, 
professionals, and the regulated community, with no quota for membership from each of these 
categories. The board's actions are to be taken by majority vote. Id. § 6026.105(c). The 13 
board members appointed to date include experts in relevant scientific areas such as chemistry 
and toxicology. PENNSYLVANIA'S Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-12. The 
CSSAB has also requested technical assistance from private sector consultants. Id. at 12; see 
also Survey Results, supra note 158. 
245. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 1995); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 
128, 153 & n.312 (describing the Ohio and Pennsylvania provisions). The generic standards are 
being developed using assumptions about exposure to contamination. Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160. The Ohio statute, for example, specifies that the generic numerical clean-up 
standards "shall be the concentration of each contaminant that may be present on a property 
that shall ensure protection of public health and safety and the environment for the reasonable 
exposure for [each] category of land use." OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 
1995). 
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dards;246 and, in some states, less "conservative" estimates of risk that 
factor in considerations such as the intended use of the property.247 In 
the latter case, the states often specify that separate standards may be 
developed for residential and nonresidential uses of sites.248 The 
states will allow higher levels of contamination to remain at sites des-
tined for industrial uses on the theory that there is less human expo-
sure and health risk.249 Some states apply the generic standards only 
to specific media (particularly soil),250 retaining existing numerical 
246. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that "in cases where generic 
standards ... are applied, there tends to be more immediate agreement and certainty"). The 
EPA's summary of the perceived advantages of generic standards includes: "an increase in con-
sistency of remedies, and an increase in defensibility of remedy decisions. In addition, settle-
ments may be achieved more quickly, voluntary cleanups may be promoted, and the standards 
may allow agencies to address a larger volume of sites due to streamlining." M1ssouRI CLEANUP 
STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 3 (quoting Executive Summary, EPA/State Soil Cleanup Levels 
Workshop, Oct. 13-14, 1993). A developer, for example, could undertake a more rapid cleanup 
by meeting a state-approved standard, without obtaining state approval of a site-specific cleanup 
standard. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 15 (describing the Texas approach). One potential 
disadvantage of generic standards is that because they apply on a statewide basis, they may be 
overprotective at an individual site. M1ssouR1 CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 3 
(quoting Executive Summary, EPA/State Soil Cleanup Levels Workshop, Oct. 13-14, 1993). 
247. The Ohio statute, for example, called for the development of separate standards "based 
upon the intended use of properties after the completion of voluntary actions, including indus-
trial, commercial, and residential uses and such other categories of land use as the director con-
siders to be appropriate." OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1) (Anderson 1995); cf MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may establish 
generic cleanup criteria for categories of sites, including residential, commercial, recreational, 
industrial, other land use based categories, limited residential, limited commercial, limited recre-
ational, limited industrial, and other "limited" categories); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-4 (Supp. 
1995) (rules establishing numerical criteria to protect human health and the environment "based 
on current and reasonably foreseeable future use of a property and surrounding natural 
resources"). 
248. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(a) (West Supp. 1996). But see WASH. AD-
MIN. CODE§ 173-340-740(1) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that although sepa-
rate standards for "Method A" [table-based) cleanups of soil may be established for industrial 
uses and other uses, the presumption is that unless the site is a qualifying industrial site under 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-745, cleanups must meet residential standards). 
249. See Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that standards based on the pro-
posed use of the site recognize "that old manufacturing properties will often continue to be used 
for industrial purposes once cleaned"); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Gwathmey & O'Brien, 
supra note 35 (noting that in New Jersey, "(d]ue to the assumption that there is less exposure 
and thus less health risk in a non-residential context, risk-based remedial standards (for soil] are 
less rigorous for non-residential property uses"). 
250. Until cleanup standards are promulgated in regulations, Pennsylvania requires that 
cleanups of contamination in surface water, groundwater, or air meet all applicable existing stan-
dards, these include, for example, maximum contaminant levels (MCL) for drinking water. PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(b)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1996). Soil standards may be set separately 
for residential and nonresidential land uses. For standards governing direct contact with soil for 
residential land uses, concentrations may not exceed either the direct contact soil medium-spe-
cific concentration based on residential exposure factors within a depth of up to 15 feet from the 
existing ground surface or a soil-to-groundwater pathway numeric value throughout the soil col-
umn, the latter to be determined by either a value 100 times the medium-specific concentration 
for groundwater, a concentration not producing a leachate in excess of the medium-specific con-
centrations for groundwater in the aquifer when subjected to the EPA's Synthetic Precipitation 
Leaching Procedures, or a generic value determined not to produce a concentration in ground-
water in the aquifer in excess of medium-specific concentrations for groundwater based on valid, 
peer-reviewed scientific methods. Id. § 6026.303(b)(4); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154 
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standards for other media (e.g., air, groundwater, and surface 
water).251 Because soil is the medium most likely to be contaminated 
at a brownfield site,252 this will often result in less strict cleanups. 
ii. Site-Specific Standards 
The site-specific approach of a number of states253 incorporates 
traditional risk assessment methodologies to determine cleanup stan-
n.313. For nonresidential land uses, the direct contact soil standard is to be determined based on 
concentrations not to exceed either concentrations based on nonresidential exposure, within a 
depth of up to 15 feet from the existing ground surface reflecting worker exposure, or the soil to 
groundwater pathway numeric value determined for residential exposures. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, § 6026.303(b)(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996). Medium-specific concentrations (other than these) 
set for carcinogens must be calculated using "reasonable exposure pathway assumptions" and 
may be no more strict than an excess upper bound lifetime cancer target risk of between 1 in 
10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000, and the concentration to which humans could be exposed "without 
appreciable risk of deleterious effects" for systemic toxicants. Id. § 6026.303(c). If the resulting 
statewide health standard is numerically less than the applicable background standard, the back-
ground standard applies. Id. § 6026.303(d); see also Survey Results, supra note 158. 
As with the background standard, developers who select statewide health standards must 
demonstrate attainment by collection and analysis of representative samples or statistical testing 
results. The developer's final report documenting attainment of the statewide health standard 
must include site investigation results, descriptions of cleanup procedures, and summaries of 
analyses that demonstrate attainment of the standards. Institutional controls may not be used to 
meet the statewide health standards, but may be used to maintain them after remediation occurs. 
Id. § 6026.303(a)-(e); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154 n.313. 
251. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740 (stating that in New Jersey, soil ''was targeted for 
reduced cleanup requirements," which, states McWilliams, "avoids relaxing standards for water 
and air, while focusing on the contamination least likely to migrate offsite"); Gwathmey & 
O'Brien, supra note 35 (describing the New Jersey approach); see infra notes 266-78 and accom-
panying text (regarding the approaches of states with "tiered" standards that retain existing stan-
dards for air, groundwater, and surface water). 
252. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740. 
253. States using a "site-specific" approach include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-
523(j) (Michie Supp. 1995) (allowing risk assessment as one of the options to determine cleanup 
criteria; ecological risk is considered in all scenarios)); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
16-305 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for remediation to be based on "the actual risk to human 
health and the environment currently posed by contaminants on the real property," taking pres-
ent or proposed uses of the site into account)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133k 
(West 1995)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9104(b)(2)(g) (WESTLAW through end of 1st 
Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 9 
(providing that the state may promulgate and revise rules to identify cleanup levels based on 
site-specific risks; state currently applies a risk-based process under Delaware Regulations § 9 
that takes land use into account)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 
1996) (providing that a cleanup may meet a "Tier III remediation objective," following a site-
specific analysis)); Indiana (INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 3); Louisiana (LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2272.l(A) (West Supp. 1996} (minimum cleanup standards for remedia-
tion activities to be modified by rule to take into consideration "the location, the surroundings, 
the intended use of the property, the potential exposure to the discharge, and the surrounding 
ambient conditions"); id. § 30:2286.l(C) (voluntary cleanups to meet these new standards when 
developed)); Massachusetts (MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0980-.0988, .0990-.0996 
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (Method 2 and Method 3 cleanups based on modeling 
(Method 2) or a site-specific risk assessment (Method 3))); Michigan (M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20120a(2) (West Supp. 1996) (calling for site-specific cleanup criteria to "utilize only rea-
sonable and relevant exposure pathways")); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.17(2) (West 
Supp. 1995) (providing for cleanups to be conducted under standards with consideration for 
planned uses of sites)); Missouri (MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 11-15 
(describing Missouri's site-specific Tier 2 "Alternate Cleanup Standards")); Montana (MONT. 
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dards at an individual site. In Pennsylvania, for example, developers 
electing to clean the property to meet the site-specific standard will 
perform remedial investigations254 and risk assessments to determine 
CODE ANN. § 75-10-721(2)(c) (1995) (requiring standards for cleanups to take account of "rea-
sonably anticipated future uses," as defined in MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-701(13); state uses the 
"waiver" process of§ 75-10-721(4) to modify existing risk-based standards)); New Hampshire 
(COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 78 (in New Hampshire, the applicant may propose standards, 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis)); New Jersey (Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11 (in New Jersey, 
cleanup criteria is based upon site-specific factors, and if the proposed standard will be protec-
tive of public health and the environment, state may approve site-specific cleanup standards)); 
New York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (in New York, standards are applied on a case-
by-case basis, with consideration for future land use)); North Carolina (N.C. GurnELINES, supra 
note 191, at 3-4 to 3-5 (allowing certain cleanups to meet "alternate remediation goals" approved 
on a site-by-site basis)); Ohio (OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(2)(a) (1995) (providing for 
the development of rules to establish procedures for basing cleanups on site-specific risk assess-
ments)); Oregon (OR. Rev. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b), (2) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the development 
of rules adopting a risk-based approach)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304 
(West Supp. 1996)); Texas (30 Tex. ADMIN. CODE§ 335.563 (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996) 
(providing for cleanups to meet "Risk Reduction Standard Number 3" by meeting site-specific 
cleanup levels)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1996) (rules 
adopting methods to establish site-specific standards to be developed, considering "the future 
industrial, commercial, residential, or other use of property to be remediated and of surrounding 
properties" along with four other factors)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-
700(3)(c) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing for "Method C" cleanups based on site-
specific risk assessments to levels for carcinogens based on an estimated lifetime cancer risk of 1 
in 100,000; however, use of this "Method C" is generally not allowed)); Wisconsin (Wis. ADMIN. 
CODE ch. NR 720 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)). See also COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87 (regarding the Delaware program); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 
20, at 44 (describing the New Jersey approach); Anderson, supra note 109, at 24 (describing the 
Massachusetts and Michigan approaches); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Minne-
sota approach); Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11 (describing the Ohio and Minnesota ap-
proaches); Michel, supra note 20, at 463 n.262; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154-55 (describing the 
Pennsylvania approach); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania approach); Survey 
Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Arkansas, Delaware, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washing-
ton approaches); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware and Montana 
programs). Maine's statute does not specify cleanup standards for voluntary cleanups; however, 
the state applies a site-specific approach that takes future land use into account. Me. Rev. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(l) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that cleanups must "remove or remedy all 
known discharges, releases and threatened releases at an identified area of real property in ac-
cordance with a voluntary response action plan"); see also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74; 
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Rhode Island's forthcoming rules are expected to imple-
ment a site-specific approach as one method in a tiered system. D1v1sION OF SITE REMEDIA-
TION, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, ISSUE SUMMARY, SOIL CLEANUP 
STANDARDS WORKSHOP I, at 2 (1995) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS WORK-
SHOP]; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
254. Pennsylvania requires the submission of a remedial investigation report that includes 
the following: 
(i) Documentation and descriptions of procedures and conclusions from the site investiga-
tion to characterize the nature, extent, direction, rate of movement, volume and composi-
tion of regulated substances. 
(ii) The concentration of regulated substances in environmental media of concern, including 
summaries of sampling methodology and analytical results, and information obtained from 
attempts to comply with the background or Statewide health standards, if any. 
(iii) A description of the existing or potential public benefits of the use or reuse of the 
property for employment opportunities, housing, open space, recreation or other uses. 
(iv) A fate and transport analysis may be included in the report to demonstrate that no 
present or future exposure pathways exist. 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(1)(1)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 
20, at 154 n.315; Tuttle, supra note 170. 
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how contaminants will affect surrounding properties.255 If preliminary 
analysis establishes that there are no pathways for the existing con-
tamination to spread beyond the property boundaries, no risk assess-
ment, cleanup plan, or remedy is required.256 On the other hand, 
when this analysis shows that exposure pathways exist, a risk assess-
ment is required in order to develop a cleanup standard and plan.257 
The site-specific approach holds considerable promise for devel-
opers.258 A number of states provide explicitly for standards allowing 
levels of health risk higher than those permitted under CERCLA.259 
The allowable level of risk for carcinogens can be higher than a 1 in· 1 
million (1 x 10"6) lifetime upper bound risk;260 as high as 1 in 10,000 (1 
x 104 ) in some instances.261 Site-specific standards, like generic stan-
dards, also consider factors such as the intended use of the property. 
A number of states provide explicitly that the cleanup required at a 
site must be based on the public health risk that is expected in light of 
the site's proposed or reasonably anticipated future use.262 
255. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(a) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 
20. at 154-55: Tuttle, supra note 170; cf ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(j)(l)(B) (Michie Supp. 
1995); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-305(1)(b) (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 51 
58.5( d)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that actual risk to nearby property is a factor to be 
considered in developing "lier III" site-specific risk-based standards); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-
10-734(2) (1995) (allowing applicants who wish to meet site-specific standards to perform risk 
assessments to determine how contaminants will affect surrounding properties; "default" levels 
such as background or EPA soil screening numbers, are used in the alternative); Omo REv. 
CoDE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(2)(b) (Anderson 1995) (rules to take account of impacts on surround-
ing land in establishing site-specific risk assessment methodologies); OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 465.315(1)(d)(D) (Supp. 1996); RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS WORKSHOP, supra note 253, 
at 1 (noting that Rhode Island is considering standards based on different land use categories); 
see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision). 
256. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(l)(l)(v) (1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 
154 n.315; Tuttle, supra note 170. 
257. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(/)(2) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra 
note 20, at 154 n.315 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing 
the Pennsylvania provision). 
258. See Courtney, supra note 140, at 14 (stating that the flexible site-specific cleanup stan-
dards "make it possible to tum a liability into an asset by utilizing a site-specific risk assessment 
for redevelopment activities.") (quoting Ronald G. Fender, Principal and Senior Program Direc-
tor, Environmental Resources Management, Exton, PA); Tuttle, supra note 170 (stating that 
Pennsylvania's site-specific standard "offers the greatest opportunity to renew properties previ-
ously considered too expensive for voluntary remediation"). 
259. Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11. 
260. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d) (West Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, § 6026.304(b) (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 154 n.315 (describing 
the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the Pennsylvania provision). 
261. See, e.g., 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d) (West Supp. 1996); Omo REv. CoDE 
ANN. § 3746.07(A)(2) (Anderson 1995) (providing that carcinogens must be cleaned to meet a 
risk level of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000, depending on the intended use of the prop-
erty); 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 335.563(b) (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996); see also Sweeney, 
supra note 20, at 126 n.147 (describing the Ohio approach). 
262. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(j)(2)(A) (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-16-305(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1996) 
(providing that this is a factor to be considered in developing "lier III" site-specific risk-based 
standards); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2272.1 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 115B.17(2a) (WESTLAW through 1995 Sp. Sess.) (providing that in determining the site-spe-
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iii. Background Standards 
In some states, certain cleanups will take place to background 
levels, either because the developer has the option .to elect to do so or 
the state requires it in some instances.263 This standard requires the 
developer to return the property to the condition it would have been 
in if the contamination associated with the previous use of the site had 
not occurred.264 However, because it requires a cleanup to natural 
conditions at the site, most observers claim that the cost of meeting a 
background standard is excessive.265 
cific cleanup standard for a brownfield site, "the commissioner shall consider the planned use of 
the property where the release or threatened release is located"); MONT. CoDE ANN. §. 75-10-
721(2)(c) (1995) (accepting a variety of risk-based standards based on "reasonably anticipated 
future uses" as defined in § 75-10-701(13)); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b) (Supp. 1996) (pro-
viding, however, that cleanups must protect against both public health and environmental risks); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(/)(1) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CooE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) 
(Michie Supp. 1996) (rules establishing site-specific standards must consider "the future indus-
trial, commercial, residential, or other use of property to be remediated and of surrounding 
properties"); see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Minnesota provision); Dins-
more, supra note 24, at 11; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 152 (describing the Virginia provision); id. 
at 154 n.315 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Tuttle, supra note 170 (describing the 
Pennsylvania provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision). 
263. States allowing or requiring cleanups to "background" levels include: Indiana (INDI-
ANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 179, at 3); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 99 
(cleanups in Minnesota may be to Department of Health standards, which "tend to reflect back-
ground contamination levels")); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West Supp. 
1996)); Texas (30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 335.554 (WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996) (providing 
that cleanups may meet background levels to meet "Risk Reduction Standard Number 1 ")); 
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that rules are re-
quired to consider "natural background levels for hazardous constituents")). See also Sweeney, 
supra note 20, at 151n.297,153 n.312 (describing the Pennsylvania and Virginia provisions). In 
Pennsylvania, developers who select the background standard are required to meet that standard 
for each regulated substance in each medium, with attainment to be demonstrated by collection 
and analysis of representative samples or statistical testing results. The developer's final report 
documenting attainment of the background standard must include site investigation results, de-
scriptions of cleanup procedures, and summaries of analyses that demonstrate attainment of the 
background standard. If the background standard was not met by removal or treatment meth-
ods, the report must also "demonstrate that remaining contaminants on the site will meet State-
wide health standards." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West Supp. 1996); see also Sweeney, 
supra note 20, at 153 n.312. 
264. Tuttle, supra note 170, at 13. 
265. See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucv FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 22 (citing the 
statement of Raymond Loehr, Chairman, Department of Civil Engineering, Univ. of Texas at 
Austin, that "[t]he cost of cleaning to background conditions can be enormous, and is often 
unnecessary"); Anderson, supra note 109, at 23 (stating that requiring cleanups to background 
levels "discourages voluntary site cleanups"); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 103 (noting that 
"Background Levels represent the more stringent standard"). State officials contacted for this 
article also indicated that requiring cleanups to background levels would hamper participation in 
voluntary cleanup programs. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Some states have acted to 
change an explicit requirement that sites be cleaned to meet background levels of contamina-
tion. In Oregon, for example, cleanups have been required to meet background levels unless the 
state determined that it was infeasible to do so or the generic soil standards applied; the state's 
voluntary cleanup statute requires revision of this requirement. OR. REV. STAT.§ 465.315(1)-(2) 
(Supp. 1996); OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-040, -045 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1996); see also 
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (describing the Oregon approach prior to the 1995 statu-
tory amendment). 
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c. Tiered System of Cleanup Standards 
A tiered or similar system has been adopted in Delaware,266 Illi~ 
nois,267 Indiana,268 Massachusetts,269 Michigan,270 Missouri,271 Penn-
Some observers, however, believe that if the surrounding area is contaminated, as will be 
the case at many sites in industrial areas, a background standard might be the most lenient 
cleanup standard. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 159 (describing the unsuccessful opposition of a 
coalition of environmentalists and community leaders to incorporating the background standard 
as an option in a proposed voluntary cleanup program in Maryland, for this reason). 
266. Delaware's system, although not strictly "tiered," has flexibility for determining the 
cleanup standard at a given site. Section 9 of Delaware's CERCLA regulations, the "Delaware 
Regulations Governing Hazardous Substance Cleanup," governs the setting of cleanup· stan-
dards. Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 9. It calls for the use of "a risk-based approach 
on a site specific basis," with cleanups allowed to be based "on current and potential future 
resource uses and reasonable maximum exposures expected to occur under both current and 
potential future use conditions of areas that could be impacted by a release or imminent threat 
of a release of hazardous substances." Id. § 9.1(1)-(2); Survey Results, supra note 158. How-
ever, the state has indicated that where contamination is limited, the use of "trigger levels" 
derived from the EPA Region Ill's Risk-Based Concentration Tables for specific contaminants 
will satisfy the requirements of the regulations. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87; Telephone 
Interviews. supra note 160. 
267. A developer in Illinois has flexibility to propose "remediation objectives" to clean up 
the site to levels developed in accordance with state rules to be promulgated for risk-based 
cleanups. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5 (West Supp. 1996). The forthcoming rules will 
establish a three-tier process for the establishment of remediation objectives. Id. § 5/58.5( d). 
"Tier I" objectives will be to meet numeric standards, and "Tier II" objectives will be to meet 
site-specific standards calculated on the basis of numerical modeling rules to be developed. Id. 
§ 5/58.5(d)(l), (2). "Tier III" objectives will include methodologies that will be developed to 
allow for risk standards for soil or groundwater that account for site-specific characteristics, cur-
rent and proposed land uses, effectiveness of engineering and institutional controls, and the ac-
tual and potential impact of contamination. Id. § 5/58.5(d)(3). Objectives will be site-specific 
standards, with residential land uses and nonresidential land uses to be evaluated separately, at 
exposures representing an excess upper-bound lifetime risk of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 
1,000,000 (depending on the proposed use of the site, with an excess upper-bound risk for resi-
dential uses of 1 in 1,000,000) for carcinogens. Id. § 5/58.5(d). Cleanups may be to levels ex-
ceeding existing state groundwater quality protection standards if "exceedance of the 
groundwater quality standard has been minimized and beneficial use appropriate to the ground-
water ... has been returned; [and any) threat to human health or the environment has been 
minimized." Id. § 5/58.5(d)(4)(A)(i)-(ii). Illinois requires the developer to submit a "Remedia-
tion Objectives Report" demonstrating the calculation of site-specific standards, if those are cho-
sen. Id. § 5/58.6(c); see also Survey Results, supra note 158. 
268. Indiana's cleanup standards, defined in guidance documents, embody a three-tier ap-
proach. Tier I involves cleanups to background levels. Tier II involves a generic risk-based 
approach, with different exposure assumptions for residential and nonresidential scenarios; this 
approach cannot be used for sites where contamination has an adverse impact on critical habi-
tats, including such areas as wetlands and dunes. Tier III standards are based on a site-specific 
risk assessment. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 96; INDIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra note 
179, at 3; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
269. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0996 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) 
specifies a three-tier system of cleanup standards. The overriding standard calls for a condition 
of "no significant risk" to exist with respect to health, safety, public welfare, or the environment 
at each site. Id. § 40.0902 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); MASSACHUSETTS MCP FACT 
SHEET, supra note 227, at 4. Three methods of setting cleanup standards are available to meet 
the "no significant risk" requirement. "Method 1" standards are numeric standards for over 100 
common chemicals in soil and groundwater; "Method 2" allows for site-specific adjustments 
(through modeling) to Method 1 standards; and "Method 3" sets standards based on a site-
specific risk assessment. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.0970-.0996 (WESTLAW through 
Register No. 794); MASSACHUSETTS MCP FACT SHEET, supra note 227, at 5. 
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sylvania,272 Texas,273 Washington,274 and Wisconsin,275 and, due to the 
influence of the ASTM RBCA standard, is an increasingly popular 
270. Prior to the 1995 statutory amendments, MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5705 (WESTLAW 
through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) specified that cleanups of sites in Michigan may be "Type 
A." "Type B," or "Type C" cleanups. A "Type A" cleanup is a cleanup to background condi-
tions . . Id. r. 299.5703(p). A "Type B" cleanup is a cleanup to generic statewide standards for 
contaminants in groundwater, soil, surface water, and air, defined in id. r. 299.5709-.5715. A 
"Type C" cleanup is a cleanup following a site-specific risk assessment. Id. r. 299.5719. This "A-
B-C" approach was heavily criticized as imposing cleanup standards that had "little bearing on 
reality." David H. Fink & Alan D. Wasserman, Winds of Change-Legislative Reform of 
MERA, 73 M1cH. B.J. 1060, 1060 (1994). Rules to be developed under the new statutory author-
ity will replace the "A-B-C" approach with a two-tier approach: the developer will have the 
option of performing a cleanup to meet generic standards developed for a variety of land use 
categories or a cleanup to meet site-specific criteria. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(l)-
(2) (West Supp. 1996). 
271. Missouri's two-tier approach allows for cleanups to meet generic standards (Tier 1 
"Uniform Cleanup Standards"), or site-specific, risk-based standards (Tier 2 "Alternate Cleanup 
Standards"). MISSOURI CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 9-10. Meeting Tier 1 stan-
dards is a "walk-away remediation." Id. at 9; Helfrich, supra note 156, at I. The Tier 1 Uniform 
Cleanup Standards for soils are the lower of the Missouri DNR's "Any Use Soil Levels" (ASLs) 
or levels for soils listed in the DNR's 1992 corrective action document. The ASLs are risk based, 
with a maximum cancer risk for carcinogens of 1 in 100,000. For groundwater, cleanups must 
meet background levels, or, if that is technically impracticable, MCLs listed in the Missouri 
Water Quality Standards or levels in the corrective action document. M1ssouRI CLEANUP STAN-
DARDS, supra note 242, at 11, app. 1; Helfrich, supra note 156, at 2. The Missouri DNR has 
discretion to require that cleanups meet Tier 2 standards in a number of situations such as if 
contamination adversely impacts habitat, or a threatened or endangered species. MISSOURI 
CLEANUP STANDARDS, supra note 242, at 9-10; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 106. 
272. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301 (West Supp. 1996). Pennsylvania requires the devel-
oper to comply with one or more of the following standards: (1) a background standard; (2) a 
statewide health standard adopted by the Environmental Quality Board; or (3) a site-specific 
standard which achieves cleanup levels based on a site-specific risk assessment. Id.; see COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 89; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 153 n.311; Tuttle, supra note 170; 
Brownfields: Pennsylvania Bill Signed into Law; Foes Appeased by Late Provisions, Hazardous 
Waste News, May 22, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407234. 
273. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 333.8(a) specifies that cleanups in the Texas Voluntary 
Cleanup Program (VCP) must meet "appropriate technical standards based upon the site char-
acteristics and site contaminants." 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996). In its pream-
ble to the new rules implementing the VCP, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation 
Commission (TNRCC) provided that the VCP will operate under existing cleanup standards of 
the "Risk Reduction Rules" until the TNRCC promulgates rules modifying cleanup standards. 
The Risk Reduction Rules, promulgated at 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 335.554-.568 (WESTLAW 
through Jan. 1, 1996), allow cleanups to background levels (Risk Reduction Standard Number 
1), to meet statewide health standards (Risk Reduction Standard Number 2), or to meet site-
specific standards (Risk Reduction Standard Number 3). The criteria for response action select-
ing is different, however, from existing requirements under the Risk Reduction Rules. The new 
selection criteria under 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 333.8(b) allow a demonstration that the re-
sponse action "will achieve the response action objectives" for the site, instead of basing the 
selection on a comparison with other remedial alternatives. 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, 
Apr. 12, 1996); Survey Results, supra note 158. 
274. WASH. ADMIN. CoDE § 173-340-700 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) provides three 
methods for determining cleanup levels. "Method A" cleanups are based on tables for individ-
ual contaminants; "Method B" cleanups are based on risk equations; and "Method C" cleanups 
are based on site-specific risk information. Method C cleanups may take place only when 
"[c]ompliance with cleanup levels developed under the method A or B may be impossible to 
achieve or may cause greater environmental harm," or at sites that are qualifying industrial sites. 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-700(3)(c) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also Survey 
Results, supra note 158. Oregon is considering implementing a similar approach in its forthcom-
ing rules. Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
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option.276 In Pennsylvania, the developer chooses from one of several 
approaches: complying with a background standard, a generic state-
wide standard, or a site-specific standard. There is no hierarchy 
among the standards in this tiered system; the developer is free to 
choose the standard deemed most efficient.277 Other states follow the 
Rebecca approach more closely, requiring cleanups to be based on 
site-specific risk assessments if applying generic standards would re-
sult in inadequate cleanups.278 
d. Presumptive Remedies 
Some states modify or reverse the usual statutory preference for 
permanent remedies such as destruction of hazardous substances.279 
The preference for engineering controls (measures designed to en-
tomb the contamination at the site, such as placement of a parking lot 
over contaminated soil)280 or institutional controls (managerial con-
trols such as fences anu warning signs, and land use restrictions),281 
which reduce cleanup costs significantly, is perhaps the "ultimate re-
laxation of cleanup standards."282 States incorporate a variety of pro-
visions regarding engineering or institutional controls.283 These 
275. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. NR 720 (1996) outlines three methods for soil cleanups: 
numeric tables, with different standards for industrial and residential uses; site-specific equations 
for modeling of contamination; and cleanup levels based on site-specific risk assessments. See 
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 103; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
276. Arkansas, North Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island are considering the creation of 
tiered systems. N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-3; RHODE ISLAND SOIL STANDARDS 
WORKSHOP, supra note 253, at 1, 3 (noting that the tiered approach is similar to the ASTM's 
methodologies); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. The forthcoming Ohio rules will offer 
the developer the option to meet either generic standards or standards based on a property-
specific risk assessment. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(1)-(2) (Anderson 1995). 
277. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.301 (West Supp. 1996); see also Tuttle, supra note 170. 
278. States continue to experiment, however. Illinois has adopted an approach that modi-
fies the "Rebecca" standard; cleanups based on site-specific risk assessments will only be re-
quired if the state determines in writing that the background level of contamination poses an 
"acute threat" to human health or the environment. 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.5(b) (West 
Supp. 1996). 
279. The general rule for cleanup remedies under CERCLA is that "[r]emedial actions in 
which treatment which permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of 
the hazardous substances ... are to be preferred over remedial actions not involving such treat-
ment." CERCLA § 12l(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(l) (1994); see RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.5, 
at 735-36; Anderson, supra note 109, at 23. 
280. Engineering controls include such measures as caps, covers, leachate collection systems, 
groundwater containment systems, and treatment systems intended to control or contain migra-
tion of hazardous substances. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25396(f) (West Supp. 
1996). 
281. "Institutional controls" is the general designation for measures such as fences, warning 
signs, and land use restrictions, undertaken to limit health risks. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 6026.103 (West Supp. 1996). 
282. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 740. 
283. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(16) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that 
a cleanup must be for residential use or provide for land use controls); id. § 324.20120b(3) (land 
use controls required for all cleanups other than residential unless the cleanup is for a use in a 
"limited" category, and the state determines that these controls are "not necessary to protect the 
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controls are either presumed to meet redefined cleanup standards284 
or specified to receive heightened consideration.285 Provisions calling 
for consideration of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed remedy286 
or its technical feasibility287 also enhance the likelihood of using these 
forms of controls. 
The use of these controls usually requires some means for record-
ing and transferring this information to future users of a site, such as 
deed notices and restrictions on future use of the site.288 
public health, safety, or welfare, or the environment and to assure the effectiveness and integrity 
of the remedial action"); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(b) (Supp. 1996). 
Michigan allows the use of institutional controls such as fences and warning signs for "lim-
ited" land use categories, when "the department determines that exposure to hazardous sub-
stances may be reliably restricted by an institutional control in lieu of a restrictive covenant, and 
that imposition of land use or resource use restrictions through restrictive covenants is impracti-
cal." M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120b(5) (West Supp. 1996). 
284. In Pennsylvania, engineering and managerial controls may be used to meet the site-
specific standard. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (West Supp. 1996); Tuttle, supra note 170. 
However, the state is directed to "disapprove a site-specific remediation plan that consists solely 
of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions unless the site-specific standard is devel-
oped on the basis of exposure factors which are no less stringent than those which would apply 
to the site at the time the contamination is discovered." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) 
(West Supp. 1996); Tuttle, supra note 170. Pennsylvania does not allow the use of managerial 
controls to meet the background standard; however, they may be used to maintain the back-
ground standard after remediation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996). 
285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523U)(2)(E) (Michie Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 75-10-721(2)(c)(iv) (1995) (providing that engineering controls are to be given "due considera-
tion"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (Anderson 1995) (providing for 
cleanup standards based on site-specific risk assessments to consider the existence of institu-
tional and engineering controls); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(c) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6026.304(j)(l)(iv) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie 
Supp. 1996) (providing that rules establishing site-specific standards must consider this); see also 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 151 n.297 (describing the Virginia provision). But see CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CoDE § 25398.6(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that no special preference is to be 
given to engineering and land use controls; state must evaluate merits of response options rea-
sonably available in light of site-specific conditions); WASH. ADMIN. CooE § 173-340-360(5) 
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (requiring preference for permanent cleanup solutions, with 
cleanups based primarily on institutional controls allowed only when it is not technically possible 
to select a more permanent cleanup alternative). 
286. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-523G)(2)(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-721(2)(c)(v) 
(1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.315(l)(d)(E) (Supp. 1996). 
287. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523U)(2)(C) (Michie Supp. 1995); Cow. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-16-305(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20118(6)(a) (West 
Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may approve a remedial action plan relaxing cleanup stan-
dards in this fashion if compliance "is technically impractical"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-
721(2)(c)(iii) (Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.315(1)(d)(B) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, § 6026.304U)(4) (1996); VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing 
that rules establishing site-specific standards must consider this); see also Sweeney, supra note 
20, at 151 n.297 (describing the Virginia provision). 
288. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16-17; RHODE ISLAND SOIL 
STANDARDS WORKSHOP, supra note 253, at 1 (noting that the use of institutional controls will be 
restricted to sites where some form of deed notice is provided); Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra 
note 35. 
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3. Limiting Future Liability 
Most voluntary cleanup programs allow developers and lenders 
to obtain some form of immunity from liability for contamination at 
the site.289 One commentator has termed this a "fundamental re-
quirement" to spur developers' participation in a state program.290 
Liability assurances for developers and, in some instances, lenders, 
come in a variety of forms and with a wide range of conditions and 
qualifications. 291 
a. Forms of Liability Protection 
The most common forms of liability protection include "no ac-
tion" letters, covenants not to sue, releases from state CERCLA lia-
bility, and certificates of completion (a state's certification that the 
cleanup meets applicable standards), all extended to developers upon 
completion of cleanup activities. Some states also alter the liability of 
owners and lenders under the state CERCLA law. Michigan has gone 
the furthest of any state in this regard by changing the structure of its 
CERCLA law to provide blanket protection from liability to an owner 
that is not responsible for causing the contamination at the brownfield 
site.292 
The following table illustrates the forms of liability protection of-
fered by each state. 
289. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16-19; Anderson, supra note 109, at 24-
26; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 97-100 (describing the types of liability releases); Dinsmore, 
supra note 24, at 11 (noting that liability protection is available in a number of states for pro-
spective purchasers and current owners who undertake cleanup activities); Sweeney, supra note 
20, at 121-22 (discussing covenants not to sue, certificates of completion, and no further action 
letters generally); Casserly, supra note 26, at 273 (contrasting Wisconsin's statute and rules, 
which contain no provisions for liability protections for developers who do partial cleanups, with 
Minnesota's law, which does allow developers to limit their liability under these circumstances); 
Solo, supra note 23, at 311 (citing to provisions in the Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon 
statutes). 
290. Solo, supra note 23, at 318-19; see also Anderson, supra note 109, at 25 (asking "what 
would motivate an owner to cleanup and sell his property if his potential liability was unend-
ing?"); Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6 (stating that "[o]ne of the key features of Minnesota's 
program is that it will release voluntary parties from liability by issuing 'no action' letters and 
'certificates of completion"'); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 163 (terming written liability assur-
ances "integral to the success of a Brownfields restoration and voluntary cleanup program"). 
291. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16. 
292. M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20126(1) (West Supp. 1996). 
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TABLE 4 
FORMS OF LIABILITY ASSURANCES 
Type of Limit on Liability State Comments 
"No action" letter or Arizona, California VCP, Washington: applies to 
determination Colorado, Connecticut, "independent remedial 
Delaware, Illinois, actions" 
Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Washington 
"Good neighbor" letter Colorado, Minnesota Minnesota: also features a 
"no association" letter 
Covenant not to sue or California ERAP, Oregon: release and cove-
release from state Connecticut, Delaware, nant not to sue applies 
CERCLA liability Indiana, Louisiana, only to parties to a pro-
Massachusetts, Maine, spective purchaser 
Michigan, Minnesota, agreement 
Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Rhode Island: no release 
Island, Texas, Vermont, for a responsible person 
Virginia (forthcoming), 
Washington, Wisconsin Washington: applies to 
parties entering into 
consent decrees with 
state oversight of clean-
ups 
Certificate of completion California V CP, 
Delaware, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia 
(forthcoming), 
Wisconsin 
Lender liability limits Louisiana, Maine, 
(protected if voluntary Minnesota 
cleanup takes place) 
Lender liability limits Illinois, Massachusetts, Wisconsin: also limits the 
(overall limits on Michigan, Ohio, liability of qualifying 
liability) Oregon, Pennsylvania, municipalities 
Rhode Island, 
Wisconsin 
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Other Arkansas 
i. No Action Letter 
Arkansas: statute 
provides for consent 
order to establish 
cleanup liabilities and 
obligations; state con-
sidering implementing 
some form of liability 
assurance 
The "no action" letter, or its equivalent, is available in a number 
of states.293 It assures a developer that the state will not pursue an 
293. A no action Jetter or its equivalent is available in: Arizona (ILLINOIS EPA GUIDE, 
supra note 158, at 2 (stating that in Arizona a "letter of completion" is available for the remedial 
action plan and for completion of cleanup)); California (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 110 
(under the California VCP, a "no further action" letter is available to a developer that completes 
a PEA showing that no cleanup is necessary)); Colorado (Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307 
(West Supp. 1996) ("no action determination")); Connecticut (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 
73 (indicating that in Connecticut, a letter of completion of remediation activities is available)); 
Delaware (Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, §§ 4.3(c), 5.3(c) ("no further action" letter 
available if no remedial action is necessary)); Illinois (415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5158.10 (new 
law makes a "No Further Remediation letter" available after completion of cleanup: letter is 
"prima facie evidence that the site does not constitute a threat to human health and the environ-
ment and does not require further remediation under this Act, so long as the site is utilized in 
accordance with the terms of the [letter]")); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(9) 
(West Supp. 1995)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20129a (West Supp. 1996) (Jetter 
of determination available after a baseline environmental assessment)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1158.177-.179 (West Supp. 1996) (provides for "off-site source determination letter"; 
state also offers several forms of written assurances, including a "no action letter," and "no 
association letter")); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.573 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CooE REGS. 
tit. 10, § 25-15.010(6) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Montana (MONT. 
CODE ANN. 75-10-738 (making a "letter of completion" available after a "petition for closure")); 
Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.)); New 
Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 78 (New Hampshire provides for a no further 
action Jetter)); New Jersey (NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A § V(7) (WESTLAW 
through Aug. 19, 1996) (developer may receive a "no further action statement")); New York 
(COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (a developer may receive a no further action letter in New 
York)); North Carolina (N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-2 to 1-3 (noting that a "no fur-
ther action" Jetter is available to any party conducting a site cleanup upon completion of all 
cleanup actions)); Ohio (Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.lO(A), 3746.11 (Anderson 1995) (pro-
viding for the certified professional to review the cleanup and issue a no further action letter); 
Omo ADMIN. CoDE § 3745-300-13 (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (defining the scope and 
content of "no further action" letters)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (before 
the 1995 amendment in Oregon, a "no further action" letter was available to participants in the 
Volunteer Cleanup Program, but not to parties who have entered into a prospective purchaser 
agreement)); Rhode Island (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 80 (indicating that in Rhode 
Island, a "letter of compliance" is available to any performing party who completes a remedy)); 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(g) (Supp. 1995)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 173-340-550(7)(a)(i) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that the department may 
provide a "written determination regarding the adequacy of the remedial actions performed at a 
site" where an independent remedial action has taken place; state issues "no further action" 
letters under this authority)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 83-84, 87, 98 (describ-
ing the Delaware, Minnesota, and New Jersey letters); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45 
(describing the New Jersey Jetter); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describ-
ing the Minnesota letters); TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET, supra note 193, at 1 (noting that a 
"Letter of Completion" is available when voluntary activities are completed); Anderson, supra 
No. 4] BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS 953 
enforcement action or require more cleanup activities at the site294 
and is typically available in two situations:295 (1) if an initial or Phase 
I assessment reveals contamination at the site at levels too low for 
regulatory concern or no contamination at all296 or (2) if contamina-
tion exists at levels exceeding applicable standards, and the developer 
completes an approved cleanup.297 Ohio, which allows developers to 
request a "variance" from cleanup standards, allows no action letters 
to be issued to these developers as well. 298 
Variations of the "no action" letter include the "off site source 
determination" (or "good neighbor") letter available in Colorado and 
Minnesota299 and Minnesota's "no association" letter.300 The good 
note 109, at 25; Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio letter); Sweeney, supra note 
20, at 134-35, 138 (describing the Minnesota and Colorado letters); Casserly, supra note 26, at 
268 (describing the Minnesota letters); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, 
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island letters); Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160 (regarding the California, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee 
provisions). Arkansas is considering extending some form of no action letter to developers. 
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
Unlike its other forms of liability protection, Minnesota's no action letter is not expressly 
provided for in the statute, but in a guidance document under the state's inherent authority to 
exercise discretion in enforcement actions. See Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134 n.188 (citing 
MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY: VOLUNTARY INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP, GUI-
DANCE DocuMENT No. 4 (rev. Jan. 1994)); Casserly, supra note 26, at 268. This is the approach 
taken by Oregon and Rhode Island, Telephone Interviews, supra note 160, as well as the states 
such as California, New Hampshire, and New York that conduct voluntary cleanup programs 
without express statutory authority. 
294. See, e.g., OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describing this feature of 
Minnesota's no action letter). The no action letter can often be tailored to the specific circum-
stances of a cleanup (e.g., when a developer undertakes a cleanup of only part of the site, or 
investigates and cleans up a limited type of contamination). Id.; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 135 
n.195; Casserly, supra note 26, at 268 (describing the Minnesota "limited no action" letter). 
295. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 3746.lO(A) (Anderson 1995); see also OTA STATE 
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19-20 (describing the Minnesota letter); Michel, supra note 20, 
at 455 n.189, 456 n.202 (describing the circumstances under which the certified professional may 
issue a no further action letter in Ohio); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 138 (describing the Colorado 
"no action determination"). 
296. In Ohio, for example, the developer can conclude cleanup activities when the Phase I 
assessment demonstrates "that information indicates that there has been a release of hazardous 
substances or petroleum at or upon a property, but that the release is not in excess of applicable 
standards." Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-13(A)(3) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996); see 
also Michel, supra note 20, at 455 n.189 (describing the Ohio statute's interim provision); cf 
Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 1 (providing that the party may receive a letter indicat-
ing that no remedial actions are necessary at the site under similar circumstances). 
297. In the latter case, a developer usually requests a no action letter only after performing 
an approved cleanup. See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(6)(8) (WESTLAW through 
ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release); Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-13(A)(4) (WESTLAW through 
Aug. 31, 1996); see also Michel, supra note 20, at 456 n.202 (describing the Ohio statute's interim 
provision). Maine also issues a "no-action assurance" letter at the plan approval stage, stating 
that if the cleanup is done properly, the state will not take enforcement action. Maine VCP Fact 
Sheet, supra note 195, at 2. Ohio, unlike most other states, provides that the "no further action" 
letter is issued by a certified professional, not the state agency. Omo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
13(A) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996). 
298. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(8)(11) (Anderson 1995). For a description of the 
Ohio variance process, see supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
299. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(2)(a)(II) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1158.177 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the site owner may receive this type of letter if 
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neighbor letter informs the developer that contamination on the site 
was caused by activities on a nearby property and that the state will 
protect the developer if it does not hinder the cleanup activities on 
that property.301 The no association letter informs the developer that 
it did not cause the contamination at the site and that its planned ac-
tivities will not contribute to contamination at the site.302 
In most states, a no action letter indicates only that the state will 
not pursue further enforcement actions. It does not release the devel-
oper from liability; it simply reduces the likelihood of future state ac-
tions. 303 If new information about the site unknown at the time of the 
letter is discovered, the state is not precluded from requiring a 
"the commissioner finds that the release originates from a source on adjacent or nearby real 
property and that the person is not otherwise responsible for the release"); see also OTA STATE 
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20 (describing the Minnesota provision); Sweeney, supra note 
20, at 138, 134 (describing the Colorado and Minnesota provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 
269 (describing the Minnesota provision). Colorado makes this form of its no action determina-
tion available to a developer whose site does not contribute to groundwater contamination. Sur-
vey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
300. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.178 (West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270. 
301. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.177(l}(b) (West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 269. 
Minnesota conditions the issuance of its good neighbor letter on the following: 
(1) agreement by the person to allow entry upon the property to the commissioner and the 
authorized representatives of the commissioner to take response actions to address the re-
lease, including in appropriate cases an agreement to grant easements to the state for that 
purpose; 
(2) agreement by the person to avoid any interference with the response actions to address 
the release taken by or at the direction of the agency or the commissioner, and to avoid 
actions that contribute to the release; 
(3) invalidation of the determination or agreement if the commissioner receives new infor-
mation indicating that the property owned by the person is a source of the release or that 
the person is otherwise responsible for the release; and 
(4) any other condition that the commissioner deems reasonable and necessary to ensure 
that the agency and commissioner can adequately respond to the release. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.177(1){b) (West Supp. 1995); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134 
n.188; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270 n.68. , 
302. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.178 {West Supp. 1995); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 20; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134; Casserly, supra note 26, at 270. The no 
association letter is available to determine that "certain actions proposed to be taken at real 
property subject to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or 
contaminant will not constitute conduct associating the person with the release or threatened 
release." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.178(1) (West Supp. 1995). 
303. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20; Anderson, supra note 109, at 25; 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 134 {describing this feature of the Minnesota letter); Telephone Inter-
views, supra note 160. 
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cleanup. 304 Thus, the no action letter is of questionable utility for 
developers. 305 
ii. Covenants Not to Sue 
Several states offer a developer a covenant not to sue.306 Because 
it offers express protection from future state administrative or en-
forcement actions for contamination found at the site,307 the covenant 
not to sue affords more protection to the developer.308 Typically, a 
developer may obtain a covenant not to sue in the same fashion as a 
no action letter: by undertaking a state-approved site investigation 
and voluntary cleanup.309 States often require a developer to obtain a 
304. The no action letter will usually include a "reopener" provision allowing the state to 
take action against the developer if contamination that was not uncovered in the site investiga-
tion and cleaned up is found later, the cleanup remedy fails to work, or other new information 
becomes available (e.g., the discovery of fraud or other misrepresentations in the developer's 
reports to the state). OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 20; see, e.g., COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 99 (describing this feature of the Minnesota letters). For a broader description 
of conditions under which liability protections may be void or voidable, see infra notes 333-44 
and accompanying text. 
305. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305 (claiming that a no action letter is less effective 
than a covenant not to sue, which provides a release from liability); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 17 (stating that letters of assurance other than covenants not to sue "vary in 
terms of their value"). But see Casserly, supra note 26, at 268-69 (stating that Minnesota regula-
tors claim that "no action" letters "have been sufficient to allow property transactions to oc-
cur"). A number of state officials contacted for this article indicated that there had been no 
subsequent actions taken in their states with respect to recipients of no action letters. Telephone 
Interviews, supra note 160. 
306. States offering covenants not to sue include: California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 25398.2(b)(l)(C) (West Supp. 1996) (making covenants not to sue available in the 
ERAP)); Connecticut (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73 (indicating that Connecticut issues 
covenants not to sue to new owners)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18 (WESTLAW 
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that a covenant must be given to a recipient of a 
certificate of completion; covenant bars all liability, including future liability)); Massachusetts 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A(j)(l) (West Supp. 1996)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.§ 324.20133(1) (West Supp. 1996)); Ohio (Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 3746.12(A) (Anderson 
1995) (providing that a.developer may submit the "no further action" letter to the state to re-
ceive a covenant not to sue)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4; OR. REv. STAT. § 465.325(7)(a) 
(Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may extend a covenant not to sue to parties entering into a 
prospective purchaser agreement)); Rhode Island (R.l. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-10 (Supp. 1995) 
(making "covenants not to sue" available only to bona fide prospective purchasers)); Washing-
ton (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(4)(c) (West Supp. 1996)). See also MASSACHU· 
SETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 1 (noting that covenants not to 
sue are available to participants in the Clean Sites Initiative); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra 
note 20, at 19-20; Anderson, supra note 109, at-;:75 (stating that the trend in recent statutes is to 
incorporate a provision for availability of a covenant not to sue); Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 
(describing the Minnesota provision); Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio provi-
sion); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58 (describing the Indiana provision); 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122 nn.113, 125, 136, 143, 152 (citing the Massachusetts, Ohio, Minne-
sota, Indiana, and Virginia provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Rhode 
Island provision). 
307. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98; 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 122. 
308. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17 (stating that covenants not to sue are 
more effective than letters of assurance because they release developers from liability). 
309. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the 
Ohio provision); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 58 (describing the Indiana pro-
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no action letter or "certificate of completion" as a condition precedent 
to receipt of a covenant not to sue. In Ohio, for example, a developer 
may obtain a covenant not to sue from the state after it receives a no 
action letter.310 
iii. Certificates of Completion 
In a number of states, the developer may obtain a "certificate of 
completion," a state approval of successful completion of cleanup ac-
tivities.311 The developer is usually required to receive confirmation 
from the state that the cleanup has been performed properly312 and 
promise to work with the state in the future (e.g., by maintaining and 
monitoring the site and by cooperating with the state in future cleanup 
vision); cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20133(l)(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1996) (making the cove-
nant not to sue available for "a person who proposes to redevelop or reuse a facility, including a 
vacant manufacturing or abandoned industrial site" who meets statutory conditions, including a 
condition that the covenant "would, when appropriate, expedite response activity consistent with 
the rules promulgated under this part"). But see COMING CLEAN, supra note 24. at 76; MASSA-
CHUSE"ITS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 189, at 2-3 (covenant not to sue is 
available upon determination that developer is eligible for the program). 
310. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A)(l) (Anderson 1995); see also Michel, supra note 
20, at 457; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 129. Indiana requires that the developer obtain a certifi-
cate of completion before receiving a covenant not to sue. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143; Survey Results, 
supra note 158. 
311. States offering certificates of completion include: California (COMING CLEAN, supra 
note 24, at 110 (indicating that a certificate of completion is available after a satisfactory cleanup 
under the California VCP); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.15(a) (West Supp. 1996) 
(certificate of completion available in the ERAP)); Delaware (DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108 
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware 
Regulations, supra note 172, § 11 (certification of completion of remedy)); Indiana (IND. CODE 
ANN.§ 13-25-5-16 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 30:2287.l(A) (West Supp. 1996); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(5) (West 
Supp. 1995)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(5) (West Supp. 1995)); Texas (TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.609 (West Supp. 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, 
Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.10 (1996))); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 6615a(k) (Supp. 1996)); Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.l(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1996) 
(directing rules to provide certificates of satisfactory completion of remediation "where volun-
tary cleanup achieves applicable cleanup st~ndards or where the Department determines that no 
further action is required")); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995) 
(certification that property has been satisfactorily restored)). See also OTA STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 20, at 17; Andrew, supra note 29, at 28; Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 (describ-
ing the Wisconsin provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 n.206, 143 n.240, 148-49 n.280, 150 
n.289, 152 n.303 (describing the California ERAP, and Indiana, Minnesota, Texas, and Virginia 
provisions); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota provision); Survey Results, 
supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware and Virginia provisions); Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160 (regarding the California VCP). 
312. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a devel-
oper in Wisconsin may receive a certificate of completion only by obtaining a certification from 
the state DNR that the property has been "satisfactorily restored and that the harmful effects 
from a release of a hazardous substance have been minimized"); see also OTA STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 20, at 20 (describing the Minnesota provision); Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 
(describing the Wisconsin provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143 (describing the Indiana 
provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota provision). 
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activities).313 The certificate of completion provides broad liability 
protection for a developer, particularly when it is accompanied by an 
exemption from liability under the state's CERCLA law.314 It is also 
the only form of liability protection that may shield the developer 
against further action by the state if additional contamination is dis-
covered at the site.315 
iv. Release from State CERCLA Liability 
In a number of states, protection from future state enforcement 
action for a developer who performs a site investigation and/or com-
pletes a state-approved cleanup takes the form of an express release 
from liability under the state CERCLA law.316 For example, a devel-
oper in Michigan may petition the state within six months of comple-
313. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a 
developer in Minnesota that receives a certificate of completion must agree "to cooperate with 
... response actions necessary to address remaining releases or threatened releases, and to avoid 
any action that interferes with the response action"); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(2)(a)(4) (West 
Supp. 1995) (providing that a developer in Wisconsin that receives a certificate of completion 
must maintain and monitor the property as required by the DNR); see also Clokey, supra note 
26, at 38 (describing the Wisconsin provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the 
Minnesota provision). 
314. For example, a recipient of Wisconsin's certificate of completion is exempted from lia-
bility under the state Hazardous Substance Discharge Law (the "Spill Statute") for contamina-
tion at the site prior to acquisition. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2) (West Supp. 1995); see also 
Clokey, supra note 26, at 37-38 (describing the Wisconsin provision). 
315. This is the case, for example, in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Wisconsin's exemption from 
liability applies even if any of the following occur: 
1. Statutes, rules or regulations are created or amended that would impose greater responsi-
bilities on the purchaser . . . [;] 
2. The purchaser fully complies with the rules [and cleanup plan] ... but it is discovered that 
the cleanup fails to fully restore the environment and minimize the effects from a release of 
a hazardous substance[; or] 
3. The contamination from a hazardous substance that is the subject of the cleanup ... is 
discovered to be more extensive than anticipated by the purchaser and the department. 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995); see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 
(describing the Wisconsin provision); Casserly, supra note 26, at 269 (describing the Minnesota 
provision). 
316. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9105(f) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess~ of the 
138th General Assembly, 1995) (exempting the holder of a certificate of completion); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:2285.l(A) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6) (West 
Supp. 1995); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20129a(5) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 115B.175(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(1) (providing for a release for a 
qualifying participant that enters.into a prospective purchaser agreement); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, § 6026.501(a) (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-7(b) (Supp. 1995) (providing an 
exemption for persons "who are define.ct as bona fide prospective purchasers and who enter an 
enforceable settlement agreement"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.610(a) (West 
Supp. 1996) (making release available; statute indicates that there is no requirement .that devel-
oper purchase property prior to issuance of the certificate of completion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6615a(c) (Supp. 1996) (providing an exemption for an "eligible person" who obtains a certifi-
cate of completion); VA. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-1429.2 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing immunity 
from state enforcement actions to the holder of a certificate of completion); Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.765(2) (West Supp. 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90 (describing the 
Pennsylvania provision); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 155 n.323, 150 n.290, 152 n.306 (describing 
the Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the 
Texas provision); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Oregon provision). 
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tion of a "baseline environmental assessment" for a "letter of 
determination" that it warrants a release from liability under the 
Michigan CERCLA statute.317 
b. Protection for Other Parties 
i. Lenders 
Some states extend the benefit of the liability protections in their 
voluntary cleanup statutes to lenders.318 Some of these states and 
others have amended their CERCLA laws to provide sweeping pro-
tections similar to those found in the EPA's invalidated lender liability 
rule,319 which redefined the situations in which a lender is "participat-
ing in the management" at a site.320 The apparent rationale for such 
provisions is that they facilitate a developer's efforts to persuade a 
lender to loan money for cleanup and redevelopment activities.321 
One commentator terms the various forms of liability protection for 
lenders "mandatory for redevelopment of urban industrial sites."322 
Other states, however, appear to be relying on the liability protection 
that they extend to developers to alleviate lenders' fear of extending 
credit at brownfield sites.323 Several major voluntary cleanup pro-
317. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20129a (West Supp. 1996). 
318. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2288.l(D) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting the lender unless it 
is a ··responsible person" as defined in id. § 30:2276); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-
E(6)(8)-(C) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(6) (West Supp. 1995); see also 
Anderson, supra note 109, at 25 (describing the Minnesota provision); Pendergrass, supra note 
26, at 6; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 n.200 (describing the Minnesota provision); Casserly, 
supra note 26, at 265 n.37 (describing the Minnesota provision). 
319. The EPA's rule was invalidated in Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see 
supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
320. This approach has been adopted in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(b) (West Supp. 1996) (redefin-
ing the situations in which a lender is exempt or released from liability at a site); MAss. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West Supp. 1996); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20101b (West 
Supp. 1996) (exempting a lender from liability if it has not "participated in the management of a 
property," as defined in id. § 324.2010la); 0Hto REV. CooE ANN. § 3746.26 (Anderson 1995); 
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-120 to -140 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing, however, 
that the state will review these rules to determine if they should be amended); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6027.5 (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.76(9m) (West Supp. 1995); see also 
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 88 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Anderson, supra 
note 109, at 25-26; Clokey, supra note 26, at 36 n.6 (describing the Wisconsin provision); Michel, 
supra note 20, at 459 (describing the Ohio provision); Survey Results, supra note 158. Wisconsin 
also exempts municipalities from liability in certain situations. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.76(9)(e) 
(West Supp. 1995). 
321. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 25; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 136 (stating that the 
Minnesota provision for lender protection "creates incentives for redevelopment"). 
322. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 161. The National Environmental Policy Institute's "model" 
state brownfield approach would include liability relief for lenders. NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 20, at 49. 
323. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 17 (noting that "[s)ome lenders have 
voiced approval of certificates of completion and no further action letters as easing concerns 
involving loan decisions"); Congdon, supra note 160, at 7 (noting that a developer's receipt of a 
certificate of completion in Virginia's voluntary cleanup program "should reassure nervous lend-
ers and investors"). 
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grams, including Indiana's, provide no liability protection for 
lenders. 324 
States extending the benefits of liability assurances to lenders 
often specify what a lender can do to protect itself without incurring 
liability.325 As noted above, this is intended to avoid the uncertainty 
associated with lenders' liability for taking actions to protect their se-
curity interests.326 
ii. Transferees, Successors, and Assigns 
The statutes often extend liability protection to the developer's 
transferees, successors, and assigns, such as subsequent owners.327 
324. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 145, 151 (noting that the Texas statute also incorporates no 
specific provisions to protect lenders). 
325. Illinois's "No Further Remediation Letter" protects not only the "remediation appli-
cant" or other person to whom it was issued, but also a financial institution that acquires owner-
ship, operation, management, or control of a site through foreclosure or other means of 
protecting a security interest. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(d)(l), (d)(lO) (West Supp. 
1996). 
326. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
327. Those states extending liability protection include: Arkansas (ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-
523(p) (Michie Supp. 1995) (extending protection to subsequent owners if they were not or are 
not responsible for causing or contributing to contamination)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
7, § 9105(e) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) 
(extending protection of a certificate of completion to "any person who owns, operates or other-
wise controls activities at the facility after the date of issuance of the certification ... provided 
such person does not interfere or permit any interference with any aspect of the remedy ad-
dressed by the certification of completion of remedy")); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 51 
58.lO(d) (West Supp. 1996) (a No Further Remediation Letter applies to a successor-in-interest 
as well as other defined parties)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18(b)(2) (WESTLAW 
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (protection of covenant not to sue extends to transferee of 
the certificate of completion or the property to which it applies)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:2288(A)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting an owner if it "is not responsible for any 
discharge or disposal or threatened discharge or disposal identified in the approved voluntary 
remedial action plan"); id. § 30:2288(A)(2) (person who "acquires or develops" the site), id. 
§ 30:2288(A)(3) (successor or assign of any person exempt from liability)); Maine (ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6)(E) (West Supp. 1995) (protection from state liability); id. § 343-
E(9)(B) (no action determination extends to successors and assigns "bound by the conditions in 
the determination or agreements")); Minnesota (MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175(6a)(c)(l)-(3) 
(West Supp. 1995) (protecting owners, purchasers, successors, and assigns in the same fashion as 
the Louisiana statute); id. § 115B.l 77(2) (protection of "good neighbor" letter extends to succes-
sors and assigns if they "are not otherwise responsible for the release and are bound by the 
conditions in the determination or agreement")); Ohio (Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.12(E) 
(Anderson 1995) (covenant not to sue remains in effect so long as property meets standards that 
were in effect when cleanup took place)); Oregon (1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(5) (benefits and bur-
dens run with the land to successors who agree to be bound by prospective purchaser agree-
ment)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.§ 6026.501(a)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1995) (current or future 
owner who participates in cleanup, developer, successor or assign, or public utility)); Rhode Is-
land (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-10 (Supp. 1995) (covenant not to sue may be transferred "to 
successors or assigns who are not otherwise found to be a responsible party," as long as they 
agree to any performance requirements, such as operation or maintenance)); Texas (TEx. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN.§ 361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting an owner or lender 
that becomes involved with the site after a certificate of completion is issued, unless it was origi-
nally a "responsible party")); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c)(2) (Supp. 1996) (ex-
emption from liability extends to successors)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(3) (West 
Supp. 1995) (exemption from liability applies to successors and assigns unless they know that 
certificate of completion was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation)). See also Anderson, 
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States may protect all successors and assigns or only future purchasers 
and owners. In order for the state's approval to extend to future buy-
ers, the statutes usually require some form of notice to the pur-
chaser.328 The typical means of notice is recordation of institutional 
controls, such as a restriction of the site to industrial uses, with the 
deed to the site.329 This puts subsequent purchasers on notice that 
certain activities at the site are restricted and some contamination 
may remain at the site.330 At sites cleaned to levels suitable for indus-
trial uses, subsequent purchasers desiring to use the sites for residen-
tial purposes are required to notify the states and, in some cases, 
undertake additional cleanup activities.331 Other states incorporate 
supra note 109, at 25; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 143 n.243, 156 n.325 (describing the Indiana 
and Pennsylvania provisions); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Arkansas and 
Rhode Island provisions). 
328. See, e.g., O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 64 (describing the Indiana 
provision). 
329. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523(0) (Michie Supp. 1995) (required for "industrial activities 
and compatible uses"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398.7(a) (West Supp. 1996) (land use 
controls, if any, must be recorded); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9115(b) (WESTLAW through end 
of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (certificate of completion must be 
recorded); 415 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.8(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996) (remediation applicant 
receiving a ''No Further Remediation Letter" must record it for it to be effective); IND. Co DE 
ANN. § 13-25-5-16(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requirement to record 
certificate of completion); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120b(4) (West Supp. 1996) (restric-
tive covenant running with the land required to be recorded if cleanup relied on land use restric-
tions); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3746.14 (Anderson 1995) (recording of no further action letters 
and covenants not to sue required); 1995 Or. Laws 662 § 4(5) (recording required of prospective 
purchaser agreement); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.609(c) (West Supp. 1996); 21 
Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CoDE § 333.9 which 
requires certificate of completion to be recorded in order to satisfy existing deed certification 
requirements); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(6), (k)(3) (Supp. 1996) (recording required for 
approved corrective action plans and certificates of completion); see also Anderson, supra note 
109, at 25 (stating that Indiana's covenant not to sue runs with the land to "lenders, successors or 
assigns of the protected entity"); Michel, supra note 20, at 457 (describing the Ohio provision); 
Sweeney, supra note 20, at 149 n.283 (describing the California provision for the recording of 
land use controls); id. at 154 (noting that the Pennsylvania exemption from deed notice require-
ments for sites cleaned up under the background or statewide health standard allows a site to 
"be sold and redeveloped free and clear of any indicia of past or present contamination"); Sur-
vey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Texas provisions). In Michigan, if the state approved 
institutional controls instead of land use restrictions in a restrictive covenant, these controls may 
be the subject of a local ordinance published in the same manner as zoning ordinances. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120b(5) (West Supp. 1996). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 6026.302(d), -.303(g) (West Supp. 1996) (if background or statewide health standard met, no 
deed notice required). 
330. Michel, supra note 20, at 457; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 164. 
331. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(q) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE 
§ 25398.7(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "terms and conditions of a land use control may 
be modified only with the express written consent of the department"); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/58.8(c) (West Supp. 1996) (site with a land use limitation may not be used in a manner 
inconsistent with the limitation unless investigation and/or new cleanup performed, and new "No 
Further Remediation Letter" obtained and recorded); MICH. Cm1P. LAWS ANN. § 324.20116(3) 
(West Supp. 1996) (transferor required to disclose applicable land or resource use restrictions); 
id. § 324.20120b(4) (restrictive covenant with land use restrictions binds successors, assigns, and 
lessees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.505(4), -.903 (West Supp. 1996) (state must approve 
requests to change the property from nonresidential to residential land uses, and may require 
additional cleanup if risk increases by a change from nonresidential to residential land uses); 
No. 4] BROWNFIELDS OF DREAMS 961 
provisions designed to ensure that engineering and managerial con-
trols are maintained properly.332 
c. Qualifications and Limitations 
i. Situations Voiding the Limit on Liability 
Many statutes provide that if the developer fails to properly per-
form the cleanup activities called for in the remedial action plan,333 
aggravates the contamination, or interferes with cleanup activities,334 
it will not receive protection from liability. States also retain their 
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE ANN. §361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (no liability protection for 
"a person who changes land use from the use specified in the certificate of completion if the new 
use may result in increased risks to human health or the environment"). 
332. See also OT A STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 16. 
333. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25398.2(b)(l)(D) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for 
the removal of a site from the list of eligible sites for the ERAP upon failure to comply with 
program requirements); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-16-306(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (failure to 
"materially comply" with the plan renders approval "void"); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108(a) 
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (state may 
condition certificate of completion on "the performance of additional remedies in the event that 
the remedial goals contained in the final plan of remedial action are not achieved as required by 
the plan"); 415 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(e) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-
19 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (state may withdraw approval of a work plan 
upon failure to substantially comply with terms and conditions of work plan or voluntary 
remediation agreement); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20133(3)(c) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 260.569(3)(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1996} (constituting grounds for termination for 
cause); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-736(10)(a) (1995) (failure "of the applicant or the applicant's 
agents to materially comply with the voluntary cleanup plan" renders approval void}; N.J. Ao. 
MIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A, § IV(l} (WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996) (state reserves 
the right to terminate the developer's participation if the developer violates the terms of the 
Memorandum of Agreement); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(4}(d) (no release for party to prospective 
purchaser agreement in the event of "failure to exercise due care or take reasonable precautions 
with respect to any hazardous substance at the facility"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 
(regarding the Indiana, Missouri, and New Jersey provisions). 
334. ARK. CooE ANN.§ 8-7-523(n) (Michie Supp. 1995) (specifies that "the purchaser shall 
take all the steps necessary to prevent aggravating or contributing to the contamination of the 
air, land, or water, including downward migration of contamination, from any existing contami-
nation on the site"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2289(1) (West Supp. 1996) (no exemption for a 
"person who aggravates or contributes to a discharge or disposal or threatened discharge or 
disposal that was not remedied under an approved voluntary remedial action plan"); Mrctt. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20133(3)(b) (West Supp. 1996) (covenant not to sue does not bar claims 
for "[i)nterference with or failure to cooperate with the department, its contractors, or other 
persons conducting response activities"); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(7)(1) (West Supp. 1995) 
(no exemption from liability for "a person who aggravates or contributes to a release or 
threatened release that was not remedied under an approved voluntary response action plan"); 
1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(1)(c), (4)(b)-(c) (no release from state liability for party to prospective 
purchaser agreement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(3) (Supp. 1996) (no limit on liability 
for "eligible person" or successor if that person "engages in activities that are inconsistent with 
or interfere with monitoring, investigation, abatement, removal or remediation activities, or con-
ditions or restrictions in a certificate of completion"); id. § 6615a(d)(5) (no limit on liability if an 
"eligible person or successor worsens an existing release or threatened release prior to the issu-
ance of a certificate of completion, and that release or threatened release is not abated, re-
moved, remediated or monitored pursuant to an approved corrective action plan prior to the 
issuance of a certificate of completion"). Michigan also imposes an affirmative obligation on an 
owner or operator who has knowledge that a site has been contaminated by hazardous sub-
stances to do all of the following, with fines and penalties for a failure to comply: 
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authority to respond to imminent hazards.335 Even in states where 
liability assurances protect the developer against the discovery of ad-
ditional contamination, the developer is not protected if it caused that 
contamination.336 This may be difficult to discern; as one commenta-
tor notes, "The longer the party has conducted operations on the site, 
the more difficult it may be to document that contamination is not the 
result of that party's activities. "337 
Once the developer receives protection from liability, many states 
provide that the liability assurance is either void automatically or 
voidable at the state's election in certain circumstances. In many 
states, protection from liability is offered only with respect to contami-
nation known about at the time of site assessment and remediation 
activities.338 This is intended to provide an incentive to discover and 
(a) Undertake measures as are necessary to prevent exacerbation of the existing 
contamination. 
(b) Exercise due care by undertaking response activity necessary to mitigate unacceptable 
exposure to hazardous substances and allow for the intended use of the facility in a manner 
that protects the public health and safety. 
(c) Take reasonable precautions against the reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of a 
third party and the consequences that foreseeably could result from those acts or omissions. 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20107a(l) (West Supp. 1996). But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2287(1) (West Supp. 1996) (no liability for "aggravating or contributing to any discharge or 
disposal or threatened discharge or disposal identified in an approved voluntary remedial action 
plan" if work performed in a "workmanlike" manner); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-
E(6)(F) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a person who, "while implementing the voluntary 
response action plan and exercising due care in implementation, causes, contributes or exacer-
bates a discharge or release [may be released from liability] provided that the discharge or re-
lease is removed or remediated to the satisfaction of the commissioner"); see also Survey 
Results, supra note 158 (stating that in Maine, a developer that does not remove or remediate 
the "contribution or exacerbation" is disqualified from the program). 
335. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-19(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.569(3)(1) (West Supp. 1996) (constituting grounds for termination 
for cause). 
336. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995); see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 43 
(describing the Wisconsin provision). 
337. Clokey, supra note 26, at 43. 
338. States that offer protection only for known contamination include: Arkansas (ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(m) (Michie Supp. 1995)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/ 
58.10(e)(6) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that discovery of additional contamination that repre-
sents a threat may result in voidance of "No Further Remediation Letter")); Indiana (IND. CODE 
ANN. § 13-25-5-18(c)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (covenant not to sue 
may not apply to future liability for contamination "not known to the commissioner at the time 
the commissioner issued the certificate of completion")); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 343-E(l) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that liability protection applies only to "known" re-
leases)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.573 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that additional 
cleanup may be required)); Montana (MoNT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-736(7) (1995) (approval "ap-
plies only to conditions at the facility that are known to the department at the time of depart-
ment approval")); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of 1995 
Reg. Sess.)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(2) (West Supp. 1996) (state may 
require additional cleanup)); Rhode Island (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Rhode Island typi-
cally requires that any grounds for disqualification be written into the settlement agreements)); 
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.l-1429.l(A)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing for the certificate 
of satisfactory completion of remediation to be based on existing conditions and available infor-
mation)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1996)). See also Maine VCP 
Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 3; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 145 
n.253 (describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Illinois 
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clean up all contamination. 339 The states are typically empowered to 
deny liability protection in a number of other situations: if the 
cleanup remedy fails to eliminate the risk to health or the environ-
ment;340 if the developer contaminates the site later;341 if the devel-
oper fails to maintain controls at the site;342 or if a ·change in land use 
at the site, usually from industrial to residential uses, would result in 
the violation of applicable standards.343 Many states also provide that 
fraudulent statements or misrepresentations in program documents 
will void the liability protection.344 
and Virginia· provisions). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(c)(3)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1996) 
(providing that the release from liability extends to protect the developer in three instances: (1) 
if existing contamination is discovered later by methods not recognized as standard at the time of 
cleanup plan approval; (2) if contaminants are first regulated as hazardous after plan approval; 
and (3) if additional cleanup activities would otherwise be required by more stringent cleanup 
standards that became effective after plan approval). 
339. See Berger et al., supra note 23, at 98; Solo, supra note 23, at 314 n.155. 
340. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(C)(2) (Anderson 1995) (providing that the state may 
deny a covenant not to sue if a remedy identified in the "no further action" letter fails to protect 
health and the environment); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(3) (West Supp. 1996); see also 
Michel, supra note 20, at 458 (describing the Ohio provision). 
341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-523(k) (Michie Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20133(3)(a) (West Supp. 1996); NEB. REv. ~TAT.§ 81-15,186 (WESTLAW through end of 
1995 Reg; Sess.); 1995 Or. Laws 662, § 4(4)(a) (providing no limit on liability for releases at the 
facility after the date of acquisition for party to prospective purchaser agreement, and developer 
has the burden to prove that contamination existed before the date of acquisition); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.504 (West Supp. 1996); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.610(a) 
(West Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1996) (extending liability 
limit to "releases and threatened releases which result from the nonreckless performance of an 
approved site investigation work plan or an approved corrective action plan and which are 
abated, removed, remediated or monitored pursuant to an approved corrective action plan prior 
to the issuance of a certificate of completion"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a) (West Supp. 
1995) (providing that exemption from liability applies only to a release occurring "prior to the 
date of acquisition of the property"). 
However, Wisconsin's liability exemption applies even if: 
1. Statutes, rules or regulations are created or amended that would impose greater responsi-
bilities on the purchaser than those imposed under par. (a)2. 
2. The purchaser fully complies with the rules promulgated by the department and any con-
tract entered into under those rules under par. (a)2 but it is discovered that the cleanup fails 
to fully restore the environment and minimize the effects from a release of a hazardous 
substance. 
3. The contamination from a hazardous substance that is the subject of the cleanup under 
par. (a)2 is discovered to be more extensive than anticipated by the purchaser and the 
department. 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
342. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(E) (Anderson 1995) (providing that a covenant not 
to sue is voidable upon the developer's discontinued maintenance of engineering controls); see 
also Michel, supra note 20, at 458. 
343. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(4) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may 
require additional cleanup activities if land use changes alter exposure patterns); TEx. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 361.610(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a release from liability in 
Texas is void if a change in the land use increases the risk to human health or the environment); 
see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90 (describing the Pennsylvania provision); Sweeney, 
supra note 20, at 150 n.290 (describing the Texas provision). 
344. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(3)(b) (West Supp. 1996) (rendering the approval 
of a voluntary cleanup plan void); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9111(a) (WESTLAW through end of 
1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (voiding any limitation on liability); 415 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.10(e)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that fraud or misrepresentation 
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ii. Limited Utility of Liability Assurances 
The various forms of liability assurances protect the developer 
from state enforcement actions but are not com~ehensive. As a re-
sult, they are of limited utility to a developer. 5 In all. but a few 
states, they do not provide immunity from private party suits.346 They 
also do not provide complete release from CERCLA liability.347 The 
EPA has taken steps to minimize the likelihood of a CERCLA en-
forcement action at a site cleaned up in a state program348 but some 
risk remains. 
in obtaining a "No Further Remediation Letter" may result in its voidance); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:2289(3) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(7)(C) (West Supp. 
1995) (extending to a successor or assign with knowledge); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20139(2) (West Supp. 1996) (imposing criminal penalties for false statements and misrepre-
sentations in cleanup documents and applications); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1158.175(7)(3) (West 
Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-736(10)(b) (1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 3746.12(C)(3) (Anderson 1995) (providing that the state shall deny a covenant not to sue if the 
no further action letter was submitted fraudulently); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.505(1) (West 
Supp. 1996) (providing that state may require additional cleanup actions if fraud was committed 
in meeting a cleanup standard); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 361.610(b) (West Supp. 
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(d)(2) (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(2)(a)(6) 
(West Supp. 1995); see also Suryey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Montana provision). 
345. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26 (stating that "state assurances 
may not go far enough for some stakeholders to promote further brownfield cleanups and 
redevelopment"). 
346. Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin, among others, do not bar private party 
lawsuits over contamination at brownfield sites. See, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 74 
(regarding the Maine program); MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN SITES INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra 
note 189. at l; Clokey, supra note 26, at 38 ("[T)he [Wisconsin) legislature stopped short of 
barring private party claims for recovery of remediation costs brought under federal or state 
law"); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160; see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 
20, at 16 (stating that state liability assurances do not protect developers from third-party 
actions). 
Indiana and Pennsylvania are among the states providing that satisfactory completion of 
cleanup activities insulates a developer from certain third-party lawsuits. IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 13-25-5-18(b), -20(b) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 6026.502(a) (West Supp. 1996) (applying only to sites located in "special industrial areas"); see 
also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 123 (describing the Indiana and Pennsylvania provisions); Sur-
vey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana provisions). 
347. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26; Michel, supra note 20, at 458; Swee-
ney, supra note 20, at 165. One commentator calls a state covenant not to sue an "implicit shield 
against the threat of federal cleanup action suits," because a developer that qualifies for the 
covenant presumably also will be meeting federal cleanup standards. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 59; see also Michel, supra note 20, at 458 n.213 (quoting this statement). 
But there are circumstances under which this would not be the case, such as when the developer 
obtained a variance from Ohio's statewide cleanup standards. Michel, supra note 20, at 458 
n.216. 
348. The EPA 's Region V has entered into an amended "Superfund Memorandum of 
Agreement" (SMOA) with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), which designates 
the MPCA as the lead agency for cleanups at sites in the state. Under the SMOA, the EPA only 
will respond under CERCLA at sites cleaned up in the state program that pose an "imminent 
threat or emergency situation." OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; see also 
Andrew, supra note 29, at 27 (terming EPA's Region V "one of the first EPA regional offices to 
respond officially to the issue of brownfield redevelopment"). Region V also has developed 
SMOAs with Indiana and Illinois, and a number of other EPA Regions, including Region VI 
(developing an agreement with Texas), and Region VII (with Missouri) are developing similar 
memoranda of agreement with states. Anne Slaughter Andrew, IDEM and EPA Sign Superfund 
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Developers may be deterred from taking part in voluntary 
cleanup programs and seeking liability protection for other reasons. 
Because they receive no advance guarantee of liability protection, 
they may perceive that cleanups are too lengthy and expensive to war-
rant the effort of obtaining protection from liability.349 This is particu-
larly likely to be true in states that apply cleanup standards of existing 
laws at brownfield sites.35° Finally, the costs of continuing state in-
volyement (e.g., monitoring of the site and a~sociated reporting re-
quirements) may deter some developers.351 
4. State Oversight and Responsibility 
a. Varying Levels of Involvement 
The voluntary cleanup programs vary considerably in the extent 
of state agency involvement in the process of evaluating and remediat-
ing each brownfield site. States usually require the developer to pay 
Memorandum of Agreement, 6 Ind. Envtl. Compliance Update (M. Lee Smith), No. 1, at 5-6 
(Jan. 1996) {describing the Region V agreement with Indiana); Telephone Interviews, supra note 
160. 
Colorado's statute attempts to provide additional assurances to developers regarding fed-
eral action. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-309 {West Supp. 1996) (providing that if the EPA 
"indicates that it is investigating a site which is the subject of an approved voluntary cleanup 
plan or no action petition, the department shall actively pursue a determination by the United 
States environmental protection agency that the property not be addressed under the federal 
act"); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 139 & n.221 {claiming that the Colorado provision 
"creates a cause of action in mandamus" if the state fails to take action). But see IND. CODE 
ANN. § 13~25-5-l{b) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that "[t]his 
section does not affect a person's legal obligations set forth in 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. (CERCLA] 
regardless of a person's participation in this chapter"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2285.l(C) 
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that a developer receives no exemption from federal liability). 
349. Clokey, supra note 26, at 43; Casserly, supra note 26, at 269-70. The certificate of 
completion is not a "pre-approval"; the developer has to wait until the completion of a cleanup 
to obtain it. The site investigation and cleanup process will often take six to twelve months or 
more, during which time the developer has no assurance that it will be exempted from liability. 
See Clokey, supra note 26, at 43. Andrew, supra note 29, at 31, reports that this has led some 
developers in states such as Minnesota and Indiana to criticize the voluntary cleanup programs, 
"claiming that the time and money it takes to obtain a final cleanup does not result in an eco-
nomic incentive for the redevelopment of a brownfield." 
350. In 1995, the Minnesota legislature recognized this disincentive to development, amend-
ing the state voluntary cleanup statute to provide that the planned use of the property be taken 
into account in determining the cleanup standard at each site. See Andrew, supra note 29, at 28; 
supra note 254 and accompanying text. Previously, Minnesota had applied existing cleanup stan-
dards at sites participating in its voluntary cleanup program. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 20, at 19; Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6. 
351. See Clokey, supra note 26, at 43. 
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application fees352 and cover costs of state oversight and 
involvement. 353 
352. Application fees are required in: California (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (the 
California VCP requires a deposit of up to half of estimated oversight costs)); Colorado (COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(4) (Supp. 1996) (fee not to exceed $2,000)); Delaware (Survey 
Results, supra note 158 (Delaware has no fee, but requires a deposit of $5,000 to cover oversight 
costs)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-2(c)(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.) ($1,000 application fee)); Maine (Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 2 (initial fee of 
$500 may be charged)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20129a(4) (West Supp. 1996) 
($750 fee for developer requesting a "letter of determination")); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(3)(8), (4)(8) (WESTLAW 
through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) ($200 application fee and $5,000 deposit or lesser amount 
the state deems sufficient; state usually requires a deposit of between $1,000 and $2,000)); Ne-
braska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-15,184(6) (WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.) ($5,000 
application fee)); Oregon (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Oregon requires $2,500 deposit for 
entrants into a prospective purchaser agreement; $5,000 deposit for entrants into the program)); 
Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.703(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1996) ($250 fee upon 
submitting report demonstrating compliance with background or statewide health standards; for 
developers choosing site-specific standards, $250 fee on "submission of a remedial investigation, 
risk assessment and cleanup plan and ... additional $500 [fee on] ... submission of the final 
report")); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.§ 68-212-224(b) (Supp. 1995) ($5,000 fee for participa-
tion in program)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §361.604(b)(3) (West Supp. 
1996) ($1,000 application fee)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(e)(1)(8), (g)(l) (Supp. 
1996) ($500 application fee and $5,000 fee "to be applied toward the direct and indirect costs of 
the secretary's review and oversight of the performance of the site investigation and any correc-
tive action plan")); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.§ 10.l-1429.l(A)(5) (Michie Supp. 1995) (registra-
tion fee "not to exceed the lesser of $5,000 or one percent of the cost of the remediation")); 
Washington (Survey Results, supra note 158 (Washington requires a $1,000 fee for review of 
work performed in an independent remedial action; maximum fee is two percent of remediation 
action costs up to a total of $15,000)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765(5) (West Supp. 
1995) (providing that the department may assess fees; current charge is $250 application fee, plus 
a deposit of between $1,000 and $3,000 to cover costs of review and oversight; unused portion of 
deposit is refundable)). See also O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61 (describing 
filing fees and other administrative requirements of Indiana's program); Sweeney, supra note 20, 
at 142 n.236, 149 n.285, 152 n.305 (describing the Indiana. Texas, and Virginia provisions); Survey 
Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Wisconsin provisions); Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin 
provisions). 
353. States requiring developers to cover the costs of state oversight and involvement in-
clude: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(8) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "[a]ny 
person who requests the director's approval of a remedial action shall reimburse the department 
for the total reasonable cost to the department for the review of the remedial action," unless 
requirement waived)); Arkansas (Survey Results, supra note 158 (indicating that Arkansas may 
assess fees for staff time incurred in review and approval of work products submitted throughout 
the process)); California (Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (indicating that under the Cali-
fornia VCP, the Voluntary Cleanup Agreement provides for recovery of oversight costs)); Con-
necticut (CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133m(c)-(d) (West 1995) (providing for the state to 
recover oversight costs at Type I sites, and pay costs of remediating Type II and Type III sites; 
state may recover the latter through property leases)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, 
§§ 9109(e), 9113(b)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of 138th General Assembly, 
1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 14.4 (state may bring action in Superior Court to 
recover all oversight costs incurred)); Illinois (415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(b) (West Supp. 
1996) (if the Remediation Applicant (RA) requests state oversight, the state may require that 
the RA pay reasonable costs incurred by the state)); Indiana (IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-
8(a)(1)(8) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2289.1(8) (West Supp. 1996) (must pay costs incurred if state provides assistance)); Maine 
(Maine VCP Fact Sheet, supra note 195, at 2 (recovery of costs exceeding initial fee)); Missouri 
(Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.569(1) (West Supp. 1996); Mo. CoDE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-15.010(8) 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release)); Minnesota (COMING CLEAN. supra note 
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Beyond this, the levels of state oversight vary. The types of over-
sight can be divided roughly into three categories that correspond to 
the amount of state review and level of responsibility delegated to 
certified environmental professionals.354 The highest level of involve-
ment is in states that have active state oversight throughout the pro-
cess in order "to provide technical guidance and oversight for any 
stage of the cleanup process from site investigation through remedia-
tion that results in certification of completed work. "355 The Indiana 
Department of Environmental Management is involved in reviewing 
and evaluating the site and documentation of site investigations, re-
viewing, approving, and overseeing implementation of the ~ork plan, 
24. at 99 (in Minnesota oversight costs are recovered on a quarterly basis)); Montana (MoNT. 
CODE ANN. § 75-10-733(3) (1995) (reimbursement for "any remedial action costs that the state 
incurs in the review and oversight of a voluntary cleanup plan")); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 81-15,184(4) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 Reg. Sess.)); New Hampshire (COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 78 (in New Hampshire, cost recovery is to be included, but state is "lax" in 
recovering costs)); New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.3 & app. A,§ III (WESTLAW 
through Aug. 19, 1996) (MOA will specify procedures for the recovery of oversight costs)); New 
York (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 85 (indicating that in New York, agreement must pro-
vide for indemnification of the state for its oversight costs)); Ohio (OHIO ADMIN. CoDE § 3745-
300-03(8)-(C) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (providing for recovery of direct and indirect 
costs associated with reviewing no further action letters submitted for covenants not to sue and 
other reviews)); Oregon (COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 112 (indicating that in Oregon, the 
state recovers oversight costs in excess of deposit, and refunds unused amount of deposit)); Ten-
nessee (TENNESSEE VOAP FACT SHEET, supra note 193, at 2 (consent order must provide for 
oversight cost reimbursement)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.603(b)(2) 
(West Supp. 1996) (all costs)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(j)(l) (Supp. 1996) (re-
quiring eligible person or successor to pay costs above fees paid)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE§ 173-340-550(1)-(2), (7)(a) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (providing that the state 
may recover remedial action costs, and costs of review of independent remedial actions; state 
charges two percent of the cost of the total remedial action to review an independent remedial 
action, up to a total fee of $15,000)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.765(5) (West Supp. 1995) 
(state recovers oversight costs)). See also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 73, 83, 87 (describ-
ing the Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey provisions); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 142 
n.236, 149 n.285, 152 n.305 (describing the Indiana, Texas, and Virginia provisions); Casserly, 
supra note 26, at 265 (noting that a developer in Minnesota "pays for the investigation and 
cleanup, including all assistance received from the MPCA "); Survey Results, supra note 158 
(regarding the Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington provisions); 
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the Delaware, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, 
and Wisconsin provisions). A number of states require the developer to reimburse the state for 
oversight costs when they exceed the application fee or deposit. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-
25-5-8(a)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.). 
California's approach in the Expedited Remedial Action Program requires that the respon-
sible persons pay for all of the state's response costs, subject to apportionment among the par-
ties. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 25398.2(b)(l)(B), 25398.8 (West Supp. 1996). Tennessee 
employs a comparable cost recovery process for participants who enter into consent orders. 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-224(d)(2), -224(h) (Supp. 1995) (if state enters into consent order, 
it may establish liability allocations and recover from program participants amounts spent on site 
investigation and cleanup up to the participant's share of liability; although authorized by stat-
ute, this method of cost recovery is not feasible in practice, as monies from the Remedial Action 
Fund are allocated to higher priority sites rather than voluntary sites); see also Survey Results, 
supra note 158. 
354. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. 
355. Id. 
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and issuing a release from liability when the cleanup is completed. 356 
Minnesota has adopted a similar approach.357 The Minnesota Pollu-
tion Control Agency approves the initial site assessment,358 work 
plans, and final reports (to determine whether liability protection is 
appropriate),359 develops cleanup standards for the site,360 and main-
tains a limited on-site presence during the assessment and cleanup.361 
Second, the state may adopt a "medium" level of involvement. 
These states delegate certain responsibilities to certified environmen-
tal professionals, who undertake tasks that the state would otherwise 
perform. These professionals "provide oversight and expertise 
throughout the remediation process and present evidence of the com-
pleted work to the state agency. "362 The state retains independent au-
thority to review the work of the private sector professionals. 363 For 
example, it may review the cleanup process that took place at a site 
before it issues a limitation on liability such as a certificate of comple-
tion. 364 The new Illinois statute provides this type of approach: The 
state delegates authority to conduct investigations, prepare plans and 
reports,365 and review and approve the progress of cleanups366 to a 
356. IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 13-25-5-9 to -17 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.). 
Once the work plan is approved, a state agency manager or technical contractor hired by the 
state supervises the remedial action. Id. § 13-25-5-9; see also IN DIANA VRP FACT SHEET, supra 
note 179, at 2; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 61-62 (stating that "(s]chedules for 
submissions, coordination of activities, estimated costs, and a timetable for state officials' actions 
are included in the (Voluntary Remediation] Agreement"); Sweeney, supra note 20, at 144; Sur-
vey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Other states that oversee 
cleanups actively, usually under the supervision of state project managers, include Minnesota, 
Oregon, Vennont, and Wisconsin. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160; cf Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 260.567(1) (West Supp. 1996) (calling for state oversight); id. § 260.567(8) (requiring review of 
quarterly progress reports); id. § 260.567(10) (requiring review of the remedial action). 
357. See OT A STA TE OF THE STA TES, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that Minnesota's program 
"offers a high level of technical assistance and oversight to the entire cleanup process"). 
358. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995). 
359. Id. § 1158.175(3); see also OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; cf CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.15(b) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring state review of a request 
for certificate of completion). 
360. Cleanup standards are to be set by the state, reflecting the planned use of the property. 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(c) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that cleanups "must meet the 
same standards for protection of public health and welfare and the environment that apply to 
response actions taken or requested under section 1158.17, subdivision 1 or 2"); see also OTA 
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 19; Andrew, supra note 29, at 28. Cleanup standards 
are detennined with reference to state guidance documents. Id. 
361. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1158.175(3)(a) (West Supp. 1995). The state's involvement in this 
phase of the cleanup is discretionary; it may "provide assistance to review voluntary response 
action plans or supervise response action implementation." Id.; see also Andrew, supra note 29, 
at 28; cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2286.l(A) (West Supp. 1996). 
362. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. 
363. See id. 
364. Id. at 17. 
365. In Illinois, direct state review of activities other than required reports is not mandatory. 
The state may provide oversight services for the Remediation Applicant's activities, in which 
case it may require that the RA pay the state's costs in furnishing services. 415 ILL COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/58.7(b}(l} (West Supp. 1996). The RA may also contract with a "Review and Evaluation 
Professional Engineer" (RELPE) for review and evaluation services; the contract with the 
RELPE must provide that the RELPE will take directions from the state, submit reports to it, 
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"Licensed Professional Engineer,"367 but the state retains final ap-
proval authority.368 
The most lenient level of oversight is in states which are involved 
only in final reviews to verify that cleanups are complete and extend 
liability protection.369 An example of this type of oversight is that 
contemplated under the Ohio statute. Ohio involves the state in the 
process less than any other state program,370 authorizing the devel-
oper to evaluate and remediate a brownfield site on its own, acting 
essentially unsupervised by the state EPA.371 By statute, the Ohio 
EPA maintains the power to audit cleanups; however, the state has 
and work on behalf of the state. Id. §§ 5/58.2 (defining a "Licensed Professional Engineer" as "a 
person, corporation, or partnership licensed under the laws of this State to practice professional 
engineering"), 5/58.6(a), 5/58.7(c)(2). 
366. Id. § 5158. 7(b )-( d). 
367. Id. § 5/58.7(d). 
368. Id. § 5/58.7(d)(3). 
369. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 14. This category includes states with 
extensive devolvement to licensed environmental professionals, and states with "independent 
remedial action" programs, as well as Colorado, where at present there is no statutory mecha-
nism for state approval of the final cleanup. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 108. 
"370. See Andrew, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the Ohio program as involving "minimal 
state oversight"); Michel, supra note 20. 
Both Connecticut and Massachusetts have also acted to vest substantial discretion with li-
censed environmental professionals. In Connecticut, the 1995 amendments to the Transfer Act 
created a procedure for devolving responsibility to Licensed Environmental Professionals 
(LEPs) in the remediation process at voluntary cleanup sites. 1995 Conn .. Pub. Acts 190, § 2; see 
also Elizabeth C. Barton, Privatization of Environmental Cleanups, CoNN. L. TRIB., Dec. 25, 
1995/Jan. 1, 1996, at 13A. LEPs are empowered to conduct site assessments, prepare remedial 
action plans, supervise cleanups, and make final reports to the state at voluntary cleanup sites. 
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2. Regulations are currently under development to expand upon 
the statutory mandate, and apply this procedure to Type I sites in the Urban Sites Remedial 
Action Program. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. Massachusetts relies extensively on 
Licensed Site Professionals (LSPs) for oversight of assessment and cleanup actions at all but the 
most serious disposal sites in the state. The LSP is required to make certain submissions (see 
MAss. REGS. CoDE tit. 310, § 40.0015 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794)) but essentially 
operates independently. The LSP may, for example, forego certain statutory requirements if, in 
its judgment, the actions are unnecessary. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.0193 (WESTLAW 
through Register No. 794). The state is required to audit only 20% of cleanups. Id. §§ 40.1101-
.1170. 
North Carolina's statute specifies that cleanups in the state will eventually be implemented 
and overseen by licensed professionals; the state is working on rules, based in part on the Massa-
chusetts and Ohio programs, that would privatize cleanups. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.9(c) 
(1995) (authorizing privatization of voluntary party cleanup oversight under the Registered En-
vironmental Consultant (REC) program); Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160. 
371. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.10 (Anderson 1995); cf PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 6026.302(e)(3), .303(h)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (limiting the state's review for developers in 
Pennsylvania choosing cleanups under background or statewide health standards to evaluating 
final reports demonstrating that the standards have been met). For developers chopsing clean-
ups under site-specific standards in Pennsylvania, however, the state is required to review the 
"remedial investigation report, risk assessment report, cleanup plan and" final report demonstrat-
ing compliance with the site-specific standard." Id. § 6026.304(n)(2). 
In New Jersey, the amount of state oversight is determined by negotiation between the state 
and the developer upon entering into the Memorandum of Agreement. N.J. ADMrN. CODE tit. 7, 
§ 26C-3.3, app. A, § I (WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 
82-83. 
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undercut this authority by admitting it will examine no more than 
twenty-five percent of sites taking part in this program.372 A number 
of other states provide that a developer may conduct "independent" 
remedial action, operating on its own until making a final report to the 
state.373 
b. Time Limits 
To reduce the time it takes to remediate a site, some states put 
time limits on various stages of the decision-making process. States 
restrict the time period for the state to approve or reject developers' 
applications to take part in state programs,374 site assessment re-
ports,375 work plans, and progress reports,376 or for issuing liability 
assurances after requests.377 In some cases, developers' activities are 
372. See Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-14(0) (WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996) (pro-
viding for random audits of 25% of the "no further action" letters annually); Ohio Voluntary 
Action Program, supra note 156, at 4; see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29; Jones, supra note 
156. The new Connecticut statute empowers the state to conduct audits of voluntary cleanups 
supervised by LEPs but does not set a target number. A final remedial action report is deemed 
approved unless the state determines, within 60 days of its submission, that an audit is necessary. 
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(c); see also Paul Frisman, Massachusetts Model Bodes Well for 
Voluntary Pollution Cleanups, CoNN. L. TRIB., Nov. 27. 1995, at 13. As noted above. the Massa-
chusetts statute outlines an audit procedure and sets a goal of auditing 20% of sites. See supra 
note 370 and accompanying text. 
373. In these states, the developer proceeds at its own risk and typically has the option to 
obtain more comfort by entering into more binding agreements with the state. For example, in 
North Carolina, the developer may conduct an independent remedial action or negotiate a con-
sent order with the state. N.C. GUIDELINES, supra note 191, at 1-1 to 1-2. In Rhode Island, only 
a "voluntary party" may proceed without state oversight; volunteers are encouraged to enter 
into agreements with the state. RHODE ISLAND USER'S GuIDE, supra note 175, at 4-5. In Wash-
ington, the "independent remedial action" proceeds without state oversight, except for final re-
view of the cleanup report. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-550(7) (WESTLAW through July 
24, 1996). 
374. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C-3.2(c), app. A (WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 
1996) (within 30 days of receipt, state must either inform developer that a site investigation is 
required or submit a Memorandum of Agreement for developer's approval); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 
(WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.4 which requires acceptance 
or rejection within 45 days of receipt). 
375. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.567(3) (West Supp. 1996) (180 days to review Phase I assess-
ment); id. § 260.567(5) (180 days to determine whether remedial action is necessary, following 
Phase II assessments; state has "not come close" to exceeding either time limit); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (for developers choosing cleanups under site-spe-
cific standards, remedial investigation report deemed approved if the state does not respond 
with deficiencies within 90 days); see also Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the 
Missouri provision). 
376. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-16-306(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (deemed approved if not 
acted on within 45 days after request, with independent review prohibited); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 260.567(6) (West Supp. 1996) (90 days); 1995 Mont. S.B. 382, § 10(1) (30 days to make "com-
pleteness" determination); id. § 10(2) (60 days to approve or disapprove plan); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (for developers choosing cleanups under site-spe-
cific standards, cleanup plan deemed approved if the state does not respond with deficiencies 
within 90 days). 
377. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398.15(b) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 90 days to 
approve or deny a request for a certificate of completion from a participant in the ERAP); 
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(1) (West Supp. 1996) (petition for no action determination 
deemed approved if not acted on within 45 days of request); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108(b) 
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deemed approved unless the state responds within the time limits,378 a 
provision intended to spur a rapid response. 
c. Administrative Appeal and Dispute Resolution Procedures 
Several states provide administrative appeals for developers dis-
satisfied with the state's decisions, particularly decisions to reject ap-
plications to take part in state programs, or decisions to reject site 
assessment reports and other progress reports.379 Other states pro-
vide for dispute resolution mechanisms.38° California's statute fea-
tures the most comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process. 
If a timely petition is filed with the Director of Environmental Health 
Assessment, an arbitration panel must be convened to resolve dis-
putes regarding any of a number of issues.381 
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995) (state re-
quired to grant or deny certificate of completion within 180 days of application); 415 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/58.lO(b) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 30 days from approval of a Remedial Action 
Completion Report to issue a No Further Remediation Letter); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20129a(2) (West Supp. 1996) (state has 15 business days to act on a request for a "letter of 
determination"); 1995 Mont. S.B. 382, § 12(2) (state must review petition for closure within 60 
days). 
378. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(1) (West Supp. 1996) (petition for no 
action determination deemed approved if not acted on within 45 days of request); 1995 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 190, § 2(c) (final remedial action report from an LEP deemed approved unless the 
state determines, within 60 days of its submission, that an audit is necessary). 
379. 415 ILJ.,. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(d)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (Remediation Applieant 
may appeal disapprovals of any plan or report, or approvals with conditions, by filing for appeal 
within 35 days); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-6(a)(l) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.) (applicant may appeal if its application is rejected); Mo. CODE REos. tit. 10, § 25-
15.010(9) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (providing for administrative ap-
peal of any departmental action); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 75-10-732(4) (1995) (if application to 
take part in the program is rejected, applicant may request a hearing before the state board of 
environmental review); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Mon-
tana provisions). 
380. IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-8(a)(2) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(voluntary remediation agreement must include mechanism to resolve "disputes arising from the 
evaluation, analysis, and oversight of the implementation of the work plan" through arbitration, 
adjudication, or another dispute resolution procedure); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) 
(West Supp. 1996) (mediation may be used as part of a community only involvement plan, re-
quired if the affected municipality requests to be involved); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 
143 n.246 (describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indi-
ana provision). 
381. Issues subject to arbitration include: 
(1) The remedial action plan ... , including disputes regarding remedy selection, other 
technical issues, conditions of approval, or any other element of the plan[;] 
(2) The department's proposed apportionment of liability ... [;] 
(3) Any proposed de minimis settlements ... [;] 
(4) The department's approval or denial of a change in land use ... [; or] 
(5) The department's approval or denial of a certificate of completion .... 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.lO(a) (West Supp. 1996). Petitions for arbitration may 
be made by any responsible person, the affected community, or the public, at any time before the. 
matter in dispute becomes final. Id. § 25398.10(b)(2). The arbitration panel must hold a public 
hearing to take testimony and evidence, and make a decision by majority vote that is supported 
by "substantial evidence in light of the whole record." Id. §§ 25398.lO(d), 25398.13. It must 
provide notice of its decisions, and judicial review is available in certain instances. Id. 
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5. Public Participation 
A number of states do not mandate public participation in their 
voluntary cleanup programs.382 The reason for this is readily appar-
ent: public involvement is often viewed as a "deterrent to undertak-
ing a voluntary cleanup."383 Ohio makes no reference to community 
involvement in individual brownfield development projects.384 Penn-
sylvania allows for public participation beyond notice only if re-
quested by the affected municipality and then only if the developer 
chooses to cleanup a site using the site-specific cleanup standard.385 
Illinois provides that the developer may elect to develop a "commu-
nity outreach plan," but requires only that the state develop guidance 
to assist developers in reaching out to the affected community.386 
§ 25398.lO(d)-(e). Arbitrators may receive technical support from the state and are disqualified 
for conflicts of interest or inadequate performance. Id. §§ 25398.11-.12. 
382. These states include Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. In Colorado, however, the April 11, 1996 Superfund Memorandum of Agreement with 
the EPA requires that the developer give public notice within 30 days of approval of the cleanup 
plan if the developer wants forbearance from EPA enforcement under CERCLA. Survey Re-
sults, supra note 158. In Washington, independent remedial actions may take place without any 
public participation, unless the developer intends to seek contribution from other parties. In 
that situation, the state would consider an independent remedial action to be the equivalent of a 
state-conducted cleanup (and hence protective against third parties) if "reasonable steps have 
been taken to provide advance public notice." WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-550(5)(c)(iii), -
550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
383. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 160; see also Paul Frisman, Goldilocks and the Cleanup 
Standards: Too Strict, Too Lax or Just Right?, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1995, at 14 (quoting the 
statement of attorney Elizabeth C. Barton that "a proposal for a discretionary public hearing 
and comment period could easily add more than three-and-a-half months to the remediation 
process," which is critical to a developer because "often the projected time to get through a 
[state] approval process is as critical as the projected cost of remediation"). See infra notes 548-
49 and accompanying text. Another justification asserted for excluding public participation is 
that the developer has come to the state voluntarily and should control the project. 
384. Ohio currently requires public participation only upon an application for a variance 
from applicable cleanup standards. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)(3) (WESTLAW 
through Aug. 31, 1996) (public meeting required). However, state regulators held public meet-
ings to review the proposed rules. Ohio VAP Update, supra note 243, at 1 (noting that five 
public meetings were held on the first set of rules). 
385. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that if the affected 
municipality requests to be involved, a community involvement plan is required); see also PENN-
SYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL PROTECTION, 0PPORTUNmES FOR Puouc PARTICIPATION IN THE 
LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM FACT SHEET No. 9 (1996) (copy on 
file with author) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET]. This plan 
must propose measures to involve the public, including (depending on the site) such measures 
as: 
• developing a proactive community information and consultation program that includes 
door step notice of cleanup activities; 
• holding public meetings and roundtable discussions; 
• providing convenient locations where documents can be made publicly available; 
• designating a single contact person for community residents; 
• forming a community-based group to solicit suggestions and comments on reports; and 
• retaining trained, independent third parties to facilitate meetings and discussions and per-
form mediation services. · 
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996). 
386. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58_7(h) (West Supp. 1996). 
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Some states provide that the developer may elect to conduct further 
community. outreach efforts; Rhode Island mandates this.387 
In states that require public participation at each site, some re-
quire that the affected community be notified of proposed cleanup 
activities.388 "fhe most typical form of public participation is a brief 
n<;>tice and comment period (often less than thirty days) on the pro-
. . 387.. Pennsylvania, as noted below in footnote 389, requires a "community involvement 
plan"' only if one is requested by the affected municipality. Rhode Island requires a "community 
involvement process." to be coordinated with the opportunity for notice and comment on the 
proposed settlement agreement. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-5 (Supp. 1995). Finding explicitly 
that the state must consider "the effects that clean-ups would have on the populations surround-
ing each site" and ·'issues of environmental equity for low income and racial minority popula-
tions," the. statute requires the state to "develop and implement a process to ensure community 
mvolvement throughout the investigation and remediation of contaminated sites." Id. That pro-
cess is required to include, at a minimum, the following: 
(a) Notification to abutting residents when a work plan for a site investigation is proposed; 
(b) Adequate availability of all public records ·concerning the investigation and clean-up of 
the site, including, where necessary, the establishment of informational repositories in the 
impacted community; and 
(c) Notification to abutting residents, and other interested parties, when the investigation of 
·the site is deemed complete by the department of environmental management. 
Id. There is no requirement that the abutting community approve the work plan. This process is 
. expected to be clarified in forthcoming rules. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. In Wash-
ington, a "public participation plan" must be developed for cleanups other than independent 
remedial actions. WASH. ADMIN .. CODE § 173-340-600(8) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996). 
· 388. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 8-7-523(d)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring notice of consent ad-
ministrative order); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398(d)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring 
notice of all activities and regular progress reports to the city or county in which an ERAP site is 
·located; state applies this and comparable public participation requirements of the ERAP to the 
.:VCP); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190, § 2(b) (requiring notice of remedial action plan); Delaware 
'Regulations, supra note 172, § 12 (voluntary cleanup agreement will provide for public notice 
once the proposed plan of remedial action is prepared); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1403(3) 
(WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring notice to public officials and to the commu-
nity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.4(c)(2), -310.9(b) (1995) (requiring that notice of proposed 
Areas of Concern (AOC) and proposed remedial action plans be given; a notice is to be mailed 
at least 30 days before state enters into an AOC and 30 days prior to approving a remedial action 
plan); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(e), -.303(h) (West Supp. 1996) (establishes a notice 
obligation for developers who choose to clean up sites to meet either background or statewide 
health standards); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1200-1-13-.10(3)(i) (WESTLAW through EN-
FLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring public notice in the form of a newspaper advertisement 
upon party's entrance into the program and upon submission of the FS; all public notices must 
·be approved by the Department); 21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) (adopting 30 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 333.11 which requires, in particular, notice to property owners and interest 
holders within two weeks of agency approval of a report describing contamination at a site at or 
below residential health-based levels, and direct notice in the form of letters to "affected individ-
ual households, businesses,. and other interest holders, when concentrations of contaminants ex-
ceeding residential health-based levels have migrated off-site"); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-
340-550(5)(c)(iii) to -550(7) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (requiring public notice if in-
dependent remedial actions will lead to contribution actions); id. § 173-340-600 (requiring notice 
for cleanups other than independent remedial actions); Wis. ADMIN. CODE§§ NR 714.05, 714.07 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (requiring notice of proposed remedial ac-
tion; responsible parties to decide whether additional notice is necessary, but public notice is 
required only if the party plans to use "performance standards" defined under § NR 720.19(2)); 
see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87 (regarding the Delaware program); Survey Results, 
supra note 158 (regarding the California, Delaware, North Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, 
and Wisconsin programs). Arkansas is considering implementing additional public participation 
requirements, including notice requirements and a notice and comment period. Telephone In-
terviews, supra note 160. 
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posed remedial action plan. 389 The form of notice to be used varies, 
with few states requiring direct notice to residents in the affected com-
munity. 390 A minority of states provide for more participation than a 
In Pennsylvania, a developer must notify the department of its intent to remediate the site, 
provide a copy of that notice to the municipality where the site is located, and publish the notice 
in a local newspaper of general circulation. The developer also must provide the same notice for 
the final report demonstrating attainment of the cleanup standard. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 6026.302(e), .303(h) (West Supp. 1996). There is no requirement for community involvement 
beyond this notice, unless the developer chooses a cleanup under the site-specific standard. Id. 
§ 6026.304(n)-(o). If the developer submits the final report to the state within 90 days of a 
release, these notice requirements do not apply. Id. § 6026.303(h)(4). 
389. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25398(d)(l), 25398.7(c)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (pro-
viding for a 30-day notice and comment period at an ERAP site); DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 7, 
§ 9107(b) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995), 
Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 12.1(3) (requiring a 20-day comment period on pro-
posed plan of remedial action); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(b) (WESTLAW through end of 
1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing for a 30-day notice and comment period); MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 324.20120d(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for notice and comment opportunities for 
proposed cleanups based on generic cleanup criteria or for sites where the state "determines that 
there is a significant public interest"); MONT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-735 (1995) (requiring a 30-day 
comment period); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.325(4)(d) (Supp. 1996) (requiring notice and comment 
if the agreement is submitted as a proposed consent decree); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.320(2) 
(1992), OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (requiring a 30-day 
notice and comment period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (pro-
viding for a 30-day notice and comment period for cleanups to meet the site-specific standards); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-ll(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing for a 14-day notice and comment pe-
riod before entry of .a settlement agreement as a final judgment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996) (providing for a 15-day notice and comment period on a corrective 
action plan); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 173-340-600(3)(e) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (re-
quiring a minimum 30-day notice and comment period for cleanups other than independent 
remedial actions); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, Indiana, and 
Montana provisions). During Pennsylvania's notice and comment period, the municipality may 
request to be involved in the cleanup plans. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West 
Supp. 1996). Then, and only then (and only if requested to do so by the municipality) would the 
developer be required to develop and implement a "community involvement plan." Id.; see also 
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET, supra note 385, at 1. Developers are en-
couraged to take a "proactive approach" in working with the community, however. PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(ii) (West Supp. 1996). 
In Massachusetts, a site may be designated as a "Public Involvement Plan" (PIP) site on the 
request of 10 or more persons. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1404 (WESTLAW through 
Register No. 794). At a PIP site, additional public participation requirements are imposed, in-
cluding both public meetings and a notice and comment period on the Public Involvement Plan 
itself as well as cleanup activities. Id. § 40.1405. 
390. California's notice requirement for the Expedited Remedial Action Program is one of 
the most comprehensive, providing that the state must: 
Notify the public, including those persons reasonably believed to be members of the af-
fected community, of the response action proposed in the plan in a manner that provides 
reasonable assurance of reaching those persons on a timely basis. The notice shall include 
posting notices in the area where the proposed remedial action would be taken and notifica-
tion, by direct mail, of the recorded owners of property contiguous to the site addressed by 
the plan, as shown in the latest equalized assessment roll and all potentially responsible 
persons identified in the plan. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 25398.6(i)(l) (West Supp. 1996); cf MAss. REos. CoDE tit. 
310, § 40.1405 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring notice at PIP sites). More 
typical are forms of notice such as those required in Indiana and Pennsylvania. Indiana requires 
the developer to notify local government units, place a copy of the proposed work plan in at 
least one public library, and publish a notice requesting comments on the proposed work plan. 
IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(a) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.); see also 
O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 62; Sweeney, supra note 20, at 144 n.249; Survey 
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notice and comment process allows by requiring that a public hearing 
be held on the remedial action plan; the hearing, however, is often 
available only upon a written request.391 The California Expedited 
Remedial Action Program is unique in providing that a public hearing 
may be held on the proposed use of the site.392 Several states require 
the state to consider public comments and testimony in the decision-
making process and provide discretion to require revisions to cleanup 
plans if that is appropriate.393 However, no statute mandates that a 
Results, supra note 158. In Pennsylvania, a developer choosing a cleanup under the site-specific 
standard must notify the department of its intent to remediate the site, provide a copy of that 
notice to the municipality where the site is located, and publish the notice in a local newspaper 
of general circulation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(n)(l)(i) (West Supp. 1996); see also 
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FACT SHEET, supra note 385, at 1. 
391. ARK. CoDE ANN. § 8-7-5230) (Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE 
§ 25398.6(i)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring one or more public meetings for information and/or 
comment; information to be provided must include "an assessment of the degree of contamina-
tion, the characteristics of the hazardous substances, an estimate of the time required to carry 
out the response action and a description of the proposed response action, the planned use, and 
the remedial objectives"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9112 (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special 
Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 12.1 (pro-
viding for a public hearing "if the Secretary receives a meritorious request ... from any person 
on the ... proposed plan of remedialaction"); IND. CoDE ANN. § 13-25-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW 
through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that if the state receives at least one written 
request during the notice and comment period, a public hearing may be held, at which the state 
is required to consider all written comments and public testimony); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, 
§ 40.1405 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794) (requiring public meetings at PIP sites); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(3) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a hearing be held if "(i) 
[t]he department determines that there is a significant public interest or that for any other reason 
a public meeting is appropriate[;] (ii) [a] city, township, or village in which the facility is located, 
by a majority vote of its governing body, requests a public meeting[; or] (iii) [a] local health 
department with jurisdiction in the area in which the facility is located requests a public meet-
ing."); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 75-10-735(2) (1995) (providing for a hearing upon a written request 
by "10 or more persons, by a group composed of 10 or more members, or by a local governing 
body of a city, town or county"; the meeting must "be held within 45 days of the department's 
completeness determination under [section] 75-10-736(1)"); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.320 (1992); 
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-100 (WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995) (providing for a hearing on a 
written request by 10 or more persons or a group of 10 or more members); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 173-340-600(5) (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996) (state may elect to hold public meetings; 
provision applies to cleanups other than independent remedial actions and therefore, a public 
hearing is required for consent decrees, orders, and agreed orders); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § NR 
714.07(6)(d) (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 Release) (public informational meetings 
required if the developer or state decides they are necessary); see also Sweeney, supra note 20, at 
144 n.249 {describing the Indiana provision); Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Del-
aware, Indiana, Montana, and Washington provisions). . 
392. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398(d)(2) (West Supp. 1996). The city's or county's 
determination of the proposed use is to be presumed by the state to be the appropriate use for 
the site and enjoys a rebuttable presumption of its validity in any subsequent proceeding. The 
state may rebut that presumption by determining that there should be a different planned use for 
the site. In making this determination, the state is required to hold a hearing, then determine 
the planned use, and explain its determination in writing to the city or county and to any person 
requesting an explanation. Id. § 25398(d). 
393. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 25398.60) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring the state to 
"review and consider any comments received at the public meeting or by other means within the 
specified time period" and "consider the affected community's acceptance of the proposed reme-
dial alternative or alternatives," in order to propose revisions to the cleanup plan, "if appropri-
ate"); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 9107(e)(3) (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 
138th General Assembly, 1995); Delaware Regulations, supra note 172, § 8.7(3) (requiring final 
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state reject a remedial action plan if it receives unfavorable public 
input. 
The following table summarizes the public participation require-
ments of the existing state voluntary cleanup programs. 
TABLE 5 
PUBLIC p ARTICIPA TION REQUIREMENTS 
Requirement 
Public Notice of Remedial 
Activities 
Public Notice and 
Comment Period 
State(s) 
Arkansas, California 
ERAP, California VCP, 
Connecticut, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington (independ-
ent remedial actions 
where contribution 
sought), Wisconsin 
California ERAP, 
California VCP, 
Delaware, Indiana, 
Massachusetts. 
Michigan, Montana, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington (cleanups 
other than independent 
remedial actions) 
Comments 
Arkansas: considering 
additional forms of 
public participation, 
including additional 
notice and a notice and 
comment period 
California: imposes a gen-
eral notice obligation in 
addition to other 
requirements 
Pennsylvania: provision 
applies to cleanups to 
meet background and 
statewide health stan-
dards only 
Pennsylvania: provision 
applies only to cleanups 
under the site-specific 
standard 
plan to be prepared "with due consideration of the comments received"); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-
25-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring state to consider com-
ments and public testimony); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(5)(e) (West Supp. 1996) 
(requiring the state to prepare an administrative record that "summarizes the significant con-
cerns raised by the members of the public and how they are to be addressed"); MoNT. CODE 
ANN.§ 75-10-735(3) (1995) (requiring the state to "consider and respond to relevant written or 
oral comments submitted during the comment period or at the public meeting"); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 465.325(4)(d) (Supp. 1996) (directing the state, if the agreement is submitted as a proposed 
consent decree, to "withdraw, withhold or modify its consent to the proposed agreement if the 
comments, views and allegations concerning the agreement disclose facts or considerations 
which indicate that the proposed agreement is inappropriate, improper or inadequate"); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 465.320(3) (1992) (requiring the consideration of written or oral comments before 
approving a cleanup plan); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-ll(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing that the 
"state may withdraw or withhold its consent to the proposed settlement if the comments, views, 
or allegations concerning the judgment disclose facts or considerations which indicate that the 
proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper or inadequate"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the state to review public comments prior to approval of 
corrective action plan); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Delaware, Indi-
ana, and Montana provisions). 
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Public Hearing on R~me­
dial Activities 
None Required 
Other 
Arkansas, California 
ERAP, Delaware, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, 
Oregon, Washington 
(cleanups other than 
independent remedial 
actions), Wisconsin 
Colorado, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maine, 
Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, 
Washington 
(independent remedial 
actions where no 
contribution sought) 
Massachusetts394 
6. Technical and Financial Incentives 
Delaware, Indiana, 
Michigan, Montana, and 
Oregon: require 
requests for hearings 
Massachusetts: applies to 
all sites classified as 
"PIP" sites (on public 
request) 
Washington, Wisconsin: 
state may decide to 
hold public meetings 
(Washington: meetings 
required for actions by 
consent decrees. orders, 
and agreed orders) 
Colorado: notice required 
if forbearance sought 
from the EPA under 
CERCLA 
A few states have created state funds to make loans and grants 
for site assessments and cleanups; these loans and grants are provided 
to public entities and (in some cases) private developers.395 Michi-
394. Massachusetts makes technical assistance grants (TAGs) available to qualifying 
applicants and requires public notice of the availability of TAGs at all sites. MAss. REGS. CODE 
tit. 310, §§ 40.1401(1)(a), 40.1450-.1462 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794). TAGs are 
available for any group of affected individuals at a site, in amounts up to $10,000. Grants may be 
used to secure expert assistance in evaluating project . risks, encourage more effective 
participation (e.g., by affording more effective dissemination of relevant information), and allow 
issues of concern to be addressed. Id. § 40.1451. Applications are evaluated on the basis of a 
scoring system that awards points for such factors as the severity of contamination at the site, the 
ability of the grant to foster public participation, and the nature of the applicant (including the 
applicant's ability to represent the affected community). Id. §§ 40.1453, 40.1457. 
395. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18 (stating that "[f]unding assistance for 
initial site assessment, cleanup, or redevelopment typically comes in the form of public grants, 
loans or loan guarantees, and tax incentives"); Andrew, supra note 29, at 29-30 (describing the 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio programs); Berger et al., supra note 23, at 117 (describing the 
Minnesota program); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36 (describing the Wisconsin program); Dins-
more, supra note 24, at 11 (noting that "New Jersey, Ohio and Michigan have created such 
funds"); Casserly, supra note 26, at 273-74 (describing the Wisconsin program); Solo, supra note 
23, at 318 n.177 (describing the Minnesota program). Delaware makes tax credits available to 
certain developers under the authority of DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2011(1), 2021(d) 
(WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 1995). COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 87; Survey Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, supra note 
160. 
States usually condition loans and grants on such criteria as "demonstrated need, the rela-
tionship of the volunteer to the contamination at the site (some states will not assist responsible 
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gan's "Environmental Protection Bond Implementation Act" estab-
lished programs for communities to apply for state bond funding for 
cleanups and site investigations at brownfield sites.396 Minnesota's 
"Contaminated Site Cleanup and Development Account" has pro-
vided funding for cleanups to local governments or quasi-governmen~ 
tal units.397 New Jersey provides up to a total of $55 million in grants 
and loans for developers.398 Ohio administers a number of programs 
that provide financial assistance to developers and local govern-
ments. 399 Pennsylvania has created two funds, the "Industrial Sites 
Cleanup Fund"400 and the "Industrial Sites Environmental Assess-
ment Fund."401 The first of these provides grants and low-interest 
loans for cleanup activities; the second is intended to finance site as-
sessment activities at sites located in areas designated as "distressed 
communities."402 Washington offers limited funding from the "Model 
parties), and demonstrated potential of the site for economic development." OTA STATE OF 
THE STATES, supra note 20, at 18; see also Casserly, supra note 26, at 274. 
396. The Environmental Protection Bond Authorization Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 324.19301-.19306 (West Supp. 1996), authorizes bond funding up to $660,000,000, and the 
Environmental Protection Bond Implementation Act, id. §§ 324.19501-.19513 designates 
$35,000,000 for cleanups at contaminated sites, and $10,000,000 in grants to eligible communities 
to perform site assessment activities. See also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29. 
397. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1161.555 (West Supp. 1995); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 
24, at 99; Andrew, supra note 29, at 29; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 117. 
398. The Hazardous Discharge Site Cleanup Program makes $55 million available in loan 
and grant funding; a major use of funds to date has been for site evaluation and investigation 
activities by municipalities. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.34 (WESTLAW through L. 1996, c. 
30, apv. 5/16/96); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 84; NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 
44; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 11; Survey Results, supra note 158. 
399. Developers may qualify for low-interest loans and loan guarantees from existing insti-
tutions, including the Water Pollution Control Loan Fund, Ohio Water Development Authority, 
and Ohio Economic Development Authority. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.036, 6123.032, 
6123.041 (Anderson Supp. 1995); see also Andrew. supra note 29, at 30; Michel, supra note 20, at 
464. 
400. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.702 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF 
ENVTL. PROTECTION, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (GRANTS AND LOANS), LAND RECYCLING FACT 
SHEET No. 8, at 1 (1996) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET]. 
401. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA FINAN-
CIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1. 
402. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.702, 6028.1-.5 (West Supp. 1996); see also COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 90. Both programs are administered by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Commerce. PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1; Sur-
vey Results, supra note 158. The Industrial Sites Cleanup Fund provides up to 75% of the costs 
of site assessment and cleanup; the fund is capitalized at up to $15 million. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, §§ 6026.702(b), (g) (West Supp. 1996). Eligible applicants for grants include political subdivi-
sions or their instrumentalities, and local economic development agencies. Id. § 6026.702(c); see 
also PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 1-2. Eligible appli-
cants for loans include these entities and others deemed eligible by the Department of Com-
merce. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.702(d) (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 400, at 2. The Industrial Sites Environmental 
Assessment Fund empowers the Department of Commerce to make grants to municipalities, 
municipal or other local authorities, nonprofit economic development agencies, and other simi-
lar agencies for site assessments in distressed communities as determined by the Department of 
Commerce. The total annual amount authorized for this fund is $2,000,000. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, §§ 6028.2, 6028.4 (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FACT 
SHEET, supra note 400, at 2. As of the end of 1995, a total of $4.7 million in requests for loans 
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Toxics Control Account" in certain instances.403 Wisconsin does not 
have a brownfields-specific funding program, but offers other sources 
of funding.404 
Connecticut's "Urban Site Remedial Action Program" has gone 
further, specifying conditions under which the state will acquire 
brownfield sites itself, clean them up, and offer them to developers; 
the state also offers bond funding for cleanups.405 The acquisition 
program is limited, however, by the state's financial resources.406 . 
C. Federal Initiatives 
1. The EPA's Brownfields Action Agenda 
While the states have taken the lead in promoting voluntary 
cleanups at brownfield sites, the EPA has also been active. In 1995, it 
launched a "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative,"407 
with an "Action Agenda" consisting of several projects designed to 
spur brownfield redevelopment.408 The EPA announced its intent'to 
remove sites from the CERCLIS database, expand an existing grant 
program for local brownfield pilot projects, clarify liability issues 
and grants had been made, and $1.62 million in loans and grants had been granted. PENN-
SYLVANIA Six-MONTI! PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 8. 
403. WASH. REV. CoDE § 70.105D.070(2){d)(xi) (West Supp. 1996) (making funds available 
only to potentially liable parties who have entered into a consent decree at mixed funding sites); 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-560 (WESTLAW through July 24, 1996); see also COMING 
CLEAN, supra note 24, at 114; Survey Results, supra note 158. . 
404. For sites contaminated with petroleum, funding is available from the Petroleum Envi-
ronmental Cleanup Fund. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. ILHR 47 (1996). Funding is also available for 
qualifying sites from the state's Agricultural Chemicals Cleanup Fund. Wis. STAT. ANN. §. 94.73 
(West Supp. 1995). The Wisconsin environmental repair statute provides for grants to political 
subdivisions for investigations and cleanups at "spill sites"; the state has begun to use this au-
thority to fund Phase I and Phase II site assessments by municipalities. Id. § 144.442(9m); see 
also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 103 {describing both funds); Clokey, supra note 26, at 36; 
Casserly, supra note 26, at 273-74; Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the use of DNR 
staff); Telephone Interviews, supra note 160 (regarding the funding of site assessments). 
405. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m (West 1995). In 1995, Connecticut also estab-
lished a "Special Contaminated Property Remediation and Insurance Fund," and provided for 
the issuance of up to $30 million in bond funding for cleanups, secured by the Fund. 1995 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 190, §§ 4-5; see also NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 45. 
406. Tondro, supra note 20, at 811 (noting that less than five percent of the sites covered by 
Connecticut's Transfer Act are within the Urban Sites program). 
407. The EPA's Administrator, Carol M. Browner, announced. the "Brownfields Action 
Agenda" at a press conference held on Jan. 25, 1995. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870-
71; Solo, supra note 23, at 323; Jones, supra note 156; see U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, The 
Brownfields Action Agenda {last modified on Jan. 25, 1995) <http://www.epa.gov/docs> (herein-
after Brownfields Initiative]. 
408. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870-72; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 
1. The response to the EPA's proposals has been positive. Carol Andress, the Environmental 
Defense Fund's economic development specialist, stated that "EPA's Brownfield Initiative helps 
to make environmental cleanup a cornerstone of urban revitalization .... Prompt and thorough 
clean-up can save jobs that might otherwise be lost to outlying areas." Brooks, supra note 158; 
see also NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 608 (calling the Initiative a welcome "first step in 
ensuring that environmental cleanup is a building block to economic development, not a stum-
bling block"); Holusha, supra note 136 (stating that local officials call the removal of sites from 
the CERCLIS database "a great leap forward" in brownfield policy). 
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under CERCLA (particularly for prospective purchasers, municipali-
ties, and lenders),409 and work with states implementing voluntary 
cleanup programs.410 
a. Deletion of CERCLIS Sites 
In early 1995, there were about 38,000 sites listed in the CER-
CLIS database of sites to be evaluated for cleanups under CER-
CLA.411 Many of these were sites where the EPA had performed an 
initial screening (a "Preliminary Assessment") and determined that 
no further investigation or remedial action was required.412 Even 
though a notation to this effect was added to the sites' listings,413 lend-
ers had stigmatized these sites and routinely refused to extend loans to 
developers.414 In February 1995, as part of the Action Agenda, the 
EPA deleted approximately 25,000 of these sites from the CERCLIS 
list;415 it announced its intent to delete another 3,300 sites in 1996. as 
part of a package of Superfund administrative reforms.416 
b. Pilot Projects 
The EPA is funding a number of brownfield "pilot projects" to 
develop strategies for redeveloping brownfield sites,417 with individual 
grants of up to $200,000. This seed money may not be used for actual 
409. The Brownfields Initiative targeted the following liability issues as the subjects of EPA 
guidance: (1) prospective purchaser liability; (2) the liability of owners of property containing 
contaminated aquifers; (3) lender liability; (4) municipal acquisition liability; and (5) lender lia-
bility at Underground Storage Tank (UST) sites. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 2; see 
also Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 872 (stating that the EPA is "identifying options and 
developing guidance" on these issues). 
410. See Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 872 (testifying that "[o)ther elements of the 
Agenda call for building strong and effective state and local cleanup programs which will prevent 
the need for Federal involvement in many sites with economic development potential"). This 
issue is largely addressed in the context of reform to CERCLA to allow the EPA to approve 
cleanups taking place under a state voluntary cleanup program; see infra notes 459-61 and ac-
companying text. 
411. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712 (noting that "[a]s of July 7, 1993, 37,921 sites 
were listed on the CERCLIS inventory"). 
412. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 224; ROD-
GERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712-13. 
413. The notation "No Further Response Action Planned" was added to records in the 
CERCLIS for sites where the EPA had decided not to proceed beyond the Preliminary Assess-
ment stage. RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 712-13; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 79 n.144. 
414. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871 ("The mere fact that these sites have re-
mained in CERCLIS has caused potential developers to shy away from them and many lending 
and real estate investment communities have denied loans for businesses in or near CERCLIS 
sites as a matter of policy."); Fields Testimony, supra note 3, at 224; Brownfields: EPA An-
nounces 11 New Pilot Projects to Return Brownfields to Productive Use, Daily Envtl. Rep. News 
(BNA), Jan. 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 DEN 17 dll [hereinafter 11 New Pilot 
Projects] (quoting EPA Administrator Browner's statement to the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
that a listing in the CERCLIS database is "like a bad credit rating that never goes away"). 
415. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871. 
416. 11 New Pilot Projects, supra note 414. 
417. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870-71. 
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cleanups.418 Instead, it is intended to achieve three purposes: testing 
of redevelopment strategies and models;419 promoting cooperative ef-
forts to bring together the stakeholders involved in brownfield pol-
icy;420 and forcing "jump start" assessment and evaluation activities at 
individual sites.421 Projects started in 1993 in Cleveland, Ohio, and in 
1994 in Richmond, Virginia, and Bridgeport, Connecticut.422 By July 
1995, eighteen cities and localities had started pilot projects or had 
projects approved by the EPA.423 In the Action Agenda, the EPA 
announced its intent to fund fifty new projects by the end of 1996.424 
It announced eleven more grants in January 1996, for a total of forty 
projects.425 Participants in these pilot projects are involved in a wide 
range of activities: developing intergovernmental cooperation net-
works for brownfield cleanups;426 identifying sites for cleanups (often 
those within qualifying federal empowerment zones );427 and selecting 
sites to use as test beds for site-specific evaluation and development 
strategies.428 Although there is no typical pilot project, the tasks be-
418. See Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 
5; Brooks, supra note 158 (stating that "[f]unds are not for actual clean up, but for assessment 
efforts to 'generate interest by pulling together community groups, investors, lenders, develop-
ers, and other affected parties to address the issues of cleaning up contaminated sites and re-
turning them to appropriate, productive use,' according to EPA"). 
419. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871 (testifying that the Brownfields Initiative 
"will give us, and others, an opportunity to observe which approaches are best suited for differ-
ent types of communities"); Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 3 . 
. 420. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 3. 
421.. Brownfields Initiative, supra note 407, at 5 . 
. 4i2. Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 871; Brownfields Iniiiative, supra note 407, at 5. 
Administrator Browner testified to the success of the Cleveland pilot project. See Browner Testi-
mony, supra note 77, at 871 ("Our first pilot in Cleveland, OH, has already leveraged $1.7 mil-
lion in private investment, obtained a quarter of a million dollars in private donations, created 
100 jobs with another 100 jobs expected within one year, and generated over $600,000 in new tax 
revenue for the city."). 
423. Pilot projects were underway in· the following cities and localities: Baltimore, MD; Bir-
mingham, AL; Bridgeport, CT; Cape Charles, VA; Cleveland, OH; Detroit, MI; Indianapolis, 
IN; Knoxville, TN; Laredo, TX; Louisville, KY; New Orleans, LA; Oregon Mills Site, OR; Rich-
mond, VA; Rochester, NY; Sacramento, CA; St. Louis, MO; Trenton, NJ; and the "West Central 
Municipal Conference" (Chicago, IL suburbs). COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 28; Brooks, 
supra note 158. · 
424. ·Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 870; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 28; 
Brooks, supra note 158; see Eric Rothenberg, New EPA Guidance Shields Buyers of Contami-
nated Sites, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 1995, at 53. 
425. 11 New Pilot Projects, supra note 414. 
426. Brooks, supra note 158 (noting that Sacramento is developing a "streamlined system 
with all levels of government and the community to develop a future land use planning and 
permitting process in conjunction with cleanup planning," and the West Central Municipal Con-
ference pilot is "combin[ing] efforts of 36 municipalities in the Chicago area to create a regional 
council of governments approach· to brownfield redevelopment"). 
427. Detroit, for example, is developing a relationship between empowerment zone activi-
ties and brownfield cleanups. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 33 (stating that Baltimore is 
working to "coordinate empowerment zone and brownfields pilot activities"); Brooks, supra 
note 158 (observing that "Detroit will marry empowerment zone activities with case studies of 
assessment, cleanup and redevelopment"). 
428. Knoxville is using its funding "to focus on 25 inner city sites that have been chosen for 
an urban business park." Brooks, supra note 158. The Richmond pilot project has selected one 
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ing conducted in the Richmond pilot project are representative of the 
range of activities involved. The Richmond "Project Team" includes 
representatives from EPA Region III, staff from a number of city of-
fices, and outside consultants.429 This Team is working with a "task 
force" of city and state staff, local and regional community leaders, 
and economic development officials.430 The project's activities in-
clude establishing a list of three or four sites deemed most suitable for 
redevelopment,431 evaluating these sites, which may include con-
ducting Phase I and limited Phase II investigations,432 and developing 
site-specific property redevelopment strategies.433 Activities also in-
clude strategies designed to involve local residents and business in 
brownfield redevelopment activities.434 
c. Prospective Purchaser Agreements 
Another EPA initiative to spur brownfield redevelopment is ex-
pansion of the coverage of its "Prospective Purchaser Agreement" 
(PPA).435 In a PPA, the EPA offers protection from liability under 
CERCLA in the form of a release and covenant not to sue for pro-
spective purchasers of contaminated properties who commit to spe-
cific cleanups.436 Therefore, a prospective developer of a brownfield 
brownfield site as a prototype site to implement the strategies developed in the program. RICH-
MOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 13. That site is a 64-acre 
parcel owned by CSX Transportation, Inc., located in a state-designated enterprise zone. COM-
ING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 32. 
429. RICHMOND BROWNFIELDS PILOT PROJECT STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 11. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. at 2. 
432. Id. at 3-6. 
433. Id. at 8. 
434. CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 33. These include the use of the "Neighborhood 
Teams Process" program and the development of courses to inform citizens about environmental 
hazards. Id. 
435. Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Set-
tlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989) (hereinafter EPA PPA Guidance] (setting forth the criteria 
under which EPA would enter into PPAs); see also CoMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35; 
Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 n.35; Howard M. Shanker & Laurent R. Hourcle, Prospective Pur-
chaser Agreements, 25 ENVTL. L REP. 10,035 (1995). 
436. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Berger et al., supra note 23, at 86; McWil-
liams, supra note 20, at 728; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158. 
The Agency's criteria for entering into agreements with prospective purchasers of contami-
nated property included the following: 
a. Enforcement action is anticipated by the Agency at the facility; 
b. A substantial benefit, not otherwise available, will be received by the Agency for 
cleanup; 
c. The Agency believes that continued operation of the facility or new site development, 
with the exercise of due care, will not aggravate or contribute to the existing contamination 
or interfere with the remedy; 
d. Due consideration has been given to the effect of continued operations or new develop-
ment on health risks to those persons likely to be present at the site; and 
e. The prospective purchaser is financially viable. 
EPA PPA Guidance, supra note 435; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Berger et al., 
supra note 23, at 86; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 77-78. 
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site may avail itself of the "innocent landowner defense"437 and avoid 
liability under CERCLA by entering into an agreement with the EPA 
before buying the property.438 The terms of these agreements are 
based upon site-specific factors, particularly the nature and extent of 
contamination discovered in a site investigation.439 
In May 1995, the EPA acted to redefine the criteria by which it 
will consider entering into a PPA agreement.440 Under the original 
guidance, the EPA insisted on receiving a "substantial benefit" from 
the developer such as either an agreement to perform cleanup work or 
reimbursement of response costs.441 This proved, however, to be 
more than most prospective purchasers were willing to spend. The 
revised guidance document adds that the EPA may enter into a PPA if 
it receives an "indirect public benefit in combination with a reduced 
direct benefit to the EPA. "442 
One commentator calls the revised guidance on PPAs the "most 
important step under the 'Brownfields Action Agenda. "'443 Given the 
PPAs' track record to date, that may be overly optimistic. The availa-
bility of a PPA has had little success in spurring brownfield redevelop-
ment as the EPA has entered into only sixteen such agreements since 
1989.444 The EPA's decision to count a project's indirect benefits 
removes a major obstacle, but others remain. The PPA is not a com-
plete release from liability because it does not apply to contamination 
437. Brooks, supra note 158. 
438. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728; Rothen-
berg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158. The EPA derives its authority to offer a covenant 
not to sue to prospective purchasers from CERCLA § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1994), which 
provides that the EPA may offer a covenant not to sue to any person if the covenant is "in the 
public interest," "would expedite response action consistent with the [NCP]," and the person is 
in "full compliance" with a consent decree for cleanup action. See generally Strock, supra note 
105 (discussing settlement policy under CERCLA § 122). 
439. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 
158. 
440. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchas-
ers· of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 
(1995); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON SETTLEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE 
PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE 
MEMORANDUM]; see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 
n.35; Rothenberg, supra note 424. 
441. EPA PPA Guidance, supra note 435; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 34-35; Buzbee, 
supra note 26, at 78; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728. 
442. MA y 1995 pp A GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440; see also COMING CLEAN, 
supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 78-79; Rothenberg, supra note 424. This decision 
was also consistent with the Clinton administration's earlier proposal for Superfund reform. See 
McWilliams, supra note 20, at 748-4;}. 
443. Rothenberg, supra note 424. 
444. Shanker & Hourcle, supra note 435, at 10,036 & nn.9-10; see also Buzbee, supra note 
26, at 80 n.148 (citing the Shanker and Hourcle count of PPAs and stating that the first four 
PPAs entered into under the new criteria are awaiting EPA approval); McWilliams, supra note 
20, at 728 (stating that "PPAs have an insufficient track record for prospective purchasers to 
confidently rely on them when assessing the liability risks of purchasing an urban industrial 
property"); Rothenberg, supra note 424. 
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"unknown" at the time the Agreement is signed.445 Finally, under 
both the original and new guidance document, PPAs are targeted at 
sites where the EPA believes it would otherwise be interested in 
bringing an enforcement action.446 This would preclude many brown-
field sites from participation. Commentators also attribute the lack of 
PPAs to the EPA's overall reluctance, given its statutory mandate, to 
release parties from CERCLA liability.447 
2. Superfund Reform Legislation (The "Reform of Superfund Act") 
Brownfield redevelopment may also be encouraged by proposed 
amendments to CERCLA that would remove disincentives to devel-
opment. A wide variety of stakeholders currently support reforms to 
CER CLA 448 and view reform as more necessary than ever because 
the basic authorizations for the Superfund expired in December 
445. U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MODEL AGREEMENT ON SEITLEMENTS WITH PRO· 
SPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY pt. IX (1996) (stating that the United 
States •·reserves and the Agreement is without prejudice to all rights against Settling Defendants 
with respect to ... (d) any liability resulting from the release or threat of release of hazardous 
substances, pollutants or contaminants, at the Site after the effective date of this Agreement, not 
within the definition of Existing Contamination"); see also Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, 
supra note 158. 
446. MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440 (criteria for entering into a 
PPA include whether "[a]n EPA action at the facility has been taken, is ongoing, or is anticipated 
to be undertaken by the Agency"); see also COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 35; Buzbee, supra 
note 26, at 77; Rothenberg, supra note 424; Brooks, supra note 158. The May 1995 memo states, 
for example, that "sites designated by EPA as No Further Response Action Planned (NFRAP) 
and removed from CERCLIS will rarely be deemed appropriate for a [PPA]." MAY 1995 PPA 
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 440. Many brownfield sites fit this definition, as indi-
cated by the EPA's own action to remove 28,000 sites from the CERCLIS database as part of its 
"Action Agenda" to spur brownfield redevelopment. See supra notes 411-16 and accompanying 
text. 
447. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 76-80 (noting the EPA's reluctance to offer true final settle-
ments to PRPs); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 728. 
448. As any account of the calls for reform of Superfund can barely scrape the tip of the 
proverbial iceberg, the following list is only representative. 
Superfund reform is a high priority for industry groups. The Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation's President, Fred Webber, recently called upon Congress to "pass a Superfund 
reauthorization bill that reforms the program and funds cleanups into the next century." Interest 
Groups Mixed on Impact of CERCLA Shutdown During Budget Impasse, Daily Rep. for Execu-
tives (BNA), No. 3, at A-4 (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Interest Groups Mixed]; see also Reform of 
Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 
(Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of George D. Baker, Executive Director of Superfund Reform '95, "a 
coalition of over 1200 small and large businesses, trade associations, environmental profession-
als, insurance companies, municipalities, chambers of commerce, and concerned citizens, all of 
whom are dedicated to comprehensive reform of the Superfund law") (testifying that the current 
Superfund program is "horribly broken and wasteful"). 
The Clinton administration has recognized the need for legislative reforms to Superfund. 
See, e.g., Browner Testimony, supra note 77, at 856 (testifying that "there have been serious 
proposals for improvement of the [CERCLA) statute which we agree need to be addressed"); 
Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 192 (Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental 
& Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Schiffer Testimony] (testifying that 
the administration supports "responsible reform" of Superfund). 
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1995.449 Congress has been moving in recent years to promote com-
prehensive reform legislation;450 as of the date of this article, however, 
prospects are unclear for the "Reform of Superfund Act" (ROSA),451 
the principal bill proposed to amend CERCLA. The Clinton adminis-
tration opposes ROSA on a wide variety of grounds, prompting the 
likelihood that the bill would be vetoed if passed in its current form.452 
State officials are critical of the proposal to "cap" the NPL and other 
provisions which they perceive as shifting cleanup costs to them.453 
The bill's provisions redefining cleanup standards and public partici-
Environmental groups, though cautious about legislative proposals, also recognize the need 
for reform. See, e.g., Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (Oct. 26, 1995) (testimony of Karen Fiorini, Senior Attorney, 
Environmental Defense Fund) (hereinafter Fiorini Testimony] (testifying that "the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund supports improvement to the Superfund program"); NWF Testimony, supra 
note 66, at 600. 
The states' frustration with the current Superfund scheme is acute. See, e.g., Hearing on 
H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 8, 1995) (testimony of Robert M. 
Cox, Jr., on behalf of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry), available in 
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 668671 (testifying that "[t]he Chamber believes that unless Congress fun-
damentally reforms this important hazardous waste cleanup program now the drain on the 
state's economy will only worsen"); see also BARNETI, supra note 98, at 268-82 (describing the 
characteristics of a proposed revamped program); EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 607-18 
(describing the problems of the current program and possible revisions to it). 
449. Interest Groups Mixed, supra note 448. The provisions that expired included provisions 
for the excise and corporate environmental income taxes that replenish the Superfund. See 
RODGERS, supra note 76, § 8.2, at 699-700 (describing the tax provisions). BARNETI, supra note 
98, at 223-27, contains a fascinating account of the legislative origins of these taxes. An agree-
ment reached by the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee on 
Nov. 12, 1995, extended Superfund excise taxes through Sept. 30, 1996, and corporate environ-
mental income taxes through Dec. 31, 1996. 
450. The "Reform of Superfund Act" is the second major recent attempt at Superfund re-
form legislation. Despite broad-based support, comprehensive legislative proposals to amend 
CERCLA failed to be enacted in 1994, at the end of the 103d Congress. According to Professor 
Abrams, "[p]opular wisdom has it that the amendment package died a political death or (failed] 
because of a lack of consensus on other Superfund reform issues." Abrams, supra note 109, at 
582. 
451. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Senate counterpart to this bill is S. 1285, 
introduced by Senator Robert Smith of New Hampshire. S. 1285, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
452. See, e.g., Schiffer Testimony, supra note 448, at 192 (testifying that "H.R. 2500 is not a 
responsible proposal for reform of Superfund," and "[a]lthough the bill addresses each of the 
key issues involved in Superfund reform, and proposes some innovative new ideas such as liabil-
ity exemptions for municipal landfill sites and de minimis parties, it is fundamentally flawed"). 
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer also testified that the administration prefers the "consen-
sus" reform bill reintroduced by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) as H.R. 228. See id.; Superfund: 
EPA Official Says Reform Bills Sacrifice Cleanup for "Exposure Control," Nat'l Env't Daily 
(BNA), Nov. 8, 1995 (quoting the EPA's Jerry Clifford). 
453. See State Officials Warn Superfund Bills Would Generate Serious Problems, Env't 
Week, Jan. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 7980833 (quoting comments of attendees 
at the annual meeting of the National Council of State Legislatures). 
The proposal to cap the NPL is detailed in H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1995), 
which would amend CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994), to provide that "the President. 
may not add any facility to the National Priorities List after December 31, 2002." No more than 
125 facilities could be added through the year 2002 (under a schedule set forth in the legislation), 
and a facility could be added only with the concurrence of the state and the affected local gov-
ernment. H.R. 2500, § 502. 
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pation have drawn fire from the environmental community454 and in-
terested community groups.455 
Nonetheless, ROSA is noteworthy because it contains a number 
of initiatives intended to make cleanup costs and liability more pre-
dictable. 456 Title III, labeled "Brownfields and Voluntary Cleanups," 
calls for providing technical and financial assistance to qualifying state 
programs457 and contains two major incentives to brownfield redevel-
opment: a limit on liability under CERCLA at brownfield sites cle-
aned up in an approved state voluntary cleanup program and a 
clarification of the "innocent landowner" defense.458 Provisions of 
other titles, particularly those of Title I that would modify CERCLA 
cleanup standards, are also relevant. 
a. Title III: Promoting State Cleanups 
i. No Liability for Sites Remediated in Approved State 
Programs 
ROSA's most significant direct incentive for brownfield redevel-
opment is a provision designed to decrease uncertainty generated by 
the states' inability to release developers from CERCLA liability.459 
454. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 270-80 (opposing these provisions and 
others). 
455. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environ-
ment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 31, 
1995) (testimony of Florence T. Robinson, representing the North Baton Rouge Environmental 
Association, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, and the Communities at Risk Network), 
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 668738 (hereinafter Robinson Testimony] (opposing provi-
sions of H.R. 2500 on remedy selection, cleanup standards, and public participation, among 
others). 
456. Representatives Ralph Regula of Ohio and Peter Visclosky of Indiana have introduced 
two free-standing brownfield bills, the "Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Act" and 
"Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Revolving Loan Fund Pilot Project Act." See H.R. 
1620 and H.R. 1621, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 54-56. 
These bills called for federal financial support of state voluntary cleanup programs. H.R. 1620, 
for example, "would authorize the EPA Administrator to establish a three-year, $20 million pilot 
project providing revolving loans to states." Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on 
H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House 
Comm on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (Oct. 18, 1995) (testimony of Rep. 
Peter J. Visclosky) [hereinafter Visclosky Testimony]; COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 54. The 
bills also would extend protection comparable to that envisioned by the omnibus Superfund 
reform bill. See Visclosky Testimony, supra, at 6 (testifying that the provision of Title III of 
ROSA limiting federal liability for sites cleaned up in an approved state program "is remarkably 
similar to the process established by legislation Mr. Regula and I introduced in May, H.R. 
1621 "). In his testimony before the House Commerce Committee, Rep. Visclosky expressed his 
hope that brownfield legislation would be enacted separately if Superfund reform fails again. Id. 
at 7. 
457. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1995). 
458. Id. §§ 304 and 303, respectively. 
459. See Hearing on H.R. 2500, A Bill to Amend the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Before the House Transportation and Infra-
structure Comm., Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 
2, 1995) (testimony of Michael A. Kahoe, Deputy Secretary, California Environmental Protec-
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Title III attempts to encourage participation in state voluntary 
cleanup programs by limiting liability under CERCLA where a devel-
oper has cleaned up a site in accordance with the requirements of a 
state program.460 This could increase certainty for developers, who 
would know in advance that complying with a state's requirements 
will preclude the EPA from pursuing an action against them. State 
programs would not qualify automatically for this deference; the EPA 
would be required to approve the state program before developers 
could receive a limit on federal liability.461 
ii. Clarification of the Innocent Landowner Defense 
Title III would clarify CERCLA's "innocent landowner" defense, 
which, as noted above, is poorly defined and rarely available to 
brownfield developers.462 Section 303 of ROSA would amend CER-
CLA to provide that a purchaser of real property has "made all ap-
propriate inquiry," as that term is used in the statute,463 if it conducts 
a Phase I site assessment.464 This would entitle the purchaser to avail 
itself of the innocent landowner defense.465 Changing the statute in 
this fashion would be of great value to a brownfield developer, if it 
were willing to underwrite the expense of a Phase I site assessment. 
Clarifying the circumstances under which a purchaser can use the 
innocent landowner defense is important.466 However, under the pro-
posed Section 303, there would be no guarantee that those who use 
tion Agency), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 645085 (hereinafter Kahoe Testimony] (observ-
ing that "[t]he primary value of [Title III] is its' [sic] release of federal liability for sites handled 
under state voluntary or brownfield programs"); see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 748 
(stating that "the federal government can streamline the remediation process by delegating or 
deferring to efficient state programs"). 
460. Section 304 of H.R. 2500, as introduced, would add the following language to CER-
CLA § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1994): 
( e) Facilities in states with approved remedial action programs. 
(1) Enforcement prohibition. 
(A) Releases subject to State plans. For any facility at which there is a release or 
threatened release of hazardous substances subject to a State remedial action plan 
adopted under a state program approved as provided in this subsection, neither the 
President nor any other person may use any authority of this act to take a new 
administrative or judicial enforcement action, or to bring a private civil action, 
against any person regarding any matter that is within the scope of such plan. 
461. Section 304 would provide that a state may apply for approval of its voluntary cleanup 
program. At the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting, in January 1996, Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-
VA), Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, announced his intent to offer an amend-
ment to delete this provision. Clinton Backs U.S. Mayors, supra note 29. 
462. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
463. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1994). 
464. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1995). Section 303 would amend CERCLA 
§ 107, 42 u.s.c. § 9607 (1994). 
465. If a purchaser has made all appropriate inquiries, it is not in a "contractual relation-
ship" and may qualify for the defense set forth in CERCLA § 107(b)(3). See supra note 102 and 
accompanying text. · 
466. See, e.g., NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 607 (testifying that the NWF "recommends 
that some form of liability relief is provided to prospective purchasers, lenders and innocent 
landowners"). 
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the defense are bona fide innocent purchasers. Opponents claim that 
developers will be able to purchase brownfield sites without ensuring 
that they are remediated. They point to Section 303's lack of a re-
quirement that the property be cleaned up if the Phase I assessment 
discovers the presence of contamination or that the purchaser cooper-
ate with a cleanup (if one takes place).467 
b. Title I: Revising Cleanup Standards 
Like state voluntary cleanup statutes, ROSA contains provisions 
that would relax cleanup standards expressly amending Section 121 of 
CERCLA. It would require the EPA to conduct "objective and unbi-
ased" risk assessments, implement "cost-effective and cost reason-
able" remedies, and base cleanup remedies on anticipated future uses 
of land, water, and other resources.468 Section 102, for example, di-
rects the EPA to use "the most plausible assumptions" for risk assess-
ments and specifies that "remedies selected at individual facilities 
shall be those necessary to protect human health and the environment 
from realistic and significant risks through cost-effective and cost-rea-
sonable means."469 ROSA also removes the "ARAR" requirement 
that other federal and state environmental standards be followed in 
Superfund cleanups.470 Some have criticized these proposals as creat-
ing standards that fail to protect health and the environment, particu-
larly in minority and lower-income communities.471 
3. Other Federal Initiatives 
The Clinton administration's budget proposal for fiscal year 1997 
offers a tax deduction for environmental cleanup expenses in 
"targeted areas," which include distressed areas such as the current 
empowerment zone and enterprise communities areas472 and areas 
467. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1995); see NWF Testimony, supra note 66, at 
607-08 (testifying that "[i]n order for bona fide prospective purchasers to obtain Superfund lia-
bility relief, they must not contribute waste to the site, make a good faith effort to determine if 
the site was contaminated, cooperate with the cleanup effort at a contaminated site and not 
aggravate existing contamination conditions"); Schiffer Testimony, supra note 448, at 201 (testi-
fying that "H.R. 2500's 'innocent landowner' liability exemption ... fails to require the purchas-
ers to cooperate with cleanup of the property [which is) inconsistent with the purpose of the 
provision to encourage the cleanup, as well as redevelopment, of brownfields sites"). 
468. Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 274-77; Robinson Testimony, supra note 455. 
469. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note 
448, at 277. The Environmental Defense Fund's Karen Fiorini stated that this provision "implic-
itly disallows consideration of atypically sensitive subpopulations (e.g., developing fetuses, in-
fants, children, asthmatics, the elderly)." Id. at 276. 
470. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra 
note 448, at 275. 
471. See, e.g., Swanston, supra note 123, at 567-72. 
472. Empowerment zones operate on the theory that removing governmental barriers to 
investment, and providing incentives for redevelopment, will spur urban revitalization and 
growth. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 752 n.232 (citing STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE 
ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 3 (1981)). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
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where brownfield pilot projects are in place.473 There is a direct rela-
tionship between the proposed tax deduction and other federal pro-
grams which focus on economic redevelopment activities, because 
these activities are already targeted to the empowerment zones and 
enterprise communities.474 Moreover, federal agencies involved in re-
development activities in these communities could work cooperatively 
with state regulators administering voluntary cleanup programs.475 
Professor Michael Allan Wolf cautions, however, that targeting these 
areas for cleanups raises distributional concerns.476 
IV. COMPARING VOLUNTARY CLEANUP. STATUTES AND 
NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION STATUTES 
A broad-based coalition of industry, policy makers, and the pub-
lic is prompting the states to take action to facilitate voluntary clean-
ups, touting the voluntary cleanup statutes' incentives for 
1993 authorized the creation of six urban empowerment zones (later designated in Detroit, Phil-
adelphia, Baltimore, New York, Chicago, and Atlanta) and 65 "enterprise communities"; Cleve-
land and Los Angeles were designated as "supplemental zones" qualifying for federal grants. 
COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 50; Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 13; Michael Allan Wolf, 
Compete and Empower, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1993 [hereinafter Wolf, Compete 
and Empower]. 
473. See White House Statutory Language, Tax Notes Today, Tax Analysts, Mar. 20, 1996, 
available in WESTLAW, TNT database, 96 TNT 56-1 (proposing Title IX, Subtitle D of the 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1996) [hereinafter Administration Tax Deduction Bill]; Adminis-
tration Looking at FY 1997 Budget as Vehicle for Brownfields Tax Proposal, Daily Tax Rept. 
(BNA), Feb. 1, 1996, at DTR 21 G7 [hereinafter FY 1997 Budget Proposal]. The administra-
tion's bill would add a new§ 198 to the Internal Revenue Code that would allow a deduction for 
a "qualified environmental remediation expenditure" in the taxable year in which it was paid or 
incurred. Qualifying expenditures would be those at a site within a "targeted area," defined as a 
population census tract with a population of less than 2,000 if more than 75% of the tract is 
zoned for commercial or industrial use, an empowerment zone or enterprise community, or a 
site included in a brownfield pilot project. Administration Tax Deduction Bill, supra, § 9476(a); 
FY 1997 Budget Proposal, supra; cf S. 1542, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing to allow 
taxpayers to deduct costs incurred "in connection with the abatement or control of environmen-
tal contaminants located within an empowerment zone or enterprise community"); FY 1997 
Budger Proposal, supra (describing S. 1542). 
474. A wide variety of federal assistance is available in empowerment zones and enterprise 
communities, including programs for economic development and job training. See Michael Al-
lan Wolf; U.S. Urban Areas Seek New Paths to Prosperity, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & Pus. PoL'v, 
Winter 1995, at 84, 87-88 [hereinafter Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas]; Wolf, Compete and Empower, 
supra note 472. The University of Richmond School of Law's "EZ Project" maintains a site on 
the Internet's World Wide Web to provide useful information about the federal program, includ-
ing specific federal regulations regarding federal program enhancements to empowerment zones 
and enterprise.communities. See Optimism Is Surviving for "Empowerment Zones," ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Dec. 25,. 1995, at B15 (mentioning the EZ Project); EZ Gazette: A Newsletter on Em-
powerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, and Enterprise Zones (last modified Sept. 25, 1996) 
<http://www.urich.edu/-ezproj>. 
475. See Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra note 474, at 90. 
476. Id. at 90: . 
Because of the high concentration of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians in the na-
tion's most distressed inner-city neighborhoods (in which there may be greater likelihood of 
exposure to environmental hazards), any sweeping waivers of environmental controls in 
such areas would directly conflict with the goals of the environmental justice movement. 
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redevelopment.477 Proponents claim that many sites have been ad-
dressed successfully in the pioneer state programs.478 But most ob-
servers conclude that the state statutes are too new for their 
effectiveness to be measured accurately and that there is still a high 
degree of uncertainty about the investment climate for developers.479 
There are a number of unresolved issues in the implementation of vol-
untary cleanup programs, many of which may hamper the states' abil-
ity to fulfill proponents' expectations over the long run.480 
This part will assess the challenges facing the voluntary cleanup 
statutes by comparing them to "negotiated compensation" statutes. 
The negotiated compensation statutes represent a notable effort to 
overcome "NIMBY-ism" and facilitate the siting of new waste dispo-
sal facilities.481 Scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) and Harvard University, recognizing that previous approaches 
had failed to address NIMBY opposition adequately, created the con-
cept of negotiated compensation. They drafted the Massachusetts ne-
gotiated compensation statute, hailed at the time of its enactment in 
1980 as a "major advance in siting policy by both industry and envi-
477. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS P01.1cY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 4 (stat-
ing that at the recent NEPI forum, "not one panelist spoke in favor of the status quo"); Buzbee, 
supra note 26. at 109; Black, supra note 42, at 51. 
478. In its "Six-Month Progress Report," Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Pro-
tection claims that since the Pennsylvania statute took effect in July 1995, 13 brownfield sites 
have been remediated, and cleanups are underway at 47 other sites. PENNSYLVANIA S1x-MoNTH 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 6-7. Of the 13 completed cleanups, eight had met state-
wide health standards, three met background standards, and two met the requirements for "spe-
cial industrial areas"; none had met the requirements for site-specific cleanups. Id. at 7; see also 
Casserly, supra note 26, at 271 (describing the Minnesota program): 
Four hundred and twenty two parcels have been examined by developers with the assistance 
of the VIC program. Of the 222 completed projects, 58 sites were completely cleaned up, 57 
required no cleanup, 57 were referred to other programs more appropriate for their 
cleanup, 26 received off site source determination letters, and 13 received no association 
determination letters. 
The OTA report describes a successful voluntary cleanup under the California program at the 
former Culver City Kite site, a 4.5-acre property used for manufacturing purposes. The site was 
cleaned up, and the developer received a certificate of completion from the state. The site, 
according to the OTA, is "currently being developed as an industrial park ... expected to pro-
vide approximately 100 new jobs." OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 21 (citing 
DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROTEcnON AGENCY, 
THE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM, May 1995, at 6, and Interview with Javier Hinojosa, Site 
Mitigation Branch, California Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Sub-
stances Control (June 1, 1995)). 
479. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 12; 
OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 28. 
480. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 2-3. 
481. See Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regu-
lation in Wisconsin, 66 MARO. L. REV. 223 (1983); Bernd Holznagel, Negotiation and Mediation: 
The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 329 
(1986) (discussing the Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin statutes); 
Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting 
Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the failure of the Massachusetts statute); Mary 
Beth Arnett, Comment, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determination in the Wis-
consin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 543. 
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ronmentalists. "482 The Massachusetts statute served as a model for 
other states, such as Wisconsin, that subsequently enacted negotiated 
compensation statutes. 
States now have over a decade of experience with these statutes. 
Like the voluntary cleanup statutes, the enactment of negotiated com-
pensation statutes was accompanied by heady optimism and a consen-
sus among a variety of stakeholders about the need for a process to 
foster decision making by developers and communities.483 But the ne-
gotiated compensation statutes have had a rather poor record of suc-
cess in addressing the difficult issues of the siting process,484 despite 
strong arguments that they might have succeeded. An analysis of the 
similarities between the two types of statutes, and an assessment of 
the shortcomings of negotiated compensation statutes, offer a frame-
work for examining challenges that lie ahead in the implementation of 
voluntary cleanup programs. Scholars have articulated criticisms of 
features of compensation schemes (particularly those of the Massa-
chusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act) that find parallels in the 
voluntary cleanup programs. These include the lack of effective pub-
lic participation, both before the initial decision to site a facility has 
been made and during the siting process; the chronic problems with 
the legitimacy of the states' decision making; the moral hazards inher-
ent in trusting developers' motives and actions; and the failure to ad-
dress issues central to the programs' success. Following a brief 
introduction to the negotiated compensation statutes, this part will ad-
dress each of these sets of issues in tum, primarily with reference to 
the Massachusetts statute. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Negotiated Compensation Statutes 
1. The Waste Disposal and "NIMBY" Problems 
For the foreseeable future, we will continue to rely on building 
new facilities to dispose of our waste.485 In recent years, it has be-
come increasingly difficult to site solid waste landfills and hazardous 
waste disposal facilities, due in large part to the "NIMBY syndrome." 
People benefit from waste disposal facilities, but no one wants these 
facilities to be located "in my backyard." Thus, fierce opposition is 
482. Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 787, 811 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Compensated Siting Proposals]. 
483. For a discussion of the theory of the negotiated compensation approach, see Lawrence 
S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The 
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv. 265 (1982). 
484. Comprehensive analyses of the successes and failures of the "negotiated compensa-
tion" approach are found in Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, and Wheeler, 
supra note 481. 
485. A number of commentators have advocated source reduction, but its full implementa-
tion is still many years away. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at 
Twenty·Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 424-26 (1995) (calling for economic incentives to reduce 
waste generation). 
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likely whenever a developer attempts to site a new disposal facility.486 
The "negotiated compensation" statutes promised to alleviate 
America's waste disposal crisis487 and the role of "NIMBY-ism" in 
perpetuating it. 
2. The Principle of Negotiated Compensation 
By the early 1980s, many states required developers to provide 
compensation to the community that hosted a waste facility.488 The 
innovation of the negotiated compensation approach was to en-
courage developers and communities to negotiate compensation 
awards-both their amounts and forms of payment.489 
The negotiated compensation approach attempts to recast the ec-
onomics of NIMBY opposition to proposed projects. The conflict 
over any siting dispute involves diffuse benefits for a large number of 
people (e.g., customers of a waste disposal facility) at the expense of 
concentrated costs to the immediately affected community. A facil-
ity's opponents are therefore able to organize a group of residents to 
protest the imposition of the facility on them. There is usually no cor-
responding group of potential beneficiaries, because individuals may 
not perceive the gains from supporting the facility.490 Negotiated 
compensation attempts to solve this problem by providing compensa-
tion to residents who perceive that a project may harm them. Under 
this approach, private waste facility developers are required to bar-
gain with communities to establish terms for accepting facilities. 
There are several types of compensation that a developer of a waste 
disposal facility may offer a local community: (1) measures to avoid 
486. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 788-89; Denis J. Brion, An 
Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 8.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REv. 
437 (1988); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198 (1990); 
Ivan Fong, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Through Negotiation, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 161 (1986-
87); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste 
Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 8.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 
239 (1991); Bruce J. Parker & John H. Turner, Overcoming Obstacles to the Siting of Solid Waste 
Facilities, 21 N.M. L. REV. 91 (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Stor-
age, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the I980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES L. 429 
(1984); Wheeler, supra note 481. 
487. Parker & Turner, supra note 486 (discussing the magnitude of America's solid waste 
problem). . 
488. See, e.g., Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 794 n.46 and statutes 
cited therein; Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed 
Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVTL L.J. 375 (1994) (describing compensation programs in states such as 
Colorado, Connecticut, and Minnesota). In these programs, compensation is often fixed as a 
lump-sum amount, or as a percentage of the facility's gross receipts or amount of wastes 
processed. Mata, supra. 
489. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 253. As Professor Wheeler indicates, the "political symbol-
ism" of allowing the host community to bargain freely with the waste developer was intended to 
represent "a clear departure from regulatory regimes under which the state merely awards dam-
ages to a community chosen to host a facility." Id. 
490. This phenomenon, and the corresponding need for collective action, was described in 
James E. Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23 STAN. L. 
REV. 623, 662-64 (1971). 
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or reduce a facility's adverse impacts on the community (e.g., installa-
tion of a groundwater monitoring system, double liners, and a 
leachate collection system); (2) measures to reverse or mitigate ad-
verse impacts that occur (e.g., provision of money or equipment to 
improve fire and police response capabilities in case of an accident); 
and (3) compensatory benefits (e.g., provision by the developer of tax 
benefits to the municipality or direct cash payments to individuals). 
3. Features of Negotiated Compensation Statutes 
The negotiated compensation statutes create a process that, as 
the name implies, involves negotiation between communities and 
waste facility developers. A developer triggers the negotiation pro-
cess by contacting the host community itself,491 or it may contact a 
state agency that has oversight responsibility for the siting process, 
often a new agency created in the statute.492 The developer declares 
its intent to site a facility in a host community.493 Then, the commu-
491. In Massachusetts, the process of siting a proposed facility begins when the developer 
files a "notice of intent" with the responsible state agency. The notice of intent is required to 
include a description of the facility (including the wastes that would be processed on the site and 
the techniques that would be used to treat or dispose of them), the developer's prior experience 
in constructing or operating waste facilities, and the developer's plans for financing the project. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); see Been, Compensated Siting 
Proposals, supra note 482, at 811; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 358-59; Wheeler, supra note 481, 
at 264-65. In Wisconsin, the developer's first step is to apply for "local approvals" (e.g., building 
permits, licenses, and zoning approvals or variances) from the host community. By taking this 
step, the developer becomes eligible to proceed in the process envisioned by the statute. This is 
a two-track process that involves the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in evaluat-
ing the project's feasibility and the host community in negotiating with the developer over com-
pensation and other issues. Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.44(lm)(b)-(c) (West 1989); see Arnett, supra 
note 481, at 548. 
492. Recognizing that existing agencies "lacked the neutrality necessary to facilitate the ne-
gotiations" between developers and host communities, the Massachusetts statute created a new 
state agency, the "Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council" (HWFSSC), to oversee the 
process. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (WESTLAW, MA-STANN96 database, 1996) 
(repealed 1996); see Holznagel, supra note 481. at 358. Other state agencies involved in the 
process include the Department of Environmental Quality and Engineering, and the Depart-
ment of Environmental Management (DEM). Id. It was the HWFSSC, however, that bears 
responsibility for evaluating the siting agreement. Id. There were 21 members of the HWFSSC: 
eight state officials (or their designees), seven representatives of interest groups, and six repre-
sentatives of the general public. In addition, two "temporary" members from the host commu-
nity may be appointed. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (WESTLAW, MA-STANN96 
database, 1996) (repealed 1996); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 358. 
The Wisconsin statute created the "Waste Facility Siting Board" (WFSB), a state agency 
with similar responsibilities. The WFSB has seven members: four state officials (or their desig-
nees); two town officials, and one county official. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 15.105(12) (1986); see Ar-
nett, supra note 481, at 547 n.23. 
493. Typically, a developer may either select the host community or ask the state to select 
one. In Massachusetts, the notice of intent may name a specific proposed site, or describe the 
type of site that the developer would prefer, and ask the state to select potential candidates. 
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 9 (West 1988); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, 
supra note 482, at 812; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 360. In the latter case, the state conducts a 
site suggestion process, accepting suggestions from interested individuals and entities (state 
agencies, the developer, communities, and other persons). The state may suggest a site if it 
receives no proposals using this process. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 9 (West 1988); 
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nity and the developer enter into a negotiation process;494 in Massa-
chusetts, a preliminary review of the proposal by the state has already 
taken place.495 Representatives of a number of constituencies are ap-
Holznagel, supra note 481, at 360. In practice, most developers identified specific sites in which 
they were interested, bypassing the state. In Wisconsin, the developer is also free to choose the 
location of the proposed facility. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 481, at 551 (stating that "[w]ithout 
state or local input, the applicant [in Wisconsin] selects the location of the proposed landfill site 
and proceeds to obtain the necessary local permits and state operating license"). 
494. In Massachusetts, the negotiation process involves the developer and a "local assess-
ment committee" (LAC) from the host community; these parties negotiate the terms (e.g., com-
pensation and protective measures) under which the host community agrees to accept the 
facility. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988); see Been, Compensated Siting Propos-
als, supra note 482, at 813; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 257. In 
Wisconsin, the negotiation process starts when the host community adopts a "siting resolution" 
in response to the developer's request for local approvals. The siting resolution declares the 
community's intent to negotiate with the developer. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(a) (West 
1989); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 
548. There is a strong incentive for the host community to adopt a siting resolution: if it does 
not do so within 120 days after the developer applies for local approvals, the developer may 
continue in the state's process for determining the need and feasibility of the project without 
being subject to any local approvals. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(f) (West 1989); see Been, 
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 548. 
495. In Massachusetts, the HWFSSC is required to make a threshold assessment whether 
the notice of intent is "complete." If the HWFSSC finds this to be the case, it must review the 
proposed project and make a further finding within 15 days whether the proposal is "feasible and 
deserving of state assistance." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 7 (West 1988); see Been, 
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 359; 
Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266. This finding indicates only that the proposal is appropriate for 
further review. Holznagel, supra note 481, at 359; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266. Shortly after 
the enactment of the Massachusetts act, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a 
HWFSSC decision about whether a developer's proposal was "feasible and deserving of state 
assistance" was not subject to judicial review. Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site 
Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1984). In Town of Warren, the HWFSSC had decided that 
a site in the town of Warren proposed as the location of a hazardous waste facility was "feasible 
and deserving of state assistance." The town argued that the Massachusetts Administrative Pro-
cedure Act entitled it to judicial review of this decision as a "final decision of [an] agency in an 
adjudicatory proceeding." The court disagreed, holding that the HWFSSC's determination was 
a preliminary step in a lengthy siting process. Town of Warren, 466 N.E.2d at 107-08. For further 
commentary on Town of Warren, see Been, Compensated Siting Propornls, supra note 482, at 
816-17; Note, The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Controversy: The Massachusetts Experience, 
12 AM. J.L. & MED. 131 (1986). 
There is no analogue in Wisconsin to the Massachusetts "feasible and deserving" screening 
process. Instead, the ONR conducts a separate determination of the need for the proposed 
facility; if it determines that the facility is not necessary, the developer may not build it. Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 144.44(2) (West 1989); see Arnett, supra note 481, at 555. 
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pointed to a committee496 that negotiates on behalf of the commu-
nity497 with .the developer. 
The developer and host community negotiate on such issues as 
the facility's design, construction, maintenance, operation, and moni-
toring procedures.498 The committee and developer are usually re-
quired to negotiate the amount and type of services the host 
community will provide the developer and the compensation, services, 
and benefits that the developer will provide the community.499 Some 
issues, particularly the need for the facility, are expressly precluded 
from negotiations.500 To obtain information to enhance its ability to 
negotiate, the committee is authorized to receive technical and finan-
cial assistance from the state. 501 While the negotiations are ongoing, 
496. In Massachusetts, the LAC consists of as many as 13 members, five of whom are de-
fined by the statute: the chief executive officer of the host community, the chair of the local 
board of heal~h, the chair of the local planning board, the chair of the local conservation com-
mission, and the chief of the fire department. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988); 
see Been,. Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813-14; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 
362. The five statutory members select four additional members, three of whom must be resi-
dents of the host community. The chief executive officer may nominate, and the city council (or 
other municipal legislative body) may approve, up to four additional members. 
In Wisconsin, a "local committee" negotiates with the developer. The city council or other 
municipal governing body of the municipality. may appoint four members, no more than two of 
whom may be elected officials or municipal employees; the host county may appoint two mem-
bers; and if it is another "affected municipality" as defined in the statute, any other affected 
community may appoint one member. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(7)(a) (West 1989); see Been, 
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 547 & n.25. 
497. In Massachusetts, the LAC is authorized to bind the community to the siting agree-
ment. The LAC is charged with representing the "best interests of the host community" by 
negotiating with the developer "to protect the public health, the public safety, and the environ-
ment of the host community, as well as to promote the fiscal welfare of said community through 
special benefits and compensation." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 5 (West 1988); see Been, 
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813-14; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 362. In 
Wisconsin, the siting agreement becomes binding when, and only when, it is approved by the 
governing body of the host community. Wrs. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(9)(k) (West 1989); see Been, 
Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 820; Arnett, supra note 481, at 548. 
498. Massachusetts requires the siting agreement (and, therefore, the negotiation process) 
to address facility construction and maintenance, design and operation, and monitoring proce-
dures. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364. 
In Wisconsin, these issues (along with compensation) may be the subject of negotiation between 
the committee and the developer, but are not specifically enumerated as issues that must be 
included in the siting agreement. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 481, at 548 (stating that 
"(c]ommonly negotiated items include property diminution, municipal costs of negotiation activ-
ities, facility appearance and hours of operation, road maintenance, control of noise, dust, debris, 
odors and rodents, and other neighborhood concerns"). 
499. Massachusetts requires the siting agreement to describe services to be provided by the 
developer to the community; compensation to be provided by the developer to the community; 
services and benefits to be provided by the state agencies to the community, among other com-
ponents of the agreement. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); see Been, Com-
pensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 814; Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364. 
500. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (West 1988); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(8)(a)(2) 
(West 1989); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach); 
Arnett, supra note 481, at 544 (describing the Wisconsin approach) .. The negotiators also cannot 
agree to relax the environmental, or health and safety standards of state and federal laws. See, 
e.g., Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach). 
501. In Massachusetts, an LAC may obtain a technical assistance and planning grant from 
the HWFSSC to enable it to assess the project more effectively. In deciding whether to award a 
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there is a separate state review of environmental issues.502 In addi-
tion, the community is usually precluded from changing its local laws 
to block the project.503 The negotiations are intended to culminate in 
a siting agreement that sets forth the agreement between the par-
ties. 504 There are time limits for the negotiations; if negotiations reach 
an impasse, there is recourse to either state-authorized mediation, 
binding arbitration,505 or both, to resolve contentious issues. Finally, 
grant, the HWFSSC evaluates the proposal's merit, deciding whether the funds will be expended 
for purposes clearly related to the siting process, whether the budget for the project is reason-
able, and whether the proposed project itself is necessary. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11 
(West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note481, at 362; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 257. 
502. In Massachusetts, the proposed facility is subject to the state's environmental impact 
process under the "little NEPA" statute, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (WESTLAW through c. 76 of 1996 2d Annual Sess. of the 
General Court); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 363; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 267.· To 
facilitate this review, the developer prepares a preliminary project impact report, consisting of an 
environmental impact report and a socioeconomic appendix, that detail the proposed facility's 
environmental impacts. Preparation of the final environmental impact report begins at this 
point and concludes only after a siting agreement is in place, with information from the negotia-
tions added to supplement the initial report. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 10 (West 1988); 
see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 813 n.182; Holznagel, supra note 
481, at 363. In Wisconsin, environmental review takes place in the ONR's process of determin-
ing the feasibility of the proposed project. This process, as noted above, is a decision"making 
track for the project that parallels the negotiation process. Arnett, supra note 481, at 550. Its 
principal component is the approval of a "feasibility report" submitted to the ONR. Wis. STAT. 
ANN.§ 144.44(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); see Arnett, supra note 481, at 550. The feasibility 
report contains a general summary of the site and surrounding area (including topography, soils, 
geology, groundwaters, and surface waters), preliminary engineering design concepts, and infor-
mation about the wastes to be treated, stored, or disposed. This information, together with in-
formation obtained at public hearings, enables the ONR to complete its environmental review of 
the facility. The ONR also approves a plan of operation setting forth operational details for the 
proposed facility and issues the facility's operating license. Id. at 550 & n.43. 
503. A developer might need a number of local approvals; for example, approval of a traffic 
plan, or a building or fire permit. See Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367 & n.269. The host 
community, in Massachusetts, is prohibited from imposing new permit requirements, if they had 
been unnecessary prior to the effective date of the statute. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 16 
(West 1988); see Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367. The host community is also prohibited from 
excluding the facility by changing the zoning of the proposed site. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
210, § 16 (West 1988); Holznagel, supra note 481, at 367-68. In Wisconsin, there is a similar 
prohibition of new local approvals. The host community may require the developer to secure 
only those local approvals that would have been required at least 15 months before the devel-
oper submitted either an "initial site report" or "feasibility report." Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.445(3)(fm), 144.445(5) (West 1989); see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 
482, at 819 n.226. 
504. In both Massachusetts and Wisconsin, the terms upon which the host community and 
developer agree are documented in a written siting agreement. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, 
§ 12 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(9)(g) (West 1989). See Been, Compensated Siting 
Proposals, supra note 482, at 814, 820 (describing the Massachusetts and Wisconsin approaches); 
Holznagel, supra note 481, at 364 (describing the Massachusetts approach); Arnett, supra note 
481, at 548-49 (describing the Wisconsin approach). 
505. In Massachusetts, the developer or the LAC may notify the HWFSSC that an impasse 
in the negotiations has been reached. The HWFSSC is then empowered to require the parties to 
submit disputed issues to arbitration. The arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators) creates a siting 
agreement, taking into account the presentations made by the host community, the developer, 
and abutting communities. The arbitrator or arbitration panel's determination is binding upon 
the parties and is subject to limited judicial review. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 15 (West 
1988); Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 814-15; Holznagel, supra note 
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there are additional approval and enforcement responsibilities for the 
state after a siting agreement has been reached.506 
B. Learning from the Successes and Failures of Negotiated 
Compensation 
The negotiated compensation statutes have had a decidedly 
mixed record of success and have been largely unsuccessful in facili-
tating the siting of hazardous waste facilities. The Massachusetts stat-
ute has been completely unsuccessful5°7 and has prompted criticism 
and legislative proposals for its abolition or change.508 One commen-
tator calls the Massachusetts statute a "conspicuous failure ... [that] 
became a focal point for community resistance. "509 Wisconsin, by 
contrast, has had modest success with its statute. One analysis indi-
cates that by the end of 1993, communities and developers had 
reached siting agreements at five hazardous waste sites and forty-one 
solid waste. sites in Wisconsin. 510 
The siting of a waste disposal facility, unlike certain reuses of 
brownfields, is guaranteed to impose environmental and other costs 
on its host community.511 Th~ opposition of local residents to waste 
disposal facilities and siting of other "locally undesirable land uses" is 
well-known and documented.512 Such opposition, however, is unlikely 
to exist at every brownfield site because residents may welcome cer-
tain development activities. Nevertheless, voluntary cleanup pro-
grams and negotiated compensation statutes share a number of 
common attributes, and the lessons learned from the shortcomings of 
the latter are instructive. 
481, at 365; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 271-72. Although the Wisconsin statute also provides for 
arbitration after an impasse occurs, the Wisconsin provision for arbitration is more limited. Top-
ics for arbitration are restricted to eight specific areas: (1) compensation for adverse economic 
impacts caused by the facility; (2) reimbursement of the local committee's negotiation, media-
tion, and arbitration costs not exceeding $2,500; (3) screening and fencing; (4) operational con-
cerns including noise, dust, debris, Odors, and hours of operation; (5) traffic flows and patterns; 
(6) postclosure site use; (7) economically feasible methods for reducing the quantity of waste 
disposed at the site including recycling; and (8) applicability of local approvals. The WFSB 
makes arbitration awards, choosing between offers made by the committee and developer.· This 
decision is binding on the committee and developer. See Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 144.445(8)(b), (10) 
(West 1989); Arnett, supra note 481, at 549. 
506. In Massachusetts, for example, after the siting agreement is entered into, the HWFSSC 
is required to review and approve it, and the licensing and permitting processes begin. See 
Wheeler, supra note 481, at 267-68. 
507. For comprehensive descriptions of the unsuccessful attempts to site hazardous waste 
facilities in Massachusetts, see Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 815-18 
and Wheeler, supra note 481, at 259-61. 
508. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 818; Wheeler, supra note 
481, at 261-64. 
509. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 244. 
510. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 821. 
511. · As Professor Wheeler notes, "The magnitude of such costs may vary markedly with 
both the type of facility and the setting in which it operates, but there should be little question 
about the existence of such costs." Wheeler, supra note 481, at 248. 
512. See, e.g., Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 789. 
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1. Promoting Effective Public Participation 
The relative failure of the negotiated compensation statutes may 
be traced in large part to deficiencies in involving the affected commu-
nity in the decision-making process. The statutes have been widely 
perceived as hampering consensual decision making, largely because 
communities believe their opportunity to participate in the siting pro-
cess is not meaningful. As a result, they have resisted projects from 
the outset; as one commentator stated recently, this resistance was en-
tirely rational.513 
Similarly, states with voluntary cleanup programs fail to en-
courage direct communication among developers, state regulators, 
and representatives of the affected community.514 Although there has 
been considerable focus on relaxing cleanup standards and providing 
for liability releases, little attention has been paid to issues related to 
public participation.515 Indeed, providing for effective public partici-
pation is often viewed as a potential deterrent to redevelopment activ-
ities. As experience with the negotiated compensation statutes has 
shown, this could not be further from the truth. The voluntary 
cleanup programs are likely to encounter public resistance precisely 
because they do not provide an opportunity for meaningful public 
participation. 
Negotiated compensation statutes establish mechanisms to deal 
with a number of fundamental public participation issues. Thus, the 
comparison between the two types of statutes is not perfect. The 
premise of negotiated compensation statutes is that unless communi-
cation between project developers and communities takes place, few 
facilities can be sited, and the statutes establish mechanisms to facili-
tate that communication. In the case of voluntary cleanup statutes, 
the states operate on the premise that timely and meaningful commu-
nication is largely unnecessary, and, as a result, provide weak mecha-
nisms for community involvement. Nevertheless, the primary lesson 
of experience with negotiated compensation statutes applies equally 
to voluntary cleanup programs: if communities do not view opportu-
nities for participation as meaningful, even meritorious projects will 
encounter resistance. 
To illustrate this proposition, this subpart examines the public 
participation provisions of Michigan's voluntary cleanup program, 
which provide a typical process for community input. The brownfield 
redevelopment process in Michigan calls for the developer to assess 
513. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 274. 
514. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that 
the panel on "A New Stakeholder Empowerment" discussed "the failure of many existing stat-
utes and policies to encourage direct communication between the local community and the deci-
sion makers"). 
515. Id. at 33 (quoting the statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, Na-
tional Wildlife Federation). 
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contamination at the site and notify the state of proposed cleanup ac-
tivities. 516 The statute provides for public input at the investigation 
stage only for sites where the state is spending cleanup funds or where 
the state decides there is "significant public interest";517 neither of 
these is likely to be the case at most brownfield sites.518 Public input 
is required, however, on cleanup plans at sites where developers pro-
pose to meet generic statewide standards. Michigan, like a number of 
other states, provides that the state may develop a number of specific 
categories of generic cleanup standards, including "commercial," "in-
dustrial," and "limited" categories such as "limited industrial."519 The 
developer has the option to choose the cleanup category, subject only 
to state approval.520 Before the state approves a remedial action plan 
consisting of a cleanup to meet a generic standard, it must, at a mini-
mum, provide for notice and comment,521 and hold a public meeting if 
the municipality or local health department requests one.522 The state 
also may hold a public meeting if it determines such a meeting is ap-
propriate. 523 With its approval of the remedial action plan, the state 
must document the comments received and the state's responses to 
"significant" concerns. 524 
516. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126(1)(c) (West Supp. 1996) provides that a pur-
chaser of a brownfield site can avoid liability under the state mini-CERCLA statute by perform-
ing a "baseline environmental assessment." See NEPI BROWNFIELDS Poucy FoRUM 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 40 (quoting David Fink, Partner, Cooper, Fink and Zausner); 
Andrew, supra note 29, at 29. If this assessment reveals the presence of contamination at the 
site, the purchaser must perform cleanup activities or face liability under the state's mini-CER-
CLA law. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20107a (West Supp. 1996). The first step in the reme-
dial process would be the submission of a proposed plan for remedial action. See id. § 324.20118.· 
Occasionally, other states use the same terms as negotiated compensation statutes to de-
scribe the developer's request to enter into the cleanup process. In Pennsylvania, the voluntary 
cleanup process starts with a developer's "notice of intent" to remediate the site to background 
standards. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(e)(l) (West Supp. 1996); see also PENNSYLVANIA 
S1~-MoNTH PRoGREss REPORT, supra note 33, at 6 (describing the "Notice of Intent to Remedi-
ate" as the "initial notice requirement" of the Pennsylvania program). 
517. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20120d(l) (West Supp. 1996). 
518. · In Michigan, state funds are only spent on cleanups of sites listed on the state analogue 
to the NPL. Id. §§ 324.20105, 324.20113(2). According to one commentator, this excludes ~4% 
of all sites from eligibility for state cleanup funding. Anderson, supra note 109, at 24. 
519. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120a(l) (West Supp. 1996). 
520. Id. 
521. Before the state approves a remedial action plan based on categorical criteria, it must 
publish "a notice and brief summary of the proposed remedial action plan," and "[p]rovide for 
public review and comment pertinent to documents relating to the proposed remedial action 
plan, including, if applicable, the feasibility study that outlines alternative remedial action meas-
ures considered." Id. § 324.20120d(3)(a)-(b). 
522. Id. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) provides that the state must hold a public meeting if any 
one of the following occur: 
(i) The department determines that there is a significant public interest or that for any other 
reason a public meeting is appropriate. . 
(ii) A city, township, or village in which the facility is located, by a majority vote of its 
governing body, requests a public meeting. 
(iii) A local health department with jurisdiction in the area in which the facility is located 
requests a public meeting. 
523. Id. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i). 
524. Id. § 324.20120d(5). 
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a. The Role of the Affected Community 
There is considerable agreement that a voluntary cleanup pro-
gram's success depends on meaningful input by the surrounding com-
munity in decisions on site uses and cleanup activities.525 The 
community often has concerns about a project's potential for eco-
nomic development.526 In addition, complex judgments must be made 
about the acceptable level of risks to health and safety in a commu-
nity. 527 Relaxing cleanup standards at brownfield sites may lower 
cleanup costs for developers and speed up cleanups, but it also shifts 
health risks to the neighboring communities.528 Legislatures529 and 
commentators530 often state explicitly that the voluntary cleanup stat-
utes codify a tradeoff of increased health risk for new jobs and in-
creased tax revenues. To take just one example, some states allow a 
525. The recommendation of several panelists at the National Environmental Policy Insti-
tute 's brownfield policy forum, for example, is to "[e]ncourage early participation with local 
community stakeholders in establishing the level of cleanup and devising redevelopment plans." 
NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 10; see id. at 34 (quoting 
the statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that "[s]takeholder empower-
ment [at brownfield sites] is not a luxury, as many people think, it has to be done to get an 
effective program going"). Among the commentators advocating early participation by the com-
munity are McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772, and Solo, supra note 23, at 319. See also Andrew, 
supra note 29, at 31 (stating that "[t]here is general agreement that community support is neces-
sary to succeed with a voluntary cleanup"); Frisman, supra note 383 (citing a statement by Don-
ald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that "[c]leanup 
plans must be prepared in the full light of day, with adequate opportunity for affected citizens to 
... voice their concerns and suggest improvements"); cf. Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra note 474, 
at 89 (concluding that if "local residents and community organizations are not actively involved 
in the [empowerment zone-enterprise community] initiative's economic, political, and social 
goals, the (initiative] is likely to repeat the costly failures of its precursors"). 
526. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9. 
527. Of course, the question of !'acceptable risk" to the community has wide-ranging moral, 
political, and scientific dimensions. See generally ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND v AL-
UES IN RISK MANAGEMENT (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) [hereinafter 
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT (1983); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks 
Through Law, 30 JuRIMETRICS J. 271 (1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and 
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995). 
528. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767. Professor Tondro expresses the challenge as 
follows: 
If we establish a given level of pollution as the maximum acceptable, and have clear and 
well established procedures for accomplishing a clean-up to those levels, any flexibility ben-
efitting the owner or lender will shift the environmental risk from that person to someone 
else-to the public, if the DEP pays for the clean-up, to the neighbors if the site does not 
have to be cleaned up as much as before, or to a future developer if a full clean-up can be 
postponed. 
Tondro, supra note 20, at 798-99. 
529. Legislative findings frequently specify that a voluntary cleanup program intends to alter 
the relative risk calculus to consider future land uses. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 51 
58(1) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that "[i]t is the intent of this Title ... [t]o establish a risk-
based system of remediation based on protection of human health and the environment relative 
to present and future uses of the site"). 
530. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 154 (praising the Michigan approach of allowing stan-
dards for carcinogens to be set at a health risk of 1in100,000 which "trad[es] a slightly greater 
health risk for the prospect of jobs and taxes"). 
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developer to clean up a site to meet a site-specific standard set at a 
level of cancer risk higher than a 1 in 1,000,000 lifetime risk.531 The 
opportunity for developers to relax cleanup standards based on the 
proposed land use is particularly troubling in this respect. Limiting 
the future of a site to industrial or commercial uses532 may be viewed 
as turning the community into a "sacrifice zone" where residents are 
forced to live with industry in their midst for the foreseeable future.533 
Many states attempt to prevent future site conversions to residential 
uses without.additional cleanup activities.534 But a community may 
want the first cleanup to anticipate a future conversion to residential 
uses. It may reject the use of engineering or institutional controls as 
unprotective.535 It may believe a cleanup should anticipate future 
uses of the site536 or decide that it wants a cleanup to residential levels 
of contamination because it is difficult to predict what use a site will 
be put to in the future.537 Moreover, if a cleanup fails, the community 
will have to shoulder some or all of the additional cleanup costs; in the 
531. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767 (criticizing this aspect of the Ohio scheme). 
532. This will occur, for example, in states such as Michigan that specify different cleanup 
standards for sites to be used for industrial and residential purposes, with the latter being more 
strict. See, e.g., M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.20120a (West Supp. 1996). 
533. See, e.g., Robinson Testimony, supra note 455; Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 767; Swan-
ston, supra note 123, at 568; Casserly, supra note 26, at 272 (suggesting that some might view 
reduced cleanup standards for industrial zones as a "loophole"); Solo, supra note 23, at 310 
(stating that "[p]roposals which simply call for differentiated standards based on [the] designated 
use [of a brownfield site] may not provide adequate protection to eurrent and potential residents 
of urban industrial areas"); Evans, supra note 159 (citing the statement in the minority report in 
Maryland that a "[c]leanup based on background levels would be particularly unacceptable for 
79 percent of industrial properties that are located near residential communities," and should 
"be allowed only when there is buy-in from the communities that live near and work at the 
site"). 
534. See supra note 343 and accompanying text; see also Tondro, supra note 20, at 799 
(describing the proposal in Connecticut to require additional cleanups when a commercial or 
industrial site is converted in the future to residential use). 
535. The Environmental Defense Fund's Karen Fiorini addressed the potential for the use 
of engineering and institutional controls at Superfund sites: 
Engineering controls can fail: fences can fall down, fallible human beings can disregard 
institutional controls (as, for example, the Niagara School Board disregarded the "do not 
excavate" notice in the deed by which Hooker Chemical conveyed Love Canal to the town-
ship of Niagara). Because excluding people by fencing and perhaps paving sites will gener-
ally be far cheaper than actually cleaning them up enough to allow productive use, Title I of 
ROSA is a recipe for creation of dead zones-a result fundamentally at odds with the pur-
poses of Titles III and IX of the same bill, to •·return ... contaminated sites to economically 
productive or other beneficial uses" .... 
Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 275 & n.14; see also Swanston, supra note 123, at 570 
(criticizing proposals to use remedies other than permanent remedies). 
536. See, e.g., Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 18 (stating that "[t]hose addressing the 
Brownfields problem should plan not only for a site's initial cleanup and reuse, but also for the 
subsequent reuses of the site and the buildings on it"). 
537. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 275-76 (pointing out that "redevelop-
ment often occurs in ways that may not be easily anticipated. Who would have envisioned hous-
ing on the site of the old Denver airport, or rapid redevelopment for residential use of formerly 
industrial properties in Minneapolis?"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 568. 
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view of some observers, this lends added urgency to making the first 
cleanup a thorough one. 538 
The legitimacy of a voluntary cleanup program depends to a great 
extent on whether the program provides the community a voice in 
making these judgments.539 This is especially true for minority and 
lower-income communities where brownfield sites are concentrated. 
As the environmental justice movement has vividly illustrated, these 
communities are often excluded from decisions that can profoundly 
affect their health and quality of life.540 Some commentators have ad-
vanced the proposition that voluntary cleanup statutes may foster an 
equitable solution to the urban redevelopment problem, suggesting it 
is inequitable to leave brownfield sites abandoned.541 But brownfield 
redevelopment strategies may perpetuate environmental inequities by 
538. See, e.g., Maryland Proposal, supra note 159. 
539. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that ··community groups ... 
expect some assurance that remediation will adequately protect their health and the environ-
ment"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 569; Frisman, supra note 383 (citing a statement by Donald 
S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that "reducing public 
input could undermine confidence in the new system," because a community will resist any at-
tempt by the state to "hand over the fate of public resources to private interests without giving 
the public even a minimal opportunity to [make) comments"). 
540. The ·•environmental justice" movement is a rapidly growing coalition that focuses on 
inequities associated with the current distribution of environmental hazards, particularly the dis-
proportionate imposition of these burdens on minority and lower-income communities. See 
BUNYON BRYANT & PAUL MOHAI, RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: 
A TIME FOR D1scouRsE (1992); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST CoMM'N FOR RACIAL JusncE, 
Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable 
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1383 (1994); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the 
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, 
Environmental Racism and 'Invisible' Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1037 (1994); Robert D. 
Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1993, at 23; 
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Means to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environ-
mental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A 
Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1992); James H. 
Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENvn.. L.J. 125 (1994); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmen-
tal Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": 
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993); Naikang 
Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting 
of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U.L. REv. 366 (1992); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Une-
qual Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 52. 
A common criticism advanced by environmental justice advocates is that the environmental 
protection laws designed to redress inequities fail to allow for effective participation by affected 
communities. See, e.g., Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the Name of Environmental Justice: A 
View from State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769 (1995) (stating that "[f)or decades, citizens 
bearing the brunt of our collective environmental insults have been excluded from environmen-
tal decision making affecting their lives"); Solo, supra note 23, at 289. 
541. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73 (stating that the "[f)ailure to clean these sites per-
petuates the existence of health hazards in depressed urban regions"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 45 (stating that "[w)hile ... decisions [to shun brownfield sites] may be 
justified as economically efficient, their consequences are equally pernicious to inner-city com-
munities as are the more traditional forms of environmental racism allegedly occurring in siting 
decisions"); Solo, supra note 23, at 289 n.21 (claiming that the existence of brownfields creates 
"additional unfairness" for inner-city residents). 
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increasing the high degree of risk that affected communities are al-
ready forced to bear.542 In lower-income or minority communities, 
environmental justice advocates who view streamlined and lenient 
cleanup processes as adding to the community's environmental bur-
den may be on a "collision course" with brownfield redevelopment 
proponents. 543 
Thus, communication between the developer and community will 
often be indispensable to a project's success.544 At the same time, 
there is widespread discomfort on the part of developers about ad-
dressing issues related to public participation and environmental jus-
tice.545 The historical ignorance and distrust of developers and 
residents for each other fuels tension among stakeholders.546 Com-
munity involvement can enhance a project's chances of success,547 but 
it creates risks for developers. Soliciting the community's input takes 
time548 and may threaten to delay the project or prompt a developer 
542. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 758 (stating that "low income, urban communities have a 
higher rate of exposure to industrial pollutants because they tend to be in close proximity to the 
industries that emit these toxins"); Swanston, supra note 123, at 566; see also Andrew, supra 
note 29, at 31 ("A developer's interest is in cleaning up the site just enough so that. it can be 
redeveloped as an industrial facility. Certain public interest groups claim that this approach 
perpetuates the disproportionate impact of urban industrial pollution on the economically 
disadvantaged."). 
543 .. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that ."[c]ommunities that demand self-
determination will rally against projects imposed on them without their consent"); id. at 780 
(stating that "[t]he interest groups battling in the area of brownfields are on the verge of a head-
on collision"); Solo, supra note 23, at 325 (citing a number of environmental justice advocates 
for the proposition that "[t]he general public may prefer to have property sit idle (and even 
contaminated) than to have their tax dollars used to profit private individuals who have no obli-
gation to benefit the community"). McWilliams, supra note 20, at 707, states:_ 
One group seeks to attract potentially hazardous industries back to urban "brownfields" 
while the other strives to shut them out. One group seeks to lower cleanup standards in 
urban areas, a policy that the other denounces as racist. One group seeks to streamline . 
government oversight while the other wants to expand opportunities for public 
participation. 
544. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9-10. 
545. NEPI BROWNFIEIDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting, that 
"many public officia_ls and potential investors are uncomfortable addressing this issue"); Tondro, 
supra note 20, at 801 (terming public participation the "wild card" of brownfield policy). 
546. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 32; see id. at ~-
35 (quoting the statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that the stake-
holders in brownfield projects "are generally ignorant of each other's needs, are inclined to 
distrust one another, and may even fear each other"). 
547. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 774; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 65; 
Frisman, supra note 383 (citing the statement of Donald S. Strait, Executive Director, Connecti-
cut Fund for the Environment, that when the public is involved in the cleanup process, "[s]tudies 
have shown that people comment in only a small percentage of cases, and that their comments 
. are usually constructive and often help speed the process along"). 
548. NEPI BROWNFIEIDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35. One com-
mentator argues, however, that the time spent on public participation efforts would be out-
weighed by time saved in the development process. Kelly, supra note 540, at 782 (stating that "a 
receptive, informed, non-resistant community outweighs any losses resulting from a time-sensi-
tive development option"). 
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to abandon the project entirely.549 Public ventilation of issues raises 
the possibility that a debate over the project might scuttle it, and local 
politicians often prefer to "balance sensitive environmental and eco-
nomic issues without high profile proceedings. "550 Developers also 
may face tougher cleanups than would otherwise be the case. If the 
community rejects the proposed standard of cleanup as insufficient to 
protect the health of the site's neighbors, it can threaten to stop a 
project. 551 
· b. Public Participation Ex Ante 
There are critical issues associated with public participation in 
making threshold decisions at brownfield sites, such as determining 
the proposed use of the site and cleanup standard. Should the devel-
oper, the community, or the state make these decisions? If, as is fre-
quently the case, the developer controls these decisions, should the 
community have power to veto or modify them? Suppose a developer 
proposes to build a manufacturing plant at a site, and residents living 
immediately nearby reject reindustrialization as "repollution."552 If 
the affected community wants a park or a hospital to be located on a 
brownfield site, not another polluting industry, should that desire be 
honored?553 If a developer chooses a cleanup to a statewide health 
standard for soil and residents reject that choice as not protective 
549. NEPI BROWNF1ELDS POLICY FoRUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that 
"[p)rotracted conflicts among [local residents, developers, and regulators) can cause the 'window 
of opportunity' for a redevelopment project to close"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 773. At 
the National Environmental Policy Institute's brownfield policy forum, Mary Gade, Director of 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, was asked "whether investors would still prefer 
greenfields to brownfields if public participation requirements were too onerous." Her response 
implied that Illinois does not mandate public participation for this reason. NEPI BROWNFIELDS 
POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 24. 
550. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775. 
551. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting the 
statement of Edwin "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc., that residents "already have the 
power to ignore, to delay, to interfere, or to negate"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that 
"communities that demand the right to participate in every level of decision making will resist 
efforts to streamline or privatize the cleanup process"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 766 (not-
ing that environmental justice advocates can mobilize community opposition to redevelopment 
projects that rely on inequitable standards for cheaper site remediation); O'Reilly, Indiana's 
Incentives, supra note 24, at 65-66. 
552. Patricia Williams, the legislative representative for the National Wildlife Federation, 
recently testified before a municipal forum that not all communities want to participate in clean-
ing up a brownfield site only to see another type of industry move in. She stated that many 
affected communities did not want "repollution," but instead want "parks and hospitals on those 
sites." Brownfields: Contaminated Site Cleanups Solve Only Some Problems in Urban Areas, 
Haz. Waste News, May 29, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407245; see also NEPI 
BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (quoting the statement of 
Patricia Williams that "[y]ou would be amazed at how many people think of re-industrialization 
as 're-pollution"'). 
553. The community often may expect to have input in this decision. See OTA STATE OF 
THE STATES, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that "[w)hen considering the prospects for site redevel-
opment, community members may feel that they have a stake in the type of activity that is 
planned for the property"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770 (stating that "communities that insist on 
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enough, should the developer have to perform additional cleanup ac-
tivities? The timing of community input is an important considera-
tion. Community participation would be merely symbolic if 
opportunities for public involvement came after significant decisions 
had already been made.ss4 
Michigan largely ignores these questions, joining the vast major-
ity of states that provide for public participation only after a remedial 
action plan is prepared.sss Indeed, no state other than California ex-
tends any power to the affected community to affect threshold deci-
sions. ss6 Moreover, certain critical decisions such as the choice of an 
appropriate cleanup standard are, by design, removed from commu-
nity scrutiny. Experience with the negotiated compensation statutes 
suggests. that these features of voluntary cleanup programs may foster 
community resistance to brownfield redevelopment projects. · 
i. · Decisions About Project Siting and Proposed Land Uses 
, A developer always faces difficult decisions in assessing how 
much of its plans it should reveal to a community and when it should 
do so.ss7 If a developer approaches a community with an incomplete 
proposal, the community may suspect that the developer is withhold-
.ing information or is contriving to change its plans.sss In some cases, 
the developer may risk losing the. project to a rival developer that 
takes advantage of its groundwork.ss9 • 
. Negotiated compensation statutes recognize this by allowing de-
velopers to make initial decisions about facility locations. In Massa-
chusetts, for example, the process begins when a developer submits a 
"notice of intent" with accompanying documentation about a pro-
posed site.s60 But to communities, decisions to site facilities in their 
midst "seem[ ] more like a preemptive strike than an invitation to 
redevelopment consistent with their neighborhood vision will demand participation in redevel· 
.. opment decisions before· a project is packaged for public review") . 
. 554. See, e.g., NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (cit-
ing the statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation, 
that "[g]oing in early is particularly important, as many local stakeholders will need time to 
become familiar with the issues and form their own opinions"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 
773-74 (labeling public participation under these terms a "hoax"). 
555. Indiana, for example, mandates public involvement only in commenting on a proposed 
voluntary remediation work plan. IND. CODE ANN.§ 13-25-5-ll(b) (WESTLAW through end of 
1996 2d Reg. Sess.); Survey Results, supra note 158; cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 
(stating that under the current Superfund law, "citizen participation in the cleanup process is not 
mandated to occur until after EPA has selected a proposed cleanup plan-well after critical and 
often irreversible cleanup decisions are made"). 
556. Rhode Island, as.noted later, provides for public input at an early stage; however, its 
"environmental equity and public participation" process does not mandate involvement other 
than notice and comment opportunities. See infra notes 573-77 and accompanying text. 
557. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 265. 
558. Id. (commenting on reasons why waste facility developers approached communities 
with fully formed proposals). 
559. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 757 (1986). 
560. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264. 
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negotiate."561 Not surprisingly, many communities react as if they 
have only two options: to accept projects or resist them.562 In Massa-
chusetts, this has prompted communities to spurn the negotiations en-
visioned by the statute563 and choose instead to resist projects as 
assaults on self-determination. 564 One commentator explains that the 
Massachusetts statute failed to recognize that communities instinc-
tively resist proposals in which they had no input, regardless of their 
merits.565 This defensive posture has been exacerbated by the percep-
tion that the state has approved a project: in Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, when proposals received rapid threshold determinations from the 
state that they were "feasible and deserving," communities perceived 
that the state had already approved them. Communities readily ob-
serve that a developer who has secured financing and passed initial 
reviews has a vested interest in the project.566 
Thus, communities may react to proposed brownfield redevelop-
ment projects in the same fashion as communities facing the negoti-
ated compensation process did: by resisting them due to a lack of 
input in threshold decisions.567 As noted above, Michigan, like virtu-
ally every other state that requires public participation, defers input 
from the community until the developer formulates a remedial action 
plan. Therefore, when a community first becomes involved in a 
brownfield redevelopment project, three critical decisions will already 
have been made: the decision to develop the site, the proposed use of 
the site, and the proposed cleanup standard. If the community per-
561. Id. 
562. Professor Wheeler describes this "defensive posture" as follows: 
From the outset, the law cast communities in a defensive posture, forcing them to cope with 
unfamiliar regulations and to respond to proposals which they neither solicited nor desired. 
Residents and officials in both Haverhill and Warren first learned that they had been 
targeted for hazardous waste facilities through press conferences the developers held in 
Boston. 
Id. at 259-60. 
563. See Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 815; Wheeler, supra note 
481, at 261. 
564. For example, when officials in Haverhill learned that a developer intended to site a 
facility there, they promptly sued the state Siting Council. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, 
supra note 482, at 816; Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264-65. 
565. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 264-65; see also Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra 
note 482, at 791 (stating that "[s]tudies show that risks a community assumes voluntarily are 
more likely to be accepted than those foisted upon a community"); McWilliams, supra note 20, 
at 766. ., 
566. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 773 (discussing this feature of brownfield redevelop-
ment ); cf. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266. 
567. Several commentators have already suggested this as a possible reaction. See Kelly, 
supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 710 (stating that "much of the resistance to 
(brownfield redevelopment] projects probably stems from a community's experience that deci-
sions about its future are made by others, leaving residents with only two options: resignation or 
resistance"). 
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ceives that it has no opportunity to influence these decisions, projects 
may be thwarted by local resistance.568 
Consider the community's reaction to a hypothetical proposal to 
clean a site in Michigan to meet a generic cleanup standard for "indus-
trial" ·purposes. The decision to specify the industrial use already has 
been made by the developer in its proposed remedial action plan with 
no community input. Limiting the community's freedom to determine 
the use to which a site will be put invites criticism that uses other than 
industrial uses have been precluded.569 This is particularly true when 
the cleanup is proposed to be based on a cleanup standard that the 
state already has approved. The proposed use of the site is tied· to a 
specific cleanup standard, and the community may perceive that by 
approving the generic cleanup standards, the state has "approved" the 
proposed level of cleanup. Like the "feasible and deserving" determi-
nation in the Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute, the 
state's threshold approval of a cleanup standard seems likely to pro-
voke a response that the project has received the state's. endorse-
ment.570 Other states make threshold decisions such as determining 
that an application is "complete" that may have the same unintended 
impact.571 
There are two appropriate responses to this concern. First, states 
such as Michigan should modify their programs to involve communi-
ties in the decision-making process before decisions are made to rede-
velop brownfield sites.572 Rhode Island, in a section of its statute 
entitled "Environmental equity and public participation," attempts to 
do this.573 The state is required to "develop and implement a process 
to ensure community involvement throughout the investigation and 
568. See Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 757 (stating that "[a]ny 
attempt to impose redevelopment on ... a community without community consent ... is more 
likely to face inspired opposition"). 
569. See, e.g., Swanston, supra note 123, at 568. It also invites speculation about how sites 
will be used many years after initial cleanups are completed. Thus, an environmental problem 
may be transferred to future generations, which forces us to consider the nature of our obliga-
tions to them. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 482, at 825; Swanston, supra 
note 123, at 568. 
570. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 266 n.100 (stating that "[a]lthough this procedure (the 'fea-
sible and deserving' screening] was intended merely as a threshold to be crossed before the 
agency could award technical assistance to a community, the unfortunate choice of statutory 
language made the 'feasible and deserving' designation seem like a hasty endorsement of the 
proposal"). 
571. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-4 (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) 
{determination of program eligibility); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 75-10-736(1) (1995) ("complete-
ness" review); VT. STAT. ANN.§ 6615a(e)(2) (Supp. 1996) (determination of eligibility); see also 
Survey Results, supra note 158 (regarding the Indiana and Montana provisions). 
572. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 711 (stating that 
"I conclude that those most impacted by redevelopment should be involved early in planning 
redevelopment projects and in promoting neighborhood sites to attract projects consistent with 
the community's development vision"). 
573. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.14-5 (Supp. 1995). 
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remediation of contaminated sites."574 That process is to be coordi-
nated with a notice and comment opportunity already required for the 
proposed settlement agreement.575 Such notice must be given to 
nearby residents when a site investigation is proposed and when it is 
deemed complete.576 The state is also required to make public 
records about the site investigation and cleanup process available to 
the community.577 
Although this effort is commendable, it is insufficient to ensure 
meaningful input by the community in threshold decisions. Neither 
Michigan nor Rhode Island has structured a decision-making process 
that gives a community the ability to help define the scope of redevel-
opment activities early in the planning process;578 at present, Rhode 
Island merely provides another notice opportunity. A better proposal 
to empower the community would involve the community in the site's 
planning process and accord substantial deference to the community's· 
recommendation regarding the proposed land use. 
Second, the states should provide for public review of the initial 
screening processes, such as decisions on the "completeness" of a de-
veloper's application. This will help alleviate the perception that the 
state has "approved" a project. 
ii. Issues Precluded from Community Scrutiny 
Another criticism of the negotiated compensation statutes is that 
certain decisions are deliberately removed from public scrutiny. The 
primary decision treated in this fashion is any consideration of the 
need for the waste facility, which the community often views as the 
single most important issue to be discussed. Massachusetts and Wis-
consin preclude the developer and community from negotiating this 
issue, on the theory that if the community could open discussion on it, 
the negotiations would quickly reach a stalemate. This, however, ig-
nores the possibility that the community would find the resulting con-
straint on the negotiation process to limit its ability to provide 
meaningful input. Not surprisingly, this was one factor in leading 
communities to shun the statutory negotiation process. 
The analogue in the voluntary cleanup context is the community's 
lack of an opportunity to influence the development of a cleanup stan-
dard, particularly a statewide generic cleanup standard. Having the 
ability to help determine the appropriate level of cleanup at a brown-
field site has been identified as the single most important issue for 
574. Id. 
575. Id. §§ 23-19.14-5, -11. 
576. Id. § 23-19.14-5(a), (c). 
577. Id. § 23-19.14-S(b). 
578. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772-73, identifies this as a central characteristic of a 
"community-responsive" voluntary cleanup program; see also Kelly, supra note 540, at 770. 
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many communities.579 But the voluntary cleanup statutes substitute 
critical decisions at the state level for local, site-specific decisions. 
Consider again the hypothetical developer in Michigan who elects to 
clean the property to meet a cleanup standard set for the "industrial" 
category. Limiting the required level of cleanup to that prescribed in 
a generic standard necessarily precludes a local decision to require a 
stricter cleanup. This, of course, is the raison d'etre of the gep.eric 
standard: its certainty and predictability in preempting local varia-
tions in cleanup requirements. Thus, Michigan provides no mecha-
nism for a community to challenge the decision to choose a cleanup to 
a statewide health standard,580 and industrial groups can sway cleanup 
decisions for years to come by influencing the development of a state-
wide health standard.581 
Proponents of voluntary cleanup programs tout the generic state-
wide cleanup standards as streamlining regulatory oversight. How-
ever, they have overlooked the potential that a community might 
resist a brownfield redevelopment project because it rejects cleanup 
standards set at different levels for different communities.582 Cleanup 
standards set at a statewide basis at levels less than those of CERCLA 
also invite a characterization that the state is discriminating against a 
community.583 Again, the appropriate remedy is to modify the statu-
tory approach to involve the community in making the fundamental 
decision about applicable cleanup standards at a brownfield site. 
c. Public Participation Ex Post 
A favorable response from the community to a proposed brown-
field redevelopment project that involves risks is more likely when 
legitimate representatives of neighborhood interests have been in-
579. See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 29, at 31 (stating that "(t]he primary concern of these 
public interest groups (and citizens] is the level of contamination allowed to remain after the 
cleanup is certified as complete."); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 
764. 
580. If a community objected to a proposed remedial action plan on this basis, the state 
would almost certainly be required to respond to this as a "significant" concern. M1cH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(5) (West Supp. 1996). But there is no requirement that the state re-
quire a stricter cleanup. 
581. See Solo, supra note 23, at 317 n.176 (stating that "(s]tates which allow for varying 
degrees of cleanup and little public participation could more easily use favoritism and politics to 
determine which plans are 'beneficial' and what standards of cleanup are required"). 
582. See, e.g., Robinson Testimony, supra note 455; Swanston, supra note 123, at 568-69. 
583. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 20, at 764; Tondro, supra note 20, at 801; Frisman, 
supra note 383 (citing a statement by Donald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut 
Fund for the Environment, criticizing lenient cleanup standards for industrial and commercial 
uses, warning that "the standards could be perceived as founded on a disregard for the health of 
occupants of these areas, which are often inhabited by lower-income groups and minorities~'). 
Professor Tondro claims, however, that the political pressure to do a "complete" cleanup might 
be deflected by applying formal, numerical, nondiscriminatory standards. Tondro, supra note 20, 
at 801-02. 
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volved in a meaningful decision-making process.584 Defining the "af-
fected community" and selecting its representatives requires a great 
deal of care, particularly in view of the environmental justice move-
ment's claims about exclusion from participation in decision-making 
processes. A system of public participation is problematic if it re-
quires the community to evaluate a project's risks in too short a time 
frame. In addition, the weight given to community representatives' 
recommendations is of paramount concern, because public participa-
tion is meaningless if a developer is free to disregard community in-
put. Finally, if the disparity in access to technical and financial 
resources renders it difficult for the community to make an informed 
decision, that too is problematic.585 
Each of these have been exposed as weaknesses of ex post deci-
sion making under the negotiated compensation statutes, and each 
finds an analogue in the voluntary cleanup programs' systems of pub-
lic participation. Again, a discussion of the Michigan statute and 
others will illustrate the similarities. 
i. Threshold Conditions on Participation and Designation of 
Community Representatives 
Michigan's public participation provisions, like those of a number 
of other states, differ from those of the negotiated compensation stat-
utes in one significant respect: they impose threshold conditions on 
public participation. The state may hold a public hearing if it decides 
to do so, but it must hold one if the elected representatives of the 
community or the local health department request it.586 This provi-
sion is comparable to Pennsylvania's provision conditioning public 
584. See McWilliams, supra note 20, at 714; Frisman, supra notP. 383 (citing a statement by 
Donald S. Strait, Executive Director of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, that 
"[n]eighbors are more likely to stall or block approval of a cleanup if they have no formal oppor-
tunities to be heard that [sic] if they do"). 
585. Despite recent efforts by the EPA, urban communities continue to lack basic informa-
tion about the nature of the hazardous waste problems in their communities. See OFFICE OF 
POI.ICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AND AGENCY FOR 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHEMICAL RISKS IN Six COMMUNmES: ANALYSIS OF A 
BASELINE SURVEY 53 (1990) [hereinafter EPA/ATSDR BASELINE SURVEY] (concluding that 
survey respondents have a "low level of perceived knowledge" about chemical risks in their 
areas); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278. 
586. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1996); cf DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, § 9112 (WESTLAW through end of 1st Special Sess. of the 138th General Assembly, 
1995) (providing for a public hearing "if the Secretary receives a meritorious request ... from 
any person on the proposed consent decree and the proposed plan of remedial action"); IND. 
CoDE ANN.§ 13-25-5-ll(c) (WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. Sess.) (providing that if 
the state receives at least one written request during the notice and comment period, a public 
hearing may be held); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 75-10-735(2) (1995) (providing for a hearing upon a 
written request by "10 or more persons, by a group composed of 10 or more members, or by a 
local governing body of a city, town or county"); see also Survey Results, supra note 158 (regard-
ing the Indiana and Montana provisions). 
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participation on a request by the affected municipality.587 The ulti-
mate condition precedent to public participation, of course, exists in 
those states with no specific provisions for mandatory community 
input. 
Given the broad consensus that public participation is desirable, 
the imposition of threshold conditions on participation is. wholly un-
warranted. This is particularly true of statutes such as Michigan's that 
place decisions about whether hearings should take place in the hands 
of local officials. Although some have suggested that brownfield sites 
pose issues of interest to a city as a whole,588 there is no guarantee 
that a city's elected representatives represent the specific views of the 
community that abuts a proposed development site.589 If the affected 
community is represented primarily (or, in this case, exclusively) by 
elected officials, significant questions arise as to whether they would 
consider fundamental questions about the distributional consequences 
of a brownfield project.590 In this respect and others, states such as 
Michigan have failed to provide for a genuine forum for articulating 
the affected community's concerns, because they do not mandate that 
the developer communicate directly with specific members of the af-
fected community, other than by notice and comment opportunities or 
public hearings. This is likely to provoke criticism from the commui:ii-
ties most directly affected by the projects; Professor Wheeler, for ex-
ample, cites a definition of a "public hearing" as "an event where the 
public speaks and the officials don't listen."591 
Moreover, having a voice in remedial decisions does not neces-
sarily give the community a stake in the future of a project. Michigan, 
like several other states, requires nothing beyond responding to public 
comments and taking those comments into account.592 Without an en-
forceable right to have their input considered in the process, commu-
nities could perceive that their recommendations will be disregarded 
by the developers and states. There is an asymmetry in the value put 
on parties' input. Although the states provide sc:ant assurances that 
587. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996). 
588. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 33 (quoting 
Charles Graves, Director of Planning, Baltimore, MD). 
589. Id. (quoting Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federa-
tion) ("We cannot afford to presume that everyone in federal, state, or local government is going 
to empower these communities and make sure that these stakeholders are active participants in 
the remediation process.") 
590. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in Proposals for Facility Siting, 5 Mo. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13 (1993-94) [hereinafter Been, Conceptions of Fairness]; cf Fiorini 
Testimony, supra note 448, at 277 (criticizing § 102 of the Reform of Superfund Act, which would 
amend CERCLA § 121(f)(l)(D) to provide that "only elected officials-not the community as a 
whole-get to have their views 'considered' in remedy selection" at Superfund sites). 
591. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 246 (quoting the definition advanced by the Citizens' 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste). 
592. In Michigan, for example, the state is required to develop a document summarizing 
significant public comments and how the state addressed them. M1cli. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20120d(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1996); cf statutes cited at note 393 and accompanying text. 
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the community can have its views considered, the developer is given 
every reason to believe its decisions will find favor with the state. In 
addition to informal assurances of lax enforcement, developers enjoy 
the benefits of provisions such as those deeming their reports ap-
proved unless the state acts within a specified time frame.593 
For brownfield projects to succeed, the members of the affected 
community must be partners throughout the entire redevelopment 
process.594 At the National Environmental Policy Institute's recent 
policy forum, one panelist stated that redevelopment efforts require 
the willing cooperation of the community, which includes agreement 
on a "common plan for redevelopment."595 
ii. Time Limits and the Perils of Turning to ADR 
Both voluntary cleanup statutes and negotiated compensation 
statutes impose severe time limits on public participation. Under the 
Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute, the waste facility de-
veloper could request arbitration within sixty days of the commence-
ment of negotiations if an impasse was reached.596 Professor Wheeler 
states that the quick recourse to arbitration in the Massachusetts stat-
ute prompted residents in communities selected to host waste facilities 
to act as if they were taking part in "gun-point negotiation."597 If the 
experience with these statutes is instructive, members of the public 
who want to have input on the scope of brownfields redevelopment 
projects may feel as if they have little meaningful input in the decision. 
The time limits set on public participation in the voluntary 
cleanup statutes, particularly the brief notice and comment periods, 
invite comparison. The period of review of a developer's proposal is 
often as short as fifteen days.598 This is a woefully insufficient" period 
to review the project. There is no guarantee that the members of the 
community will receive notices that are printed in a newspaper or 
placed in a library. The required form of notice is likely to be useless 
593. See supra note 377. 
594. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13 (stating the 
common recommendation that "[e]xisting reform proposals should enhance the level of commu-
nity participation by enacting requirements for early public involvement in the cleanup and rede-
velopment decisions"); Kelly, supra note 540, at 770; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 766 (calling 
for "collaborative solutions" to brownfield redevelopment); cf Wolf, U.S. Urban Areas, supra 
note 474, at 90 (calling for early public involvement in decision making in the "empowerment 
zone-enterprise communities" initiative). 
595. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting Ed-
win "Toby" Clark, President, Clean Sites, Inc.); cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 
(stating that "the adversely affected community members should determine the future use of any 
Superfund parcel in their community"). 
596. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 271. 
597. Id. at 276. 
598. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. § 6615a(h)(5) (Supp. 1996); cf statutes cited at note 389 and 
accompanying text. 
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to residents whose primary language is not English.599 Even those 
who receive the notice will feel that their options for participation are 
limited. Because the state solicits comments on the full cleanup plan, 
the community must, in that short time period, develop sufficient ex-
pertise to comment on the proposed use of the site, the choice of 
clean.up standards, and other issues. Residents in the communities 
where brownfield sites are located, who typically have not worked 
with state regulators or developers in the past,600 will have little op-
portunity to alter redevelopment proposals. 
In some states, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods 
are a possible means to provide for additional community input. 
ADR has some, useful applications in resolving environmental dis-
putes.601 For example, negotiation over the content of federal regula-
tions (regulatory negotiation, or "reg-neg") is increasingly taking 
place.602 
However, experience under the negotiated compensation statutes 
indicates that it would be counterproductive to turn to ADR in the 
brownfields context. Again, the availability of arbitration under the 
state-negotiated compensation statutes provides an analogy. In Pro-
fessor Wheeler's view, when mediation or arbitration is available 
under a process with severe time constraints, it resembles "conven-
599. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 34 (citing the 
statement of Patricia Williams, Legislative Representative, National Wildlife Federation, that 
"[p]roviding information to the community may require notice in several languages"); Kelly, 
supra note 540, at 783. 
600. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 13. 
601. Joel B. Eisen, Alternative Dispute Resolution in American Environmental Conflicts: A 
Framework for Analysis and Application to Environmental Protection in Israel, in VI A PRESER-
VATION OF OUR WORLD iN THE WAKE OF CHANGE 321 (Y. Steinberger ed., 1996). See generally 
·Richard C. Collins, The Emergence of Environmental Mediation, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. vi-x (1990) 
(discussing the ADR program at the University of Virginia's Institute for Environmental Negoti-
ation, by its Director); Carol Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute 
Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,398 (1984); Frank P. Grad, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157 (1989); Nancy Kubasek 
& Gary Silverman, Environmental Mediation, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 553 (1988); Charlene 
Stukenborg, The Proper Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Environmental Con-
flicts, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1305 (1994). 
602. Regulatory negotiation, or "reg-neg," seeks to create agreement on potentially divisive 
government rules and regulations before they are issued and thus preempt unnecessary or pro-
tracted litigation. See Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 
(1982); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 583-590 (1994), has been the catalyst for increased reg-neg activity by the EPA. See, e.g., 
Chris Kirtz, Regulatory Negotiation: The New Way to Develop Regulations?, ENVTL. PERMIT-
TING, Summer 1992, at 269 (article by the head of the EPA's reg-neg project, describing the 
EPA's successes and failures in reg-neg implementation). Vice Pr~sident Al Gore's "National 
Performance Review" recently recommended that federal agencies put added emphasis on reg-
neg. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A 
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, 
ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULA-
TORY SYSTEMS (1993). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical 
Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994) (criticizing the use of reg-neg). 
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tional collective bargaining in which a neutral party is called in to 
avert a strike."603 As Professor Wheeler notes, "[T]he collective bar-
gaining model offers a poor analogy to siting decisions," because 
third-party neutrals, developers, and communities have no shared his-
tory from which to draw guidance.604 Moreover, a substantial number 
of commentators criticize ADR processes as reducing the influence of 
disadvantaged communities. 605 
Professor Wheeler describes the arbitration provision of the Mas-
sachusetts statute as asymmetrical in its treatment of developers and 
communities.606 A community might perceive that it enjoyed substan-
tial leverage with a developer, because it could proceed to arbitration 
if it was offered too little compensation, but it would have no recourse 
if the arbitrator rejected tl:ie community's position; it would "have to 
swallow the result. "607 On the other hand, the developer always had 
an alternative to accepting an unfavorable decision: it could decide 
not to build the facility if it did not approve of an arbitrator's 
award.608 In practice under the voluntary cleanup statutes, the same is 
likely to be true: developers can walk away from the table if their 
proposals are not accepted, whereas communities cannot appeal unfa-
vorable results. Given this and other limitations of ADR, the states 
should not rely on it in brownfield cleanups. · 
d. Addressing Disparities in Technical and Financial 
Resources 
Finally, if the disparity in access to technical and financial re-
sources renders it difficult for the community to make an informed 
decision, that, too, is problematic. Given the wide range of proposed 
brownfield redevelopment projects, and the complex judgments that 
the community is being asked to make, it is reasonable to ask whether 
the affected community has sufficient information to evaluate the 
projects. Douglas McWilliams, for example, argues that "[b]ecause 
the pathways of risk exposure vary greatly from industry to industry, 
the community needs reliable and adequate information about the 
particular facility proposed in order to assess the increased risk it is 
being asked to accept as compared to the benefits the facility of-
fers. "609 Moreover, little empirical evidence exists on how redevelop-
603. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 270. 
604. Id. 
605. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risks of Prej-
udice in ADR, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers 
for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). 
606. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 272. 
607. Id. 
608. Id. 
609. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 723; see also Kelly, supra note 540, at 777 (stating that "it 
is important to provide communities with the technical assistance that will enable them to know 
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ment projects have worked, so communities may find it difficult to 
learn from the experience of other communities.610 
The states that have allocated substantial sums to developers to 
facilitate cleanups611 provide no funding for communities to perform 
independent health and safety analyses, or even to retain their own 
consultants to review developers' remedial action plans and site inves-
tigations. The states should provide technical and financial resources 
to the community to assist it in performing these functions.612 Profes-
sor Wheeler cautions that in the negotiated compensation context, 
communities used these grants to hire experts who would generate 
studies intended to defeat projects.613 That, however, is not a reason 
to deny communities meaningful rights to assistance under the volun-
tary cleanup statutes. 
2. · Proposals for Adequate Community Input 
For the reasons noted above, states such as Michigan have failed 
to provide for an enforceable right to effective participation by those 
members of the community most directly affected by decisions being 
made in voluntary cleanup programs. Without such a right, notice and 
comment opportunities and public hearings are essentially meaning-
less. 614 A number of different approaches have been proposed for en-
suring the community's input. These include the "community impact 
statement" approach, the creation of nonprofit organizations to per-
form cleanups, and the "community working group" concept. 
a. The Community Impact Statement 
One possible means of soliciting additional community input in 
brownfield redevelopment projects is to allow the community to pre-
pare a statement of a project's environmental impacts. This "commu-
nity impact statement" (CIS) would be similar in purpose to the 
environmental impact statement of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) and its state analogues.615 That is, it would seek to force 
as much as possible, and as much as necessary about the complex regulatory provisions and 
processes that are intrinsic to environmental law and policy"). 
610. Anecdotal evidence of brownfield "success stories" offers some useful information 
(see, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 117-37), but more targeted information will be 
necessary for communities grappling with the difficult issues addressed in specific projects. 
611. See supra notes 395-406 and accompanying text. 
612. This assistance could take the form of "Technical Assistance Grants," similar to those 
given by Massachusetts to qualifying groups of citizens. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, 
§§ 40.1451-.1453 (WESTLAW through Register No. 794); Kelly, supra note 540, at 777-78. 
613. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 268-69. 
614. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 772; cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (criticiz-
ing public participation provisions of CERCLA on similar grounds). · 
615. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); see generally Dinah Bear, The National Environmental 
Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 3. About 26 
states have "little NEPA" statutes. Bear, supra, at 71; see, e.g., California Environmental Qual-
ity Act, CAL Pus. RES. CoDE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1996). NEPA requires that an environmen-
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state regulators and developers to consider environmental impacts of 
their project decisions, such as the community's perception of added 
health risk stemming from the proposed project. The CIS idea has 
already been proposed in environmental justice legislation advanced 
in Congress,616 where, in Professor Been's view, it attempts to reflect a 
"treatment as equals" notion of fairness by trying "to bring the con-
cern shown to poor and minority communities up to par with that al-
ready shown to wealthier and white communities."617 
Environmental impact statements, however, have proven to be 
largely unhelpful in changing agency decisions. As Professor Been 
and a number of others have indicated, experience to date with NEPA 
and the state "little NEPAs" engenders "great dissatisfaction with the 
impact statement as a tool for 'making bureaucracies think. "'618 A 
community impact statement would therefore be unsuccessful in 
prompting regulators and developers to consider the consequences of 
their actions and act accordingly. Another problem is that impact 
statements create only a procedural mandate and confer no rights of 
review of their substance.619 However, legislation creating the obliga-
tion to allow the community to prepare a CIS, unlike NEPA and the 
state "little NEPAs," could feature a substantive component. A resi-
dent of an affected community, for example, could be given an en-
forceable right to challenge decisions such as a state's approval of a 
remedial action plan over the community's objection. In light of the 
prevailing interpretation of NEPA, however, states would almost cer-
tainly not follow this course. For these reasons, the CIS appears un-
likely to promote effective community involvement. 
b. Creating Nonprofit Organizations 
In a number of communities, newly created nonprofit organiza-
tions have become "a popular structure for facilitating the remedia-
tal impact statement (EIS) be prepared for "every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment." NEPA§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also Bear, supra, at 6. 
616. Been, Conceptions of Fairness, supra note 590, at 22. 
617. Id. 
618. Id.; see also Lynton K. Caldwell, A Constitutional Law for the Environment: 20 Years 
with NEPA Indicates the Need, 31 ENv'T 6 (1989) (article by one of NEPA's authors calling for 
an environmental protection amendment to the Constitution to remedy NEPA's shortcomings). 
619. The Supreme Court has constrained the interpretation of NEPA to a procedural man-
date. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978), the Court concluded that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for 
the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." See also Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (holding that NEPA is procedural 
and not substantive); Bear, supra note 615, at 5. As Professor Rodgers observes, "Some observ-
ers believe the procedural nature of the endeavor robs it of consequence and reduces it to a 
paper-pushing formality." RODGERS, supra note 76, § 1.4, at 58. 
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tion and rehabilitation of contaminated sites."62° For example, 
Bartsch and his coauthors describe the efforts of the "Rejuvenate 
Davenport" group in Davenport, Iowa, to reclaim and reuse an aban-
doned manufacturing plant, as a "model of broad-based community 
involvement in reuse projects."621 There is no evidence, however, to 
indicate that these organizations would be more effective than other 
entities at representing residents of the community.622 
c. The Community Working Group Concept 
Deficiencies in the public participation provisions of the volun-
tary cleanup statutes might be alleviated by statutory amendments 
calling for the establishment of "Community Working Groups" 
(CWG) similar to those provided for in H.R. 3800, the CERCLA re-
form proposal that failed to be enacted at the end of the 103d Con-
gress.623 A CWG could be formed either when a state deemed it 
necessary624 or when a sufficient number of citizens requested the 
state to do so.625 In order to facilitate community involvement, the 
state would be required to provide sufficient notice to the community 
by posting notices in the area near the site,626 notifying residents by 
direct mail, and, in some communities, providing doorstep notice of 
program activities. Once a CWG is formed, its responsibilities, as in 
the Superfund context, would be to provide input on actions taken at 
all stages of the voluntary cleanup process, including, for example, the 
designation of a cleanup standard. Although it is unlikely that a CWG 
would reach a consensus about each step in the remedial process, it 
would enable a community to articulate common concerns about 
brownfield projects throughout the decision-making process.627 This 
would meet the environmental justice advocates' desire to allow the 
community to take part in fundamental decisions about its future.628 
620. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775; see, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 131-34 
(describing the efforts of the "Williams Economic Reuse Advisory Board" in overseeing the 
redevelopment of the Williams Air Force Base in Mesa, Arizona). 
621. Charles Bartsch et al., REVIVAL OF CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL Sims: CASE STUDIES 
5 (1992). 
622. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 779. 
623. H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994); see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 774 
(describing the administration's proposal); Solo, supra note 23, at 316 n.160. 
624. The state, for example, might provide that it could establish a CWG on its own initia-
tive if it deemed it to be "in the public interest" to do so. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 324.20120d(3)(c)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the state may hold a public meeting on a 
remedial action plan when it deems that "there is a significant public interest"). 
625. H.R. 3800 directed the establishment of a CWG when either the President determines 
such a group will be helpful or 50 citizens, or at least 20% of the population of the locality in 
which an NPL site is located, requested it. H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994). This 
threshold would be an appropriate one for brownfield sites as well, as it would.ensure the forma-
tion of a CWG when there is a high level of community interest in the proposed project. 
626. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(i)(l) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring this 
form of notice for public meetings on approval of remedial action plans). 
627. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 775. 
628. Id. 
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The CWG would be composed primarily of local residents near 
the proposed site, because their health is directly at risk.629 This 
would avoid the flaw inherent in provisions of the negotiated compen-
sation statutes that specified the composition of local committees. 
The CWG's representatives would be local residents and others most 
directly affected by the project, not elected officials.630 Provisions es-
tablishing the CWGs would require the states to impose a mandatory 
obligation to foster public participation throughout the voluntary 
cleanup process, at each of the important stages of the process from 
project planning through to completion of the cleanup.631 This would 
require the state to allow for the formation of a CWG immediately 
upon receipt of a notice of intent by the developer to enter into the 
voluntary cleanup program. Pennsylvania's statute already allows for 
"the formation of a community-based group which is used to solicit 
suggestions and comments,"632 but this is neither a mandatory obliga-
tion nor required from the commencement of the project. 
Existing statutes should be amended to require consultation with 
the CWG in addition to existing notice and comment and public hear-
ing opportunities at each of the following points in the process: (1) 
determining the planned use of the site; (2) approving the developer's 
application for participation in the program; (3) performing and ap-
proving a Phase I and/or Phase II site investigation; ( 4) approving the 
cleanup standard; (5) approving the remedial action plan; and (6) 
making a decision on extending liability protection to the devel-
oper. 633 In addition, the CWG would have to be consulted any time a 
state official with authority to make significant decisions meets with 
anyone else who would be affected by the decision, and the subject of 
the meeting involves identification, investigation, or remedial activi-
ties at the site.634 
To provide an obligation to consider the CWG's views, the states 
should amend their statutes to follow the "substantial weight" stan-
dard of the 1994 Superfund proposal, a consensus bill that neverthe-
less failed to be enacted into law. That bill directed the EPA to give 
629. H.R. 3800 provided that local residents would make up no less than 50% of a CWG. 
H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1994); see also Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 
(criticizing provisions of the Reform of Superfund Act that would allow fewer than 50% of a 
"Community Assistance Group," the citizens' group formed for purposes of informing 
Superfund decisions, to be local residents). 
630. Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 774 (observing that direct representation is necessary for 
community input to avoid bypassing of community input); cf H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 102 (1994). 
631. Cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (calling for changes to the Reform of 
Superfund Act to "confer on EPA a nondiscretionary obligation to foster community participa-
tion in the process at all significant points in the cleanup process"). 
632. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West Supp. 1996). 
633. Cf Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278 (calling for community participation at 
similar points in the Superfund cleanup process). 
634. Id. (calling for this provision in the Superfund cleanup process). 
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substantial weight in remedial decisions to a consensus recommenda-
tion of a CWG, or, absent a consensus, to the views of the affected 
community.635 This would give the community influence in helping 
make decisions such as one regarding the proposed use of the site.636 
A community that felt aggrieved by a state's decisions would have an 
enforceable right to challenge any or all of the state's actions at an 
individual brownfield site. 
The community also should be given an enforceable right to 
make the most fundamental decision at a brownfield site: the deter-
mination of an applicable cleanup standard. To facilitate this, the 
states should amend their statutes to reverse the existing hierarchy of 
cleanup standards. Unless a community indicates that it is willing to 
accept a lower level of cleanup, the cleanup at every brownfield site 
should be presumed to meet residential standards.637 This is the only 
approach that guarantees meaningful community involvement in 
cleanup standard setting. Ohio's approach-allowing individuals to 
coniment on statewide rules setting cleanup standards while preclud-
ing involvement by an affected community in setting the cleanup stan-
dard for an action affecting its health and welfare-is especially 
egregious in this respect. 
If the states will not take this action, another intriguing option is 
available to communities. They could conceivably use their zoning 
power to displace a generic cleanup standard. Unlike the negotiated 
compensation statutes, which prevent localities from adopting zoning 
provisions that would defeat proposed facilities,638 voluntary cleanup 
statutes contain no preemption provisions. In Michigan, for example, 
it does appear that redevelopment foes could achieve their goal 
through the zoning process. Michigan imposes an affirmative obliga-
tion to satisfy zoning requirements, because cleanups based on any 
635. H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 502 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA 
§ 121(b)(2)(B)). . 
636. See, e.g., Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 278. 
637. See, e.g., id. at 276 (testifying that Superfund cleanups "should routinely seek to make 
sites available for unrestricted (residential) land use, unless the proponent of a less-stringent 
cleanup can demonstrate that such a use is implausible"). It has been argued elsewhere that the 
appropriate response to a community's resistance to a more lenient cleanup standard is 
negotiation: 
For redevelopment to occur, the community and the developer, with the government's ap-
proval, must reach a point of equilibrium where the community is comfortable with the 
standard and the developer is willing and able to pay for the remediation. Assuming that 
the government considers the agreement an appropriate risk, then the developer's liability 
should be capped at that level of equilibrium. 
Kelly, supra note 540, at 781; see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 767. However, given the 
potential inequities of generic cleanup standards, and the disparity in technical and financial 
resources between developers and communities, any negotiations should start with a presump-
tion that differential cleanup standards are inapplicable. My proposal would give tlie initial enti-
tlement to the community, which it could bargain away, but only if it so chose. Cf McWilliams, 
supra note 20, at 767 (excluding the application of tiered cleanup standards from collaborative 
solutions). 
638. See supra note 503 and accompanying text. 
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land use other than residential are made expressly contingent on exist-
ence or adoption of appropriate zoning for the site.639 
3. Problems Related to State Decision Making 
The rise of the voluntary cleanup statutes is consistent with the 
trend of devolving responsibility for environmental protection to the 
states. The states are bearing an increased share of the environmental 
protection burden, and some states are moving forward aggressively 
with environmental protection programs. However, there is reason 
for concern. The federal environmental laws were developed in large 
part because the states' environmental protection efforts were viewed 
as dismal failures,640 and concern about state regulatory efforts has 
not abated.641 States may be inclined to approve less stringent clean-
ups at brownfield sites because they want to attract businesses and the 
tax revenues and jobs they provide.642 State involvement in both the 
negotiated compensation and voluntary cleanup contexts invites two 
specific forms of criticism: regulators are captured by pro-develop-
ment interests643 or are otherwise unaccountable to the public. 
a. Capture of State Regulators 
Developers have strong incentives to participate politically in the 
states' decisions influencing waste facility siting or brownfield sites.644 
The experience with the negotiated compensation statutes has evoked 
the frequent criticism that state regulators' decisions are swayed by 
the predominant influence of in<;tustrial interests. For example, state 
siting councils, established to make fundamental decisions in the 
waste facility siting process, were criticized for a lack of neutrality.645 
In the voluntary cleanup context, the various regulatory bodies estab-
639. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(6) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that 
the state may not apply remedial action plans specifying cleanups for any use other than residen-
tial use without documentation that "the current zoning of the property is consistent with the 
categorical criteria being proposed, or that the governing zoning authority intends to change the 
zoning designation so that the proposed criteria are consistent with the new zoning designation, 
or the current property use is a legal nonconforming use"). The state may not approve a reme-
dial action plan that depends on a zoning change, "until a final determination of that zoning 
change has been made by the local unit of government." Id. 
640. NAPA REPORT, supra note 3, at 14; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 111; James R.L. Jones, 
Beyond the Beltway Buzzwords, ENVTL F., SeptJOct. 1995, at 35. The most frequent criticism 
of the states' efforts is that those states interested in business projects will compete with other 
states to attract the projects by relaxing environmental standards and spurring a "race to the 
bottom." See Buzbee, supra note 26, at 11. 
641. See generally Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political In-
fluence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARYL. REV. 823 (1990) (discussing the limitations 
of state environmental protection efforts); Anderson, supra note 109, at 417-22; Buzbee, supra 
note 26, at 111. 
642. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 114-15. 
643. Butler, supra note 641, discusses this limitation of state environmental programs. 
644. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 113. . 
645. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277; cf. Krier, supra note 490, at 665 (suggesting that a 
lesson learned from the actions of California's Environmental Quality Study Council is that "en-
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lished to streamline the regulatory process feature little or no public 
representation. These include, for example, the bodies constituted to 
establish statewide health standards, as in Pennsylvania, where there 
will be few public representatives on the standard-setting board.646 
Ohio also empowers a "Property Revitalization Board," composed of 
state.bureaucrats, without representation from the public, to influence 
whether a variance should be granted from a specific cleanup standard 
at a given site.647 Experience from the nego~iated compensation con-
text suggests that unless there is more significant public representation 
on these boards to guarantee neutrality, they will be criticized as cap-
tured by the interests they purportedly regulate.648 A board such as 
Ohio's Property Revitalization Board appears to be a potential "regu-
latory 'backroom' for cutting deals that shift risk to the excluded com-
munity,"649 because it does not require any representation from 
affected communities. The states should take action to expand public 
representation in these bodies that will be making critical decisions in 
the voluntary cleanup programs.650 
b. The Lack of Meaningful State Oversight 
Besides the prospect of regulatory capture, there are other rea-
sons to be suspicious of the likely quality of state regulatory decision 
making in voluntary cleanup programs. By definition, the developer's 
compliance with the voluntary cleanup process earns it redu~ed over-
sight by state regulators, with streamlined regulation and limited like-
lihood of enforcement actions. In imposing time limits on various 
stages of the pr:oceedings, the states are embodying the spirit of what 
Gregg Easterbrook has called "ecorealism": .the preference for rapid, 
"reasonable" action over the "quest of hypothetical perfection" in sit-
ing decisions or cleanups.651 In many cases, the state's role in the 
cleanup at a brownfield site will be merely to confirm the soundness 
of what a developer has already done.652 In some cases, decisions will 
be devo,ved ev~n further to private individuals not responsible to the 
vironmental interests, as a general rule, will be underrepresented before legislative bodies, ad-
ministrative agencies, and courts"). 
646. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 6026.105(b) (West Supp. 1996). 
647. The "property revitalization board" consists of "the directors of commerce, develop-
ment, environmental protection, health, industrial relations, natural resources, and taxation or 
their designees." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.08 (Anderson 1995); see also McWilliams, 
supra note 20, at 771 (describing the proposal embodied in the statute); Michel, supra note 20, at 
463. 
648. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277. 
649. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 771. 
650. Kelly, supra note 540, at 782 (stating that "[p)articipation at this (state) level is central 
to the environmental justice movement and cannot be compromised in such redevelopment 
efforts"). 
651. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 611. 
652. This will be the case, for example, in states such as Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington (in the Independent Remedial Action Pro-
gram) that Confine their oversight role to approval of the reports submitted by the developer. 
1022 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1996 
public.653 A number of states, most notably Connecticut, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio, contemplate that regulators 
will approve the activities of developers and their licensed environ-
mental professionals without performing independent investigations. 
Given the lack of state resources to devote to oversight, the states will 
often-and intend to-find themselves rubber-stamping developers' 
decisions. For example, when a state is determining whether a 
cleanup is complete (e.g., for purposes of issuing a certificate of com-
pletion), it will often rely on an after-the-fact analysis of a licensed 
professional's assessment that the cleanup has been satisfactorily com-
pleted.654 Ohio has indicated that its goal is to audit only twenty-five 
percent of all cleanups.655 
This has the potential to undermine the public's confidence in 
state oversight abilities. Although purportedly devoted to serving the 
public interest, state regulators are making decisions that have the ap-
pearance of creating a deregulated climate for business interests.656 A 
developer can obtain the state's imprimatur regarding the finality of a 
cleanup, complete with liability protection, while leaving the impres-
sion that contamination remains unabated.657 Similar situations have 
arisen in the negotiated compensation context. Professor Wheeler 
states that the neutrality of the Massachusetts siting board was under-
mined in the public eye by the board's involvement in such decisions 
as certifying a project's feasibility.658 The states should guard the neu-
trality of their decision making by taking a more proactive role in 
overseeing the cleanups at brownfield sites and by rejecting ap-
proaches such as Ohio's assignment of responsibility to the private 
sector. This might take the form, for example, of adopting approaches 
such as those of Indiana, Vermont, and Wisconsin, with comprehen-
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.302-.304 (West Supp. 1996); see supra notes 362-68 and 
accompanying text. 
653. See, e.g., Mc Williams, supra note 20, at 751 (stating that under Ohio's statute, "remov-
ing the responsibility for assessing public risk one step further from an accountable public ser-
vant could make it more difficult for community activists to obtain full disclosure regarding 
contamination at a site"). 
654. See, e.g., 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(e)(4) (West Supp. 1996) (considering ap-
proval of the "Remedial Action Completion Report"). 
655. Ohio Voluntary Action Program, supra note 156, at 4 (stating that "Ohio EPA will 
audit at least 25 percent of the properties which have been cleaned up in the Voluntary Action 
Program to make sure that cleanup standards are met"); see also Andrew, supra note 29, at 29. 
656. See Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (testifying that "[t)he cleanup process 
will be streamlined, the regulatory approach is non-confrontational and emphasis is placed on 
achieving compliance-not heavy-handed enforcement actions"); McWilliams, supra note 20, at 
772. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this new attitude is the large logo on Ohio's 
Internet (World Wide Web) site, which displays the word "SUE" with the international sign for 
"no" prominently displayed across it. Ohio Voluntary Action Program, supra note 156, at 1. 
657. See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 29, at 31. 
658. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 277. 
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sive state involvement and oversight in the redevelopment and 
cleanup process.659 
4. Moral Hazards 
There are serious moral questions raised by programs that have 
as their express goal rewarding voluntary participation by developers, 
as is the case under both types of statutes. 
·a. Promoting Effective Risk Communication 
~oth types of statute make the fundamental assumption that re-
quiring developers to communicate environmental risks accurately to 
the community would frustrate the goals of the statute. Thus, in 
neither case is the developer forced to fully disclose environmental 
risks to the community. The risk communication provisions of the 
voluntary cleanup statutes are thin, typically requiring only that the 
developer notify the public of its proposed remediation activities.660 
Given the lack of knowledge· in most communities about basic risk 
concepts,661 let alone the ability to understand complicated informa-
tion necessary to make a judgment on a brownfield redevelopment 
project, this turns effective decision making on its head.662 Communi-
ties' abilities to judge project risks require a careful presentation of 
evidence about risks,663 not ineffective risk communication. This is 
particularly true in the context of cleanup of contaminated sites, be-
cause current risk assessment methodologies have shortcomings that 
must be presented as qualifications to the community.664 
In the negotiated compensation context, it turned out to be a seri-
mis mistake to rely upon companies' voluntary disclosures. Commu-
nities distrusted promises made to them about companies' 
environmental records.665 This was particularly true in one case in 
Massachusetts where the developer obfuscated the risks by refusing to 
disclose what wastes it would treat at the site.666 To avoid this result, 
states should require developers to make a more substantial effort to 
659. See Frisman, supra note 383' (citing statements by Donald S. Strait, Executive Director 
of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, criticizing the proposal to rely upon licensed 
environmental professionals for voluntary cleanups, expressing concern that "the [Connecticut 
DEP] won't give LEPs enough guidance, ... [and that] the department should retain its supervi-
sory role"). 
660. See supra notes 382-93 and accompanying text. 
661. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and 
Risk Communication, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 527, at 48, 50; EPA/ATSDR BASE-
LINE SURVEY, supra note 585, at 99. 
662. EPNATSDR BASELINE SURVEY, supra note 585, at 99. 
663. Slovic, supra note 661, at 62. 
664. See, e.g., Brian D. Israel, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 469, 520-22 (1995). 
665. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 269. 
666. The would-be developer in Warren, Massachusetts, "antagonized local residents and 
state officials by refusing to reveal what kinds of wastes it intended to treat." Id. at 259. 
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educate the community about the risks involved in a voluntary 
remediation project. The California provision requiring the informa-
tion to be provided to the community is a good starting point.667 
Before development activities proceed, developers should be required 
to conduct targeted educational programs to explain the risks of 
brownfield projects to affected communities. 
b. Some Developers Are Not "Good Actors" 
There are additional moral hazards in the brownfield context. 
The reduced likelihood of enforcement actions guarantees that the 
primary responsibility for ensuring cleanups' efficacy rests with the 
developers. The "reopener" provisions in many statutes that allow 
the state to sue the developer if it violates the terms of its agreement 
may not be invoked668 or may come into play too late669 to stop irre-
versible damage. 
The states therefore place a premium on trusting developers to be 
"good actors,"670 that is, entities with good environmental records. 
But, as in the negotiated compensation context, there are reasons to 
be wary of developers' honesty.671 The expense of site assessment 
may limit participation in the process to large corporations with sus-
pect environmental records because "they alone have the funds to in-
vest in site assessment and cleanup. "672 Because developers 
voluntarily provide information to regulatory agencies that might later 
use it against them in enforcement actions,673 the potential exists for 
deceitful behavior. Developers can obscure the real nature of con-
667. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 25398.6(i)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring informa-
tion to be provided that includes "an assessment of the degree of contamination, [and] the char-
acteristics of the hazardous substances"). 
668. In this era of limited enforcement resources, the state may be too preoccupied with 
other enforcement actions to revisit the subject of the efficacy of a clea11up at a brownfield site. 
669. Solo, supra note 23, at 308-09. If a site is initially cleaned up to meet standards applica-
ble to commercial and industrial uses, it may be too late to clean up the property later, when 
converting the site to residential use: "A change in use from industrial to residential, or to a 
school or playground could have serious results if cleanup procedures are not extremely protec-
tive from the outset." Id. at 309; see also McWilliams, supra note 20, at 743. 
670. See, e.g., Dunlop Testimony, supra note 123, at 237 (testifying that Virginia's voluntary 
remediation program rewards "good actors"). 
671. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 77 (citing "an unfortunate history of environmental 
misdeeds and a deep public skepticism" as factors inhibiting redeveloPIJlent). Even if develop-
ers are honest, there is no guarantee that contamination has been remediated. Cleanups may fail 
to work after the state has certified their effectiveness. 
672. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 737; see also Clokey, supra note 26, at 43 (noting that the 
Wisconsin program will "see its primary application in the purchase of large industrial properties 
where the parties can afford the costs of investigation and cleanup and can tolerate the delays 
inherent in administration of the program"). 
673. If a cleanup proves ineffective, or if additional contamination is discovered later, a state 
retains all of its enforcement authority to force a cleanup at the site. See, e.g., O'Reilly, Indi-
ana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 62. O'Reilly notes that this gives a developer an incentive to 
"make the site cleanup successful." Id. This assumes that developers are concerned with envi-
ronmental liability only in the short term. If a developer knows it may face liability in the future, 
it may conceal contamination and rely on the state's lack of investigative resources. 
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tamination at a brownfield site in a number of ways.674 They can build 
a structure or other improvement that makes discovery and cleanup of 
contamination more difficult.675 In addition, because they are assess-
ing and remediating the preexisting level of contamination, developers 
are not guaranteeing that they will not cause pollution in the future.676 
The states should extend additional consideration to the existing 
environmental record of their remediators. States currently allowing 
PRPs to take part in their programs should disqualify them from par-
ticipating, as these parties have demonstrated that there are reasons 
for serious concern about their environmental records. A person's 
conduct elsewhere should be relevant as well. Developers should not 
be required to have faultless records; however, a pattern of violations 
at other sites may be a sign of potential problems in the cleanup at a 
brownfield site. Thus, a developer's persistent failure to comply with 
state and federal environmental laws at other sites and facilities 
should disqualify that developer from participation in a state's volun-
tary cleanup program. "Persistent failure" could be defined with ref-
erence to pending enforcement actions but should also incorporate 
considerations for past conduct viewed as egregious. 
5. The Failure to Address Central Issues 
Finally, proponents of both statutes oversell their ability to ad-
dress the underlying problems that the statutes are intended to ad-
dress. Both involve the states taking the lead to solve a national 
problem with local land use implications, NIMBY-ism and the oner-
ous nature of Superfund liability, respectively, in situations where the 
federal government is perceived as either unable or unwilling to ad-
dress the central issue. 
a. The Shortcomings of Site-Specific Urban Development 
The negotiated compensation statutes failed in part because they 
did not address the central concern of their proponents: pervasive 
NIMBY-ism. Perhaps their greatest failure in this regard was assum-
ing that a site-specific approach to development would work.677 The 
statutes, with their focus on benefits and costs of individual projects, 
addressed only the dynamic in a single community. The offer of com-
pensation, no matter how lucrative, could not prevent a community 
from resisting a facility and forcing it to go elsewhere. The commu-
nity, in other words, was not required to internalize the external costs 
674. See generally RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 20-21. 
675. Id. at 21; Solo, supra note 23, at 309 (noting that "[t]he prospect of conducting full site 
remediation after foundations and buildings have been constructed on the property could be 
enormously costly"). 
676. RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 26, at 20-21. A developer may also be a 
"good actor," but lack the ability to control future contamination at the site. See id. 
677. Wheeler, supra note 481, at 282. 
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imposed on the unfortunate community that wound up hosting the 
waste facility. Professor Wheeler, an original supporter of the negoti-
ated compensation statutes, now calls for structured regionwide dis-
cussions of waste facility siting to address this concern.678 
As in the negotiated compensation context, a more comprehen-
sive solution to the brownfield paradox may be the adoption of a 
more regional approach to urban development, instead of the piece-
meal, site-specific development approaches inherent in voluntary 
cleanup programs.679 The voluntary cleanup statutes may not be suc-
cessful in reversing the loss of worthy projects to greenfield locations. 
States tend to sidestep the question of how much their voluntary 
cleanup programs will benefit the local economy. Cleanups may still 
be too difficult680 or perceived as too expensive for redevelopment 
activities to take place,681 unless the real costs of suburban and ex-
urban development are factored into the decision. Moreover, clean-
ing up a site and resolving liability problems of owners and lenders 
does nothing to address the other barriers to redevelopment, such as 
the crime rates and shrinking population bases near brownfield 
sites.682 Although some form of regional approach may be necessary, 
the design of a regional land development process is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
b. The Need for Effective Federal Involvement 
Without some form of federal approval of states' actions, states 
cannot address what developers term the central issue in brownfield 
policy-the fear of environmental liability.683 State agreements to 
limit liability, release prospective purchasers, or certify a site as clean 
do not preclude private party lawsuits684 or interfere with the EPA's 
678. Id. at 281-82 (calling for regional interdependence and reciprocity in the siting process). 
679. See Dinsmore, supra note 24, at 17. 
680. O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 64-65 (noting that "three of the earliest 
projects [under the Indiana program] involved groundwater contaminant cleanup, one of the 
most challenging environmental remedies"). 
681. Solo, supra note 23, at 313 (noting that liability releases may not encourage prospective 
purchasers to develop on brownfield sites if they have to pay remediation costs). Casserly, supra 
note 26, at 272, cites one example of a site in Minnesota that remains undeveloped notwithstand-
ing the incentives offered by the state. 
682. Voluntary Cleanup Programs Downplay Enforcement, Emphasize Cooperation, Haz. 
Waste News, Apr. 3, 1995 (quoting Lydia Duff of the Baltimore firm Miles & Stockbridge), 
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2407170. 
683. See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that "[o]ne option is to en-
courage the development of credible, EPA-certified state voluntary cleanup programs that allow 
states to define a remediation process, and give states final oversight and sign-off on remedia-
tions at low and medium priority sites"); NEPI WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 37; OTA STATE 
OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26; Buzbee, supra note 26, at 48 n.36 (citing the statement of 
Mark Anderson, Editor of The Greenfields Report, Comments at the 1995 University of Geor-
gia Red Clay Conference (Mar. 11, 1995) that "state programs are a step in the right direction, 
but ... a federal signoff is needed to reduce disincentives to voluntary cleanups"). 
684. OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305; OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 
26. 
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ability to bring a RCRA or CERCLA enforcement action in states 
where the applicable EPA Region has not entered into a "Superfund 
Memorandum of Agreement" with the state.685 Professor Buzbee 
notes that CERCLA is the only major federal environmental statute 
that lacks a "feedback" mechanism whereby a developer or state gov-
ernment can obtain a federal response about the legality of its con-
duct. 686 The need for some form of approval will become particularly 
acute as the states, in their zeal to redefine cleanup standards and of-
fer liability protection, create programs that depart further from 
CERCLA's mandates.687 
Untilthe EPA offers significant releases from liability or cove-
nants not to sue under federal law, or CERCLA is reformed to rede-
fine the federal role at sites taking part in a state program,688 state 
brownfield programs will face some uncertainty.689 Some commenta-
tors suggest that sites will be developed even without releases from 
federal liability, noting that the EPA will focus its limited enforcement 
resources on NPL sites, not brownfield sites (which typically are not 
on the NPL).690 They also claim that if a state informs a developer 
that the site is clean, that would constitute a defense against federal 
enforcement action.691 But it is also possible that in a state such as 
Ohio or Pennsylvania, the EPA will monitor the state program by 
commencing enforcement actions at high profile sites.692 Although 
the risk of this occurring is probably min:imal,693 it leaves an amount 
685. Pennsylvania Chamber Testimony, supra note 74, at 258 (claiming that the Pennsylvania 
voluntary remediation statute "cannot overcome the major disincentives that the federal 
Superfund's liability system produces"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26; 
Clokey, supra note 26, at 38; McWilliams, supra note 20, at 733; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, 
supra note 24, at 59-60; Solo, supra note 23, at 288 n.20 (stating that ·"[s)tate and local laws, 
however, cannot override federal Jaw, and sites that contain sufficient contamination, which have 
been targeted by the federal government will still be dealt with under CERCLA"); Jones, supra 
note 156; see OTA Testimony, supra note 20, at 305. 
686. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 71-72. 
687. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26. 
688. See supra notes 448-70 and accompanying text. 
689. Jones, supra note 156. 
690. Berger et al., supra note 23, at 96 (stating that "[b)ecause the sites which are the focus 
of this report would have made it to neither the state nor the federal priority list, chances are 
slim that they will ever be the target of a federal Superfund action"); O'Reilly, Indiana's Incen-
tives, supra note 24, at 60. However, this might not be the case in a.state where virtually any site 
qualifies for the voluntary cleanup program. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
691. O'Reilly, lndiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 59 (suggesting that "federal comity" 
gives the developer "an implicit shield against the threat of federal cleanup action suits" if it 
complies with a state's requirements). One commentator goes further, suggesting that "volun-
tary cleanup activity [in a state program] should be asserted as a defense at federal environmen-
tal enforcement proceedings." Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165. However, this would fit none of 
the commonly available defenses to a CERCLA action. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(b)(3) (1994). 
692. McWilliams, supra note 20, at 733; Casserly, supra note 26, at 272 (stating that "[o]ne of 
the biggest complaints of developers is the remote, but possible threat that the U.S. EPA will 
target a 'recycled' parcel through the federal Superfund program"). 
693. Casserly, supra note 26, at 272. The EPA's guidance memo on Prospective Purchaser 
Agreements supports this proposition, suggesting that "future EPA activity at such a site [being 
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of uncertainty that may discourage brownfield investments. There is 
also the uncertainty generated by the state's ability to sue for addi-
tional contamination discovered at the site.694 
In sum, the federal government may be "in the best position to. 
define a framework for determining the true risks involved with old 
industrial sites and to identify standards for cleanup and remedia-
tion. "695 This could be accomplished in a number of ways. Congress 
could redefine the CERCLA cleanup standards, as Title I of the Re-
form of Superfund Act proposes to do.696 The EPA could be more 
aggressive in entering into more Prospective Purchaser Agreements697 
or entering into other agreements, such as the Superfund Memoran-
dum of Agreement between EPA Region V and Minnesota, to recog-
nize the primacy of state voluntary cleanup programs.698 Professor 
Buzbee suggests that the EPA go further and develop an omnibus 
"Cleanup Approval Process" (CAP} that would delegate authority to 
the states but retain federal oversight and review capabilities.699 The 
CAP scheme would involve a federally created model cleanup process 
that states could implement and administer in a fashion similar to 
state administration of the Clean Water Act or Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act permit schemes.700 A considerable disadvan-
tage of this approach is that it would almost certainly require 
congressional action to alter the basic nature of the Superfund 
cleanup and settlement scheme. 701 The EPA has not shown interest to 
date in creating a federal voluntary cleanup program, viewing it as a 
dilution of the statutory mandate to clean up hazardous waste sites 
and punish the responsible parties. 702 Congress appears more inclined 
to provide credibility to the state programs with some form of explicit 
cleaned up in a state program] is extremely unlikely." MAY 1995 PPA GUIDANCE MEMORAN-
DUM, supra note 440. 
694. Solo, supra note 23, at 301. 
695. Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 30. 
696. A number of panelists at the National Environmental Policy Institute's recent forum 
advocated this approach. NEPI BROWNFlELDS PouCY FoRuM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 
11 (stating that "many panelists looked to Superfund reauthorization as the catalyst for rational-
izing cleanup standards"). 
6CJ"7. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165, advocates this approach. 
698. See supra note 348. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection is ne-
gotiating a "Performance Partnership" with the EPA's Region III, which may include a provision 
that the EPA will not initiate federal enforcement actions at sites taking part in the Pennsylvania 
program. PENNSYLVANIA Six-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 13. The DEP has 
also participated in discussions aimed at developing a model Superfund Memorandum of Agree-
ment. Id. 
699. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 41-42, 100-04. A CAP scheme would involve developers and 
the EPA in agreeing to consent decrees that would differ from current consent decrees negoti-
ated under CERCLA in a number of respects. For example, a CAP consent decree would pre-
clude future state and federal enforcement actions. Id. at 103. 
700. Id. at 100-04, 115. 
701. Id. at 100-01 (stating that because "it is unlikely EPA would ever voluntarily create 
such a procedure, ... statutory modification is likely necessary"). 
702. Id. at 95, 106. 
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approval of state programs from the EPA, such as that contemplated 
under the approval process proposed in Title III of ROSA. 
As the Office of Technology Assessment has recognized, the rela-
tionship between the state and federal governments in this area re-
quires considerable attention, far more attention than Title III of 
ROSA empowers the EPA to devote to the task.703 One state official 
testifying before Congress strongly opposed federal involvement in 
approving state voluntary cleanup programs.704 Federal oversight, 
however, is necessary to ensure the efficacy of cleanups,705 and federal 
approval of state programs should be a condition to any decision to 
certify cleanups.706 Federal approval can reduce the state's ability to 
approve lax cleanups and provide developers with additional 
certainty. 707 
Given this, there are reasons to be concerned about the effective-
ness of the proposed system of approvals. There would be no oppor-
tunity for public participation in the decisions.708 The EPA's ability to 
disapprove a state's program would be severely limited.709 Under the 
proposal, it could not, for example, consider a state's prior perform-
ance in supervising remedial actions (e.g., under a state's CERCLA 
law). If the EPA were concerned that a state might sanction cleanups 
that did not protect the environment, its ability to disapprove the pro-
gram or condition approval on the adoption of modifications would be 
limited.710 An application would be deemed approved unless EPA 
703. OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26. 
704. Kahoe Testimony, supra note 459 (testifying that "[w]e strongly oppose expansion of 
federal.authority to [brownfield] sites, a situation which would only add to the time~ cost, and 
complexity of a working system"). Deputy Secretary Kahoe testified that the state of California 
was working with the EPA's Region IX to secure an administrative release for sites in the Cali-
fornia cleanup program. Id. 
705. See supra notes 651-59 and accompanying text (regarding the legitimacy of state deci-
sion making in the brownfield context); see also Buzbee, supra note 26, at 110-11. 
706. Buzbee, supra note 26, at 115. 
707. Id. 
708. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304.(1995); Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 
279. This is especially troubling, given the ability of federal involvement to offset the ability of 
developers to influence political choices at the state and local level. See Buzbee, supra note 26, 
at 115. 
709. Section 304 would allow the EPA Administrator to disapprove a state's application 
only if the Administrator finds that "the State does not have the legal authority and the financial 
and personnel resources, organization, and expertise to carry out such [a] remedial action pro-
gram." H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995). The Administrator would not be able to 
place any condition on approval. See id. A disapproval of a state program would be subject to 
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act as a "final agency action." Id.; see 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (provision for judicial review of a "final agency action"). · 
710. The EPA might be expected, for example, to express concern about the delegation of 
decision-making responsibility to private individuals in the Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, and Ohio programs. See OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, at 26 
(noting that the EPA viewed unfavorably a proposal in the Illinois legislature to privatize the 
cleanup process and "only involv[e] the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA} on 
completion of remediation to enable closure at a site with a [no action] letter by the state"). 
However, it could not reject the state's program on that basis, nor could it condition approval on 
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disapproved it within sixty days.711 This has been called "an absurdly 
inadequate period given the massively increased workload imposed by 
other provisions of the [Superfund reform] bill as well as the lack of 
resources provided."712 Although there is a provision for withdrawal 
of federal approval if the EPA finds deficiencies in the program,713 
that too is subject to criticism if the EPA is not provided sufficient 
resources to monitor state performance. 
Title Ill's proposal to exempt from CERCLA liability sites that 
have been cleaned up in an approved state program amounts to a li-
cense to evade CERCLA's protective cleanup standards.714 At a min-
imum, the EPA must be given latitude to disapprove of a 
nonconforming program on substantive grounds (e.g., if the cleanup 
standards are not strict enough, in the EPA's view, to protect health 
and the environment).715 The EPA must require that a state's pro-
gram provide for effective public participation, both in decision mak-
ing at individual sites and in statewide fora that set brownfield 
policy.716 Finally, because the states' programs are evolving rapidly, 
the states should be required to recertify their programs frequently: 
Representative Visclosky proposes that this take place every two 
years.717 
V. CONCLUSION 
The incentives for brownfield redevelopment are based on a 
"Brownfields of Dreams" premise: "if you provide the appropriate 
climate, they [developers] will clean and invest."718 At the National 
Environmental Policy lnstitute's brownfield policy forum, Mary Gade, 
the state's adoption of more comprehensive review procedures. See H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 304 (1995). 
711. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995). 
712. Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 279 (adding that "the bill elevates the form of 
federalism over the substance of cleanup"). For an opposing view, see Kahoe Testimony, supra 
note 459 (stating that "[i]nstead of applying [the release from liability] voluntarily or as a matter 
of state right, litle III exacts the price of federal review and approval of state laws that are now 
solely within the purview of the states"). · 
713. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1995). 
714. NEPI BROWNFIELDS PouCY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 26 (citing the 
statement of Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) that "minimum standards must still be met 
[because] 'a race to the bottom must be avoided'"); OTA STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 20, 
at 26 (stating that the EPA's difficult task in this area is to "develop criteria for agreements that 
would be flexible enough to meet individual state needs, yet rigorous enough to ensure adequate 
cleanups"). 
715. See Fiorini Testimony, supra note 448, at 279 (criticizing the Reform of Superfund Act 
because "EPA's sole ground for rejecting a delegation application is that the state lacks adequate 
authority," and neither the "adequacy of resources" or "the state's prior performance" are 
considered.). 
716. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 26 (citing the 
statement of Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) calling for this requirement). 
717. Id. 
718. NEPI BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 27 (quoting the 
statement of Charles Bartsch, Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast-Midwest Institute). 
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Director of the Illinois EPA, was asked "whether investors would still 
prefer greenfields to brownfields if public participation requirements 
were too onerous." She responded that Illinois does not mandate 
public participation.719 Proponents of the voluntary cleanup statutes 
say that the command-and-control regime of pollution control laws 
has backfired, in this case spawning a pervasive fear of environmental 
liability that chills productive redevelopment. Cleanups, they say, are 
too slow and expensive, and only a streamlined cleanup process with 
economic incentives to developers will get abandoned sites back into 
commerce. The transition away from the rigorous cleanup standards 
of the regulatory regime, however, is prompting the states to move too 
far to relax cleanup standards and requirements for contaminated 
sites, jeopardizing public health and safety. Experience from the ne-
gotiated compensation context, moreover, shows that the voluntary 
cleanup statutes. may fail to attain the goal of revitalizing moribund 
urban economies. 
As one commentator notes, the "ultimate test of success" of the 
programs established for brownfield cleanups is "the development of 
procedures that ensure the legitimate remediation of contaminated in-
dustrial property."720 The nascent state voluntary cleanup programs 
stake a claim to legitimacy with their frequent references to "re-
cycling" and "reuse. "721 All recycling activities are not beneficial, 
however,722 and neither are the state programs, in their present form. 
Some states' voluntary cleanup programs may produce abandoned 
cleanups, not clean up abandoned sites.723 
The shortcomings of the state programs include the lack of effec-
tive public participation, the likelihood that state regulators will be 
captured by industry or otherwise unaccountable to the public, and 
the moral hazards inherent in trusting developers' motives and ac-
tions. Experience with the negotiated compensation statutes suggests 
that, without statutory amendments to address these concerns, even 
meritorious projects will be stymied by local resistance. The states 
must provide for meaningful opportunities for community input in the 
719. See id. at 24. 
720. Sweeney, supra note 20, at 165. 
721. Stakeholders in the brownfield debate frequently use the tenns "recycling" and "reuse" 
to invoke the image of pollution prevention (that is, by preventing the despoliation of green-
fields by reusing brownfield sites). See, e.g., Bartsch Testimony, supra note 22, at 25; NWF Testi-
mony, supra note 66, at 606 (calling brownfield redevelopment a fonn of pollution prevention); 
Berger et al., supra note 23, at 73; O'Reilly, Indiana's Incentives, supra note 24, at 47-49 (describ-
ing "recycling [of] manufacturing sites in the inner city"); Solo, supra note 23, at 326 (stating that 
"[s]afely redeveloping previously contaminated sites is essentially 'recycling' of industrial land"). 
722. "Recycling" involves some activities so dangerous that fonner recycling facilities find 
their way on to the NPL in substantial numbers. See Philip L. Comella, Understanding a Sham: 
When ls Recycling, Treatment?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 415 (1993); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Solid 
Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 EcoLOGY L.Q. 
623, 634 (1989); Barry Needleman, Hazardous Waste Recycling Under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act: Problems and Potential Solutions, 24 ENVTL. L. 971 (1994). 
723. See Pendergrass, supra note 26, at 6. 
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process, both in the planning stage and during the cleanup process. 
The suspect legitimacy of the states' decision making under voluntary 
cleanup statutes should be addressed by increased public participation 
in statewide decision-making bodies. The moral hazards should be 
addressed by amendments requiring effective risk communication and 
disqualifying prospective developers who are not "good actors." Fi-
nally, the EPA should be given authority to disapprove of a state's 
program if it does not impose protective cleanup standards or provide 
for effective community input. Then, and only then, will the voluntary 
cleanup programs begin to fulfill their tremendous promise. 
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APPENDIX: AUTHORITIES FOR STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP 
PROGRAMS 
States' voluntary cleanup programs operate under a combination 
of authorities. These include new statutes intended to promote volun-
tary cleanups, existing statutory authorities (typiCally state CERCLA 
laws), regulations promulgated under th~ authority of new statutes, 
existing regulations, and informal policy and guidance documents. 
In the following list, the first citation is to the legislative enaet-
ment commonly considered to be the "voluntary cleanup statute" (ab-
breviated herein as VCP Statute). The second citation, where 
applicable, is to regulations promulgated under the authority of that 
statute (abbreviated herein as VCP Regs). The third and fourth cita-
tions, where applicable, are to state CERCLA laws and regulations 
promulgated thereunder, where applicable (abbreviated, respectively, 
as State CERCLA Law and State CERCLA Regs). If a state bases a 
feature of its program substantially on guidance or policy documents, 
that fact is noted as well. Indiana's voluntary cleanup statute, for ex-
ample, makes no reference to applicable cleanup standards; that fea-
ture of the program is dealt with in guidance documents. Telephone 
Interviews, supra note 160. 
The programs in Iowa and Kansas are pilot projects and are listed 
as such in this appendix. The Utah statute is listed; however, no de-
veloper has entered into an agreement in the Utah program. See 
supra note 158. Connecticut's program includes a voluntary cleanup 
program that operates in conjunction with the requirements of the 
Transfer Act (with authorities listed below as State Transfer Act/VCP 
Statute) and the Urban Sites Remedial Action Program (with authori-
ties listed below as VCP Statute). 
STATE 
ARIZONA: 
ARKANSAS: 
CALIFORNIA: 
AUTHORITIES 
VCP Statute: 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(B) (West 
Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
ARK. CooE ANN. §§ 8-7-503, -520(a), -523 
(Michie Supp. 1995). 
(brownfield program that the state is 
considering merging with existing 
administrative voluntary cleanup program; 
see Telephone Interviews, supra note 160) 
VCP Statute (Expedited Remedial Action 
Program): 
1034 
COLORADO: 
CONNECTICUT: 
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CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25396-
25399.2 (West Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 67401-67401.12 
(WESTLAW through Oct. 25, 1996). 
(regulations for ERAP) 
State CERCLA Law: 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25201.9 
(West Supp. 1996) 
(authorizing charges for consultation) 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25396-
25399.2 (West Supp. 1996). 
(elements of Voluntary Cleanup Program) 
VCP Statute: 
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-16-301 to -311 (West 
Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
State Transfer Act/VCP Statute: 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 22a-452d, -452e, 
-432, -133k, -134(e), -133(0), -133(p), -134d 
(West 1995); 1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 190 §§ 1-6, 
14). 
(allowing additional voluntary cleanups; 
defining the role of LEPs and other issues) 
1995 Conn. Pub. Acts 183. 
(redefining responsibilities under the transfer 
act) 
VCP Statute: 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133m (West 
1995). 
(Urban Sites Remedial Action Program) 
State Transfer Act Regs: 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-133k (West 
1995). 
(authorizing regulations for all hazardous 
substance spill sites) 
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 22a-133k-1 to -3 
(WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996). 
(defining cleanup standards) 
VCP Regs: 
CONN. AGENCIES REGS.§§ 22a-133m-1 to -3 
(WESTLAW through Sept. 24, 1996). 
(governing Type III site cleanup process in 
the USRAP) 
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DELAWARE: 
ILLINOIS: 
INDIANA: 
low A: 
KANSAS: 
LOUISIANA: 
MAINE: 
MASSACHUSETTS: 
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State CERCLA Law: 
70 Del. Laws ch. 218 (1995), amending DEL 
CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 9101-9120. 
State CERCLA Regs: 
Delaware Regulations Governing Hazardous 
Substance Cleanup §§ 1-15 (1996). 
VCP Statute: 
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58-58.12 (West 
Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
State CERCLA Law: 
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22.2 (West Supp. 
1996). 
VCP Statute: 
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-1 to -23 
(WESTLAW through end of 1996 2d Reg. 
Sess.). 
VCP Regs: 
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
Guidance Documents: 
Define applicable cleanup standards. 
Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
Pilot project. 
Pilot project. 
VCP Statute: 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2272.1, :2285-90 
(West Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
None at present. 
VCP Statute: 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E (West 
Supp. 1995). 
VCP Regs: 
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
State CERCLA Law: 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (West 
Supp. 1996). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 4.01-.10 
(WESTLAW through Reg. No. 794). 
(fee structure) 
Id. § 40.0001-.1600. 
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(Massachusetts Contingency Plan) 
MICHIGAN: State CERCLA Law: 
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.20101 to 
-.20142 (West Supp. 1996). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 299.5101-.5823 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 
Release). 
(cleanup standards to be defined in MICH. 
ADMIN. CoDE r. 299.5701-.5727) 
MINNESOTA: VCP Statute: 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 115B.175-.179 (West 
Supp. 1995). 
State CERCLA Law: 
Id. § 115B.17. 
(directing that land use be taken into account 
in setting of cleanup standards) 
Guidance Documents: 
Define a number of program features, 
including the scope of certain liability 
assurances. See supra note 176. 
MISSOURI: VCP Statute: 
Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 260.565-.575 (West Supp. 
1996). 
VCP Regs: 
Mo. CoDE REGS. ANN. tit. 10, § 25-15.010 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 
Release). 
Guidance Documents: 
Define applicable cleanup standards. See 
Helfrich, supra note 156; Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160. 
MONTANA: VCP Statute: 
MONT. CODE. ANN.§§ 75-10-701, -721, -722 
(1995); id. §§ 75-10-730 to -738. 
VCP Regs: 
None expected. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
NEBRASKA: VCP Statute: 
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-15,181 to -15,188 
(WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.). 
VCP Regs: 
None. 
NEw HAMPSHIRE: VCP Statute: 
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NEW JERSEY: 
NEW YORK:. 
NORTH 
CAROLINA: 
OHIO: 
OREGON: 
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None. Program operates under administrative 
discretion. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 
77-78. 
State Transfer Act: 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West Supp. 
1996). 
State Transfer Act Regs: 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, chs. 26C, E 
(WESTLAW through Aug. 19, 1996). 
VCP Statute: 
None. Program operates under administrative 
discretion. COMING CLEAN, supra note 24, at 
84-85. 
VCP Statute: 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.8, -310.9, -310.12 
(1995). 
VCP Regs: 
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
Siate CERCLA Law: 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310 to -310.23 
(1995). 
(defining certain features of current program; 
see Survey Results, supra note 158) 
Guidance Documents: 
Define most features of current program . 
. Telephone Interviews, supra note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 3746.01-.99 
. (Anderson 1995 & Supp. 1995). 
· VCP Regs: . 
OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-01, 3745-300-
03 to -05, 3745-300-12 to -14, 3745-300-99 
(WESTLAW through Aug. 31, 1996). . 
VCP Statute: 
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 465.315, -.325 (Supp. 1996); 
1995 Or. Laws 662, §§ 4, 8 (to be codified at 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 465.200-.455). 
VCP Regs: 
Required to be promulgated by 1997 for 
certain aspects of the 1995 law; applicable to 
other cleanups as well; forthcoming. Survey 
Results, supra note 158; Telephone Interviews, 
supra note 160. 
State CERCLA Law: 
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PENNSYLVANIA: 
RHODE ISLAND: 
TENNESSEE: 
TEXAS: 
UTAH: 
VERMONT: 
VIRGINIA: 
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 465.200-.391 (Supp. 1996). 
State CERCLA Regs: ' 
OR. ADMIN. R. 340-122-010 to -140 
(WESTLAW through Oct. 31, 1995). 
VCP Statute: 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.101-.908 (West 
Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
In development. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-19.14.1 to -19, 23-63-4.2 
(Supp. 1995). 
VCP Regs: 
In development and will include generic 
cleanup standards. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212(4), -207(b), -224 
(Supp. 1995). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
TENN. CoMP. R. & REGS. §§ 1200-1-13-.01 to 
-.13 (WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 
Release). 
VCP Statute: 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 361.601-
.613, 361.133(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
21 Tex. Reg. 3203 (WESTLAW, Apr. 12, 1996) 
(adopting 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §§ 333.1-.11). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 335.554-.569 
(WESTLAW through Jan. 1, 1996). 
(defining applicable cleanup standards) 
VCP Statute: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-325 (1995). 
VCP Regs: 
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a (Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
VCP Statute: 
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WASHINGTON: 
WISCONSIN: 
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VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to .3 (Michie 
Supp. 1996). 
VCP Regs: 
Forthcoming. See supra note 175. 
State CERCLA Law: 
WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 70.1050.010 to 
.921 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 173-340-100 to -890 
(WESTLAW through July 24, 1996). 
(Independent Remedial Action Program is 
found in w ASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-
550(7).) 
VCP Statute: 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1995). 
VCP Regs: 
None at present. Telephone Interviews, supra 
note 160. 
State CERCLA Law: 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.442, 144.76 (West 1989 
& Supp. 1995). 
State CERCLA Regs: 
Wis. ADMIN. CODE chs. NR 140, 700-726 
(WESTLAW through ENFLEX Aug. 1996 
Release). · 

